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Introduction
Suburban governments are becoming ever more adventuresome in
their efforts to control housing development. Some have imposed
temporary moratoria on new growth. Others have adopted quotas on
residential construction or subjected developers to exotic taxes or
charges. Controversy over these devices has pushed a fistful of small
towns into the national spotlight: Petaluma, California; Black Jack,
Missouri; Ramapo, New York; Mount Laurel, New Jersey.'
Because state legislatures have placed few tethers on municipal ef-
forts to limit growth, courts have felt compelled to shoulder the burden
of guarding against suburban abuses. The thousands of lawsuits
brought by land developers2 (and on occasion civil rights groups3) to
challenge growth controls, however, have yet to yield a coherent set of
legal doctrines for limiting the range of municipal discretion. As an
initial matter, there is no consensus on how courts should deal with
challenges to specific suburban strategies like large-lot zoning, the
exaction of park land from subdividers, and moratoria on sewer con-
nections. Even the most thoughtful judicial opinions and academic
commentaries on these issues have placed insufficient emphasis on
their interconnectedness. As a result, a complicated and confusing case
law has evolved into a series of irrational pigeonholes. Current ambi-
guities frustrate both land developers, who are uncertain what they
may do, and suburban officials, who are uncertain what they may stop.
This article seeks to help remedy the current confusion. Specifically,
it employs economic and legal analysis in an attempt to establish a
comprehensive set of legal doctrines defining the rights of suburbs,
landowners, and housing consumers. It also sets out the remedies that
should be available to each group when those rights are violated.
Part I introduces and develops the relationships among the devices
local governments use to limit new housing construction. Economic
analysis is used to show their potential impact on housing prices and
1. I can offer two hypotheses to explain why urban growth issues are now arousing
more political controversy than before. First, the 1970s have been marked by sharply
increased concern about environmental conditions generally. Second, the postwar baby
boom has reached the household-formation stage. The resulting increase in demand for
housing will probably make the 1970s a recordbreaking decade for housing production.
2. From 1972 to 1975, the growth-control program of Fairfax County, Virginia,
triggered 231 state court suits. Wash. Post, June 17, 1975, § C, at 1, col. 5.
3. E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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the amount of housing built. Part II illustrates how the incidence of
the benefits and burdens of growth controls combines with the
political structure of suburban municipalities to create a bias against
growth. The upshot is that suburban homeowners (if unconstrained)
will behave like a profit-maximizing cartel.
The next six Parts invoke economic theory to determine what legal
entitlements among local governments, landowners, and housing con-
sumers are most likely to promote efficiency and fairness. Part III
initiates this endeavor by applying an analytical scheme created by
Calabresi and Melamed to identify the set of legal issues that must be
decided to structure a comprehensive law of growth controls. Part IV
is mainly devoted to explaining a new approach for deciding when a
governmental restriction on the use of private land constitutes a taking
of property. Part V introduces economic models of suburban housing
markets to explore the legal implications of the possibility that subur-
banites may want to monopolize housing supply. The tentative legal
conclusions of this Part are refined in Parts VI and VII, which analyze
two complicating factors: that urban growth may result in excessive
congestion and that current residents of a suburb may suffer fiscal
burdens from new development. Part VIII summarizes the compre-
hensive legal approach that this analysis has generated and shows how
it might be grounded in constitutional doctrine.
The last portion of the article is somewhat more conventional. Part
IX is a detailed discussion of the law of subdivision exactions and
other development charges; Part X, of the law of zoning, quotas,
moratoria, and other mandatory restrictions on development. Hypo-
thetical controversies are posed in both Parts to illustrate the recom-
mended approach and to contrast it with the disparate doctrines the
courts now employ.
A central conclusion is that the current case law is consistently mis-
carrying on the issue of remedy. Most courts confronting growth-
control controversies apparently assume that they have a choice only
between two rather unappealing courses of action. If they defer to
restrictive municipal enactments, they must be willing to stomach
obvious inequities and misallocations of resources. If they require
suburbs to undertake affirmative steps to accommodate unwanted
housing, they become embroiled in experiments in social engineering
that inevitably involve awesome administrative complexities. The
courts are mistaken, however, to think they face this Hobson's choice.
This article will suggest that another course of action-the granting of
damages to landowners and consumers-is usually the best way to
ensure that suburbs do not misuse land-use controls.
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I. The Economic Effects of Various Municipal Strategies
to Limit Housing Construction
A. The Panoply of Growth Controls
Imagine the City of Eden, a predominantly undeveloped suburban
municipality situated squarely in the path of metropolitan expansion.
If there were no limitations on municipal power,4 what might Eden
officials do to slow, if not stop, the tide of development?
Most obviously, Eden could simply ban forever the construction of
new housing units within its boundaries. Local governments in the
United States have not been quite this bold, presumably because they
have been advised that a permanent development ban would likely be
held an unconstitutional taking of undeveloped land. Eden officials
therefore can be expected to fall back on more indirect controls. In-
stead of a ban in perpetuity, they could impose a moratorium on
development by delaying consideration of all applications for, say,
subdivision map approvals, utility hook-ups, or building permits., A
related strategy would be to establish quotas on the number of these
approvals. The city of Petaluma, California, for example, has adopted
a "periodic quota" that allows developers to construct an average of
only 500 new dwelling units each year.; The Boulder, Colorado,
electorate considered (but rejected) a ceiling of 100,000 on the city's
population7 Voters in Boca Raton, Florida, have set 40,000 as the
maximum number of housing units, ever, for that city.s The balance
4. To simplify the scope of the discussion, it will be assumed that states have
delegated to local governments plenary authority to control land use. The reach of local
authority under enabling acts or home-rule provisions is, of course, often a central issue
in land-use cases.
5. Moratoria have become remarkably popular recently. A 1973 survey found that
approximately 20% of responding counties and cities had imposed some type of
moratorium in the preceding two years. Rivkin, Growth Control via Sewer Moratoria, 33
Umn. LAND, Mar. 1974, at 10, 12. Concern about overloaded sewerage facilities is reported
to have sparked moratoria by about 100 New Jersey localities during 1972-74. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 20, 1974, § IV, at 9, col. 1.
6. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). The 500-unit figure applies only to buildings or sub-
divisions that have five or more units. Other California municipalities have reportedly
followed Petaluma's lead. See L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
In November 1976 voters in Boulder, Colorado, narrowly approved an initiative mea-
sure that established a Petaluma-type quota system for their city. Daily Camera (Boulder),
Nov. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
7. A city charter amendment that would have imposed this ceiling was defeated in a
referendum. See 60 CEO. L.J. 1363, 1363 n.1 (1972).
8. Boca Raton, Fla., No Growth Referendum (Nov. 7, 1972) (codified in BocA RATON,
FLA., CITY CHARTER § 7.05 (1977)). Cf. Livermore, Cal., Ordinance 767 (Dec. 13, 1971)
(future residential building permits limited to 1,500 total units until new sources of
Vol. 86: 385, 1977
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis
left to be built must suffice for all time and thus represents a "blanket
quota."
Instead of placing numerical restrictions on the supply of housing,
Eden might impose burdensome development standards to inhibit
housing construction. Many American suburbs employ severe zoning
restrictions on mobile homes, apartments, and modest single-family
houses. These measures may be supplemented with onerous design
specifications in subdivision ordinances and building codes. Eden can
also raise the costs of supplying housing by levying development
charges. These fees may be made either payable in cash-as in the
case of building permit fees, connection charges, or construction taxes
-or payable in kind, as when a subdivision approval is conditioned on
the dedication of completed tangible improvements.
Rather than raising the costs of supplying housing, Eden might
instead choose to limit growth by dampening demand. Thus some
suburbs have begun to specify the age9 and family'0 characteristics of
households permitted to reside in various neighborhoods.
Eden's remaining basic alternative for limiting its growth is to
acquire the development rights of landowners, either through eminent
domain or through arms-length purchases." Municipal acquisition of
greenbelts and open-space easements by both these means is not un-
known in the United States. "2 It should not be surprising, however,
water become available). A Florida court has held the Boca Raton scheme violative of
state and federal guarantees of substantive due process. Bocas Villas Corp. v. Pence,
No. 73-106-CA-(L)-01-F (Cir. Ct. of Palm Beach County, Fla., Oct. 1, 1976) (Schotts, J.).
9. See, e.g., Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 116, 824 N.E.2d 406, 411 (1975)
(condition in special-use permit that families with children can occupy no more than
25% of development's units violated state's public policy); Shepard v. Woodland Town-
ship Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976) (sustaining zoning amend-
ment restricting residency to persons aged 52 and over); Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth
Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976) (upholding ordinance that limited residency
in trailer park to families headed by person aged 52 or older).
10. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (sustaining ordinance
barring dwelling occupancy by three or more persons not related by family); City of
Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 111. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966) (similar ordinance beyond
authority delegated to city); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241,
251-54, 281 A.2d 513, 518-20 (1971) (similar ordinance denied substantive due process in
violation of [state?] constitution).
11. These two approaches differ only when a landowner subjectively values his land
at more than its market value. In an arms-length transaction, he would then insist on a
price greater than market value-the usual measure of compensation in eminent domain
proceedings.
For discussion of a related technique-the purchase of personal rights to reside-see
note 70 infra.
12. See generally W. WHYTE, THE LASr LANDSCAPE 78-101 (1968); W. WHYTE, SECURING
OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (Urban Land Inst. Tech. Bull.
No. 36, 1959); Jordahl, Conservation and Scenic Easements: An Experience Resume, 39
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that the two acquisition devices have proven to be relatively unpop-
ular. Local officials who desire reelection will normally refuse to pay
to stop development if they can stop it without expending tax revenues
or, better yet, convert the pressures for urban growth into an op-
portunity for community, or even personal, fundraising.
B. The Economic Consequences of Growth Controls
To be able to predict what specific strategies suburbs will pursue
and to devise legal doctrines to limit their excesses, one must under-
stand the effects of the various antigrowth devices. This section em-
ploys some basic tools of economic analysis to illustrate what specific
growth controls can do and to demonstrate how the effects of seem-
ingly unlike devices may be quite similar. Specifically, this section
examines the allocational effects of growth controls (their impacts on
the price and quantity of housing) and their distributional effects
(their impacts on the wealth of different classes of individuals). This
economic analysis, together with the political analysis in Part II, lays
the foundation for the legal analysis that begins in Part III.
To facilitate this initial discussion, several simplifying assumptions
will be made about the Eden housing market. The first deals with
the conditions of housing supply. Housing services are derived both
from existing units and, to a much lesser extent, from new produc-
tion.' 3 The ensuing analysis postulates, not unrealistically, that both
new and used housing are neither perfectly elastically nor perfectly
inelastically supplied in Eden and that used housing, because it al-
ready exists, is somewhat more inelastically supplied than new hous-
ing.'4 Second, on the demand side, it is assumed that consumers do not
discriminate between new and used housing units of identical quality
LAND ECON. 343 (1963). The "public use" requirement for exercise of eminent domain
powers poses no barrier here. See, e.g., Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d
793 (1966).
13. On a national basis, new housing production (measured in dwelling units) equals
only 2-3% of the standing stock in a typical year. BUREAU OF THr CENSUS, STATISTcaL,
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 711, 716 (1975) (compare Table Nos. 1212 & 1223).
14. Elasticity of supply is the name given to the quotient derived by dividing the
proportionate change in quantity supplied in response to a given price change by the
proportionate change in price. The larger the quotient, the greater the elasticity. Muth
estimates the long-run elasticity of supply of housing to be 5.5. Muth, The Demand for
Non-Farm Housing, in THE DEMAND FOR DURABLE GOODs 27, 42-46, 50 (A. Harberger ed.
1960). See also de Leeuw & Ekanen, The Supply of Rental Housing: Reply, 63 A.M. EcoN.
REv. 437 (1973); Grieson, The Supply of Rental Housing: Conmnent, id. at 433.
The supply of used housing, measured in standard house equivalents, see p. 393 infra,
is far from perfectly inelastic because a housing owner can make improvements and
alterations and also vary his expenditures on repairs and maintenance.
392
Vol. 86: 385, 1977
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis
and thus that one can speak of housing demand in the aggregate. For
this initial discussion, the demand for housing in Eden is assumed to
be rather elastic, but not perfectly so.15 (Where housing demand is
perfectly elastic-as it may well be in many small suburbs-the eco-
nomic consequences of growth controls are somewhat simpler. For
instance, consumers are then not vulnerable to economic injury. The
dynamics of these housing markets are explored in Part V.) Third, the
discussion assumes that dwelling units of varying sizes and qualities
can be aggregated together and discussed as a single market. This will
be done by using Muth's technique for measuring the housing services
in any actual dwelling unit by computing its number of "standard
house equivalents."' 0 Under Muth's system, a shack might count as
one-quarter of a standard house equivalent, and a mansion as six. So
weighted, they can then be analyzed together. Lastly, it will be as-
sumed initially that a socially optimal' 7 package of controls on new
housing production was in effect in Eden before the restriction being
discussed was imposed. This final simplification permits deferral of
consideration of the possible congestion costs and fiscal costs of urban
growth to Parts VI and VII.' s
15. The elasticity of demand is the quotient derived by dividing the proportionate
change in quantity demanded in response to a given price change by the proportionate
change in price. Muth has placed the national price elasticity of demand for housing at
about -1.0. Muth, supra note 14, at 49-51. See Laidler, Income Tax Incentives for
Owner-Occupied Housing, in THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 50, 51-52 (A. Har-
berger & M. Bailey eds. 1969) (estimates elasticity to be -1.5).
The amount of housing demanded in a sub-area of the national market would, of
course, be more responsive to price. Consumers can avoid a housing price increase in
Eden by moving to another suburb; at the national level, they would be forced either to
emigrate or to substitute another commodity for housing. Generally, the fewer unique
features a municipality has, the greater the elasticity of demand for housing in that
municipality. See R. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING 69 (1969).
16. See Muth, supra note 14, at 27, 32-33.
17. The most rigorous economists call an outcome "suboptimal" or "inefficient" only
when it is Pareto-inferior-i.e., when it would be possible to move to another outcome
(perhaps one involving transfer payments) that would make some people better off and
no one worse off. In this article, I use the term "efficiency" in a less rigorous but more
practical sense. I call inefficient any outcome involving a deadweight loss of consumer
or producer surplus (terms defined in note 32 infra). I describe as efficient any outcome
that increases the amount of surplus generated, regardless of who obtains that surplus.
Some changes in policy that I describe as efficient are not Pareto-superior because they
would impair the welfare of some individuals. For a lucid discussion of various usages of
the term "efficiency," see B. ACKERMAN, EcoNoMIc FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xi-xiv
(1975).
18. In addition, I assume throughout the article that there is no private monopoly
power over housing supply. Because the housing industry is highly atomized, this as-
sumption is hardly farfetched. On a national basis in 1971, the top 131 firms in on-site
housing produced less than 20% of the units. L. GREBLER, LARGE SCALE HOUSING AND REAL
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1. Allocational Effects of Municipal Growth Controls
If Eden were permitted to outlaw the construction of new housing
forever, the price of used housing would rise and the total quantity
of housing consumed in Eden would decline. The ban on new hous-
ing would, however, increase the quantity of used housing consumed
in Eden as more housing owners would upgrade their units as the
price of housing rose.' 9 A moratorium on new development would
ESTATE FIR.!s 26 (1973). Somewhat higher levels of concentration call, of course, be found
in specific regional markets. There also appears to be a high degree of competition
among landlords. See G. PETERSON, A. SOLOMON, H. MADJID & W. A'GAR, PROPERTY T.XXEs,
HOUSING AND THE CITIES 17 (1973).
19. These economic consequences, as well as many of the others soon to be narrated,
are illustrated in Figure 1. SS' represents the supply of new housing in Eden, and UU'
the supply of used housing. The aggregate supply curve is the horizontal summation of
SS' and UU, or UVW. DD' represents the aggregate demand for new and used housing
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have the same sorts of effects as a development ban in perpetuity, but
the consequences would not be as great, and they would not last as
long. Once the moratorium were lifted, unnaturally large bursts of
new housing production would, in time, return the market to normal
conditions. The magnitude of the moratorium's impact on housing
prices and output would be a function of its duration and the number
of loopholes available for escaping it.
A permanent ceiling on the number of dwelling units (as in Boca
Raton) would actually promote growth as the ceiling was approached.
Landowners would rush to build units before it was too late. Once
reached, the ceiling would operate like a periodic quota; the quota
for a period would equal the number of units demolished during the
prior period.20 The impact of a periodic quota depends on the quota
level. If the quota for a specific time period restricts the quantity of
new housing below the amount that would normally be supplied dur-
ing that period, the quota will raise the price of both new and used
housing, reduce the total quantity of housing consumed, and slightly
boost the quantity of used housing consumed.21 None of these con-
sequences, however, would be as great as under a development ban.
Development charges often have essentially the same effects as a
quota, but development charges are considerably more difficult to
analyze. When a landowner makes a payment (cash or in-kind) to a
municipality, the economic consequences depend, as an initial matter,
on whether his land will receive any incremental municipal services
as a result of the payment. For example, suppose Eden required home-
builders to pay for the municipality's costs of undergrounding utility
wires in new subdivisions. In that case a homebuilder would be able
equilibrium that has been assumed to be optimal for resource allocation. Q,, the optimal
quantity of housing to be produced, would consist of some new housing, and considerably
more used housing, both selling for the common price of P. per standard house equivalent.
A permanent development ban would make UU' the housing supply curve for the
Eden market. The resulting equilibrium would then be F, the intersection of UU' and
DD'. As a result, the price of a standard house equivalent in Eden would increase from
P. to P,. At price P,, more used housing would be produced than at P.. The total
amount of housing produced and consumed, however, would fall from Q, to Q,.
20. By the same token, an achieved ceiling on population operates as a periodic
quota based on departures during the prior period. "'The way people actually should
come in here,' said former Boca Raton councilman William Archer, Jr. in a bit of
overstatement to make his, point, 'would be to watch the obituaries and apply for
residency as the older citizens die off.'" Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1975, § A, at I, col. 1, and
2, col. 2.
21. Line QQ" in Figure 1, supra note 19, represents a quota for the time period in
question of magnitude equal to the horizontal distance between lines UU' and QQ'. This
quota would produce an equilibrium of G, the intersection of QQ' and DD'. The effects
on prices and quantities outlined in the text should be self-evident.
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to "pass on" all of this cost in the sales price of his houses to the extent
that homebuyers preferred to live in a pole-free subdivision. The
strength of that homebuyer preference would depend on many factors,
including prevailing aesthetic tastes and how undergrounding was
furnished and financed in other Eden neighborhoods and in other
suburbs. If the value homebuyers placed on their new benefits hap-
pened exactly to equal what the homebuilders had paid Eden, the
development charges for undergrounding would injure neither home-
builders nor housing consumers.22 Although one might observe that
prices for actual dwelling units were higher in new, pole-free sub-
divisions than in older, cluttered ones, the relative prices per standard
house equivalent would not have been affected.2 3
Because the housing market in Eden was assumed already to be at
a social optimum, however, any development charge imposed by Eden
would necessarily raise the costs of housing construction by more than
the prospect of additional services would increase the value of that
housing to consumers. This disparity is to be expected whenever a
suburb places a tax on new development to raise general revenue or
makes developers pay for facilities that consumers either do not value
highly or can enjoy at no charge in other neighborhoods. Any excess
of development charges over consumer benefits is the equivalent of
an excise tax on new housing. The principal economic effects are the
same as those produced by a construction quota: the price of both
new and used housing rises, and new housing production declines
more than the production of used housing increases.24
The analysis of wasteful development standards is much the same,
but not entirely so. Suppose Eden's single-family zoning required lots
to contain at least one-half of an acre, and that every homebuyer would
bid $3,000 more for a half-acre lot than for a quarter-acre lot-the size
favored by Eden developers. The larger lots would nevertheless be less
efficient than the smaller ones if each one would cost a developer
22. Because the tastes of homebuyers may vary, the preferences of buyers at the
margin would technically determine the effect of development charges on housing prices.
To simplify the exposition, I assume that all consumers value undergrounding by the
same dollar amount and thus that the demand curve for housing blessed by under-
grounding is parallel to the demand curve for housing not similarly outfitted.
23. For a brief discussion of the merits of undergrounding requirements, see note
328 infra.
24. If homebuilders in the housing market portrayed in Figure 1, supra note 19, were
uniformly subject to development charges that exceeded the value of benefits returned,
the supply curve for new housing would shift above 5'-say to TTV. The aggregate
supply curve would then be UXY, the horizontal summation of TT" and UU'. Figure I
has been designed so that the new market equilibrium would be G; thus, the effects on
price and quantity of this illustrative development charge would be the same as those
produced by the quota indicated by QQ'.
396
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$5,000 more to produce because of higher land acquisition and im-
provement costs. To the extent that a developer's costs of meeting
Eden's zoning requirements would be counterbalanced by new con-
sumer benefits (here $3,000), the lot-size requirement would not affect
the supply of the standard house equivalents he produces. The costs of
compliance that could not be recouped (here $2,000), however, would
increase the cost of supplying standard house equivalents. The eco-
nomic effects of the $2,000 wasted to meet the large-lot standard are
much the same as the effects that would be produced by a develop-
ment charge of 52,000 per house.2 5 But there is one major difference.
The spending of $2,000 to meet a wasteful standard is a deadweight
loss that benefits no one; if a development charge had been imposed
instead, this $2,000 in wealth would have been transferred from hous-
ing producers or consumers or both to community residents.
Because residency restrictions influence demand as opposed to
supply, they may have somewhat different repercussions. If Eden were
to limit occupancy of newly built dwellings to families headed by a
person aged 65 or over, under some conditions the price of new
housing would fall and the price of used housing would rise.26 If this
occurred, eventually all elderly families would move into the "new"
housing only they could occupy, and all used housing would come to
be occupied by nonelderly families. The result would be a dual hous-
ing market, with the elderly enjoying cheaper housing than the non-
elderly.
Municipal antigrowth measures are usually framed in terms of
specific housing units, not standard house equivalents. As a result,
these measures also affect the characteristics of the new dwelling units
that are built. This phenomenon may be illustrated by three examples.
25. A wasteful development standard raises the supply curve for new housing by an
amount equal to each standard house equivalent's share of the waste. This shift could
be illustrated by the movement in Figure 1, supra note 19, of SS' to TT', the line em-
ployed in note 24 supra to demonstrate the ramifications of a development charge. It
should be emphasized that the discussion in text implicitly assumes that the half-acre
requirement does not confer benefits or impose costs on any individuals other than the
developers and the people who purchase houses from them.
26. Assume that the curve representing demand for housing by elderly households
passes through point H on the SS' curve in Figure 1, supra note 19. The price of new
housing would then fall to Ph. The equilibrium price in the used housing market would
be determined by the intersection of UU' and the demand curve of the nonelderly for
housing. Since the demand curve for the nonelderly is below DD' (DD' is the sum of
the elderly and nonelderly demand curves), it is possible that this price would again be
P0, the same price that would have been produced by the quota, development charge,
and wasteful development standards that have been illustrated.
Restricting residency in new housing to elderly families has an exclusionary effect only
when the elderly demand for housing at the normal market price (P,) is less than the
amount homebuilders would provide at that price in an unrestricted market.
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The city of Los Angeles considers new condominium projects to be
subdivisions and subjects them to stiff park exactions. New rental
buildings are not considered subdivisions and are exempted from
these charges. Not surprisingly, a developer considering a high-density
condominium near Marina Del Rey, when informed that he would
be required to make a park fund contribution of $6,000 per con-
dominium unit, is reported to have decided to market his structure as
a rental building.27
Los Angeles also serves as an example of the many local governments
that employ flat per-unit development charges, rather than levying fees
proportional to unit value or some other proxy for standard house
equivalents. It imposes a dwelling unit construction tax of $200 per
unit regardless of unit quality28 and in addition levies a flat fee of
$348 on all new single-family homes to finance off-site sewerage
facilities..20 Xlthough easy to assess, flat per-unit taxes have an inherent
misallocative effect. They may encourage homebuilders to upgrade the
quality of new housing units in order to reduce the tax as a percentage
of sales price. Flat per-unit charges thus may discourage production of
units at the bottom end of the new housing market 30 and are more
likely to be regressive than are charges keyed to unit value.31
As a last example, the Petaluma and Boca Raton quotas are based
on actual housing units, not standardized ones. If the producers' sur-
plus 32 garnered by a homebuilder increases with the number of
27. Interview with Skip Marvick, Administrative Assistant, Los Angeles Department
of Recreation and Parks, in Los Angeles (June 27, 1974). For more on Los Angeles's sys-
tems for raising funds for parks, see notes 221 & 282 infra.
28. L.A., CAL. CODE § 21.10.3 (1976).
29. Id. §§ 64.11.3, .19.1. These facilities include treatment plants and trunk lines.
30. As a result, a 5200-per-unit tax like the one in Los Angeles may raise the average
price of new housing units actually constructed by more than 5200. (The increase in
price per standard house equivalent, however, could possibly exceed .3200 only for units
consisting of less than one standard house equivalent.) This result is not inevitable. It
may be that there are distinct submarkets for housing units of different qualities. If the
demand for housing in higher-quality submarkets is substantially more elastic than in
lower-quality housing submarkets, the flat per-unit charge may not induce homebuilders
to shift to units of higher quality.
31. Since flat per-unit taxes discourage production of new, modestly priced housing,
more of that market has to be satisfied out of the used housing stock. Because owners of
large, high quality, used units will face more competition from new suppliers, they will
be tempted to respond by splitting their units into several lower quality ones. If these
conversions are inhibited by local housing or zoning codes, flat fees will fall somewhat
more harshly on low-income and middle-income housing consumers than on rich ones.
32. This surplus, a form of "economic rent," is the amount by which the market price
for a good exceeds its owner's next most valued use for that good. Graphically it is
represented by the region that is both above the supply curve and below the equilibrium
price. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 226-27 (1972). Consumers' surplus is the
amount consumers would be willing to pay for a product less what they actually hai e to
pay at the prevailing market price. It is represented by the area below the demand curve
but above the equilibrium price. See E. MISHAN, CoST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 31-33 (1972).
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standard house equivalents he produces, these quotas will also induce
the upgrading of the average quality of new production.33
2. Distributional Effects of Municipal Growth Controls
Who is affected (for good or ill) by the movements in prices and
quantities brought about by growth controls? Most courts and legal
scholars have assumed that the costs of, say, excessive subdivision exac-
tions are completely "passed on" to housing consumers. 34 This pre-
supposes either perfect inelasticity of demand or perfect elasticity of
supply. Since neither is a realistic possibility (in either the short or
long run), complete "passing on" is actually the least likely outcome. 35
In many cases, in fact, one would expect the entire burden of exclu-
33. To make their quota systems effective, Petaluma and Boca Raton must monitor
conversions in the existing stock to prevent owners of large older structures from splitting
up their units to satisfy the demand for modestly priced housing.
34. For judicial opinions expressly assuming that developer costs are completely
"passed on" to consumers, see, e.g., Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E. Brunswick,
60 N.J. 115, 131-32, 286 A.2d 498, 507 (1972); Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. City of San
Antonio, 433 S.AV.2d 448, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). For similar assumptions in the
academic literature, see, e.g., 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JULIN, BASIC PROPERTY
LAW 1222-23 (2d ed. 1973); F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERN.MENT IN URBAN AREAS
513 nA (1970) (assumes property taxes on apartments may be completely passed on to
tenants); Doebele, Improved State Enabling Legislation for the Nineteen-Sixties: New
Proposals for the State of New Mexico, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 321, 339-40 (1962); Feldman,
The Constitutionality of Subdivision Exactions for Educational Purposes, 76 DICK. L.
REV. 651, 658-59 (1972); Platt & Moloney-Merkle, Municipal Improvisation: Open Space
Exactions in the Land of Pioneer Trust, 5 URB. LAW. 706, 717 (1973); Reps & Smith,
Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 405, 409 (1963). The leading
article on municipal fiscal discrimination against outsiders, Heyman & Gilhool, The
Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Subdivision Residents
Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964), implies complete passing on in
the text (id. at 1121, 1133-34) but adds qualifications in the footnotes (id. at 1133 nn.60
& 61).
Some authors, of course, have recognized the possibility that development charges
might be at least partly borne by landowners or others. For an exceptionally sophisticated
treatment of incidence issues, see Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Eco-
nomics of Serrano and Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89 (1972). Several other efforts to apply formal
economic analysis have oversimplified the problem and thus produced potentially mis-
leading answers. One study assumed the supply of land for residences to be wholly in-
elastic in the relevant price range and therefore concluded that development charges are
always entirely borne by landowners. Adelstein & Edelson, Subdivision Exactions and
Congestion Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 160-61 & n.37 (1976). Another author
also adopted the dubious assumption of a vertical supply curve but nevertheless con-
cluded that developers can usually pass on the cost of park exactions because the avail-
ability of parks will shift up the demand curve. Note, Subdivision Land Dedication:
Objectives and Objections, 27 STAN. L. REV. 419, 421-30 (1975). No such shift would occur,
however, if, for example, the municipality had a prior policy of providing free parks in
all neighborhoods. The preexisting demand curve would then reflect consumers' expecta-
tions that they would receive park services.
35. Figure 1, supra note 19, illustrates that the portion of a development charge that
is not completely offset by new consumer benefits is not automatically passed on to
consumers. A charge that raised the supply curve from SS to TT' would only increase
housing prices from P, to P,, a shorter vertical distance.
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sionary policies to be borne by housing suppliers. 36 The incidence of
excessive growth controls is a complex matter, and essentially depends
on the elasticities of supply and demand in the housing market in
question.
a. Effects on Owners of Existing Housing:
The Homeowner Becomes Monopolist
Antigrowth measures have one premier class of beneficiaries: those
who already own residential structures in the municipality doing the
excluding. If consumer demand for residency in a suburb is not com-
pletely elastic, its housing owners can employ growth controls to
cartelize housing supply. Current landlords obviously have an interest
in barring the entry of competitors. Upon reflection, one can see that
suburban homeowners also should be tempted to exert monopoly
power. The owner-occupant of a single-family house at some point
will sell or rent his house to a third party. The owner-occupant's gains
from that transfer will be increased if construction of new housing
units is limited, since the price of all used housing will be raised.
The more unique a suburb (i.e., the more sloped its demand curve),
the more lucrative the monopoly possibilities for its homeowners.
Existing housing owners can obtain other benefits as well. As we
have seen, exclusionary devices increase the quantity of used housing
supplied. Since only existing owners can supply more used housing,
they benefit in addition from any producers' surplus arising from that
increment to the used housing stock. They may share these gains, of
course, with owners of inelastically supplied factors employed to up-
grade used housing-for example, architectural firms or building con-
tractors who specialize in remodeling.
When a suburb has close substitutes, its current housing owners will
not be particularly successful in using antigrowth measures to raise
the market value of their buildings. Consumers will respond to ex-
clusionary practices not by bidding up home values but by settling
elsewhere. In these communities (and all others as well), there is still
one policy strongly in the self-interest of owners of existing structures:
development charges. These charges permit existing homeowners to
share in the producers' surplus of land developers. It does not matter
whether the revenue raised in, this fashion is devoted to increasing
municipal services or to reducing other municipal taxes; either way,
current housing owners are the prime beneficiaries.
36. See p. 425 infra.
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The last possible benefit of exclusionary measures to current resi-
dents is likely to evoke more sympathy. Residents may genuinely
prefer that their municipality remain the way it is rather than grow
rapidly. If old-timers feel that new development is destroying the
desirable features of their community, they are in effect reducing their
subjective valuations ("reservation prices") for their houses. Curbing
growth enables them to prevent their surplus over market value from
being eroded.
b. Effects on Suppliers of New Housing
The burdens of antigrowth policies are borne by the owners of
factors employed to produce new housing and by housing consumers
generally. The loss on the producers' side is divided among owners of
production factors that are not perfectly elastically supplied. If a con-
struction worker employed in Eden can switch to equally remunera-
tive employment elsewhere, he can completely avoid the effects of
Eden's antigrowth programs. By contrast, homebuilders or civil engi-
neers who have unusually intimate political connections in Eden might
lose some producers' surplus if the suburb switched from a prodevelop-
ment to an antidevelopment stance.
Land is usually the most inelastically supplied factor in housing
production because it is the only factor that is completely immobile.
An owner of vacant land will be unable to escape serious losses from
antigrowth ordinances in the common situation where his tract is much
more valuable for residential development than, for example, for
agricultural, commercial, or industrial use.37 The costs of exclusion
borne by housing suppliers are thus likely to be felt largely by land-
owners-especially farmers, speculators, homebuilders, and others who
own large tracts of undeveloped or underdeveloped real estate.38
37. Some of these alternative uses may also be barred by local zoning codes.
At and beyond the urban fringe, the price of land suitable for housing development
cannot rise much above the price of land for agricultural use. Landowners in urbanized
areas thus have more to lose from exclusionary policies than their rural counterparts.
Cf. R. MUTH, supra note 15, at 86 (supply elasticity of land for housing greater at urban
fringe than near center).
38. The many empirical studies of the incidence of property taxes generally support
the theory that changes in municipal fiscal policy are largely capitalized into the value
of existing property. Everything else being equal, higher property taxes tend to result in
lower land values; increased municipal services levels tend to be capitalized positively. See,
e.g., Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values:
An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POLITICAL
EcON. 957 (1969); Sabella, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Expenditures
on the Sales Prices of Residential Dwellings, 42 APPRAISAL J. 114 (1974); Smith, Property
Tax Capitalization in San Francisco, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 177 (1970). Cf. A. KING, PROPERTY
TAXES, AMENITIES, AND RESIDENTIAL LAND VALUES 96-102 (1973) (absent highly visible tax
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c. Effects on Housing Consumers
If demand for housing in Eden is not perfectly elastic, that suburb's
exclusionary devices will raise the price of both new and used hous-
ing.3 9 These price increases will reduce the surplus-i.e., impair the
welfare-of four distinct groups of housing consumers. The two groups
worst affected (in dollar terms) will be: (1) current tenants who like
Eden too much to want to move out (as they will have to pay higher
rents when they renew their leases); and (2) all households that move
into Eden in the future. These two groups will suffer a loss in surplus
equal to the full housing price increase. The two remaining groups
will lose less surplus. They will consist of: (1) tenants who subsequently
leave the municipality because their rents go up; and (2) potential
immigrants to Eden who have decided not to buy or rent there simply
because of the price increase caused by the antigrowth policies. Much
of the literature on exclusionary zoning assumes that growth controls
principally injure the last group-the housing consumers whose entry
is "barred." In fact, those who enter despite the barriers suffer a larger
monetary loss. 40
3. Extraterritorial Effects of Municipal Growth Controls
The discussion thus far has ignored the impacts Eden's growth con-
trols might have on housing markets outside the suburb. 41 Antigrowth
changes, "evidence of capitalization is ambiguous"); Heinberg & Oates, The Incidence of
Differential Property Taxes on Urban Housing: A Comment and Some Further Evidence,
23 NAT'L TAX J. 92 (1970) (study suggesting that differentials in local property-tax rates on
owner-occupied housing are capitalized). But see Stull, Community Environment, Zoning,
and the Market Value of Single-Family Homes, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 535 (1975).
The best effort so far to investigate the impact of local land use policies on housing
prices is L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS (1973).
39. Residency restrictions may lower the price of housing for the group of favored
consumers. See p. 397 supra. This article is primarily concerned with controls on
physical improvements to land and thus ignores residency restrictions in this and most
subsequent discussions.
40. The text identifies only the chief beneficiaries and losers from exclusionary
policies. Others may also be affected. Local employers may have to pay higher wages if
a municipality has impaired the growth of the local work force. Retailers may ex-
perience fewer sales for the same reason. The added costs of these merchants may be
passed on in part to suppliers of the factors that they use-for example, to owners of
industrial parks and shopping centers-or to their consumers. (Where people can easily
commute among many suburbs to work or shop these sorts of effects should not be
great.)
41. Economists refer to the discussion in the text and the graph in Figure 1, supra
note 19, as a "partial equilibrium analysis," since it examines a single market in isola-
tion from the rest of the economy. Such an isolated focus often fails to reveal the full
complexity of the incidence of government regulatory and taxation programs. As
Mieszkowski's work on the incidence of the property tax suggests, partial equilibrium
analysis tends to be accurate only when used to explain the effects of differentials between
the policies of local governments. See Mieszkowski, The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or
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policies that raise housing prices within municipal boundaries make
housing in competing jurisdictions relatively more attractive to con-
sumers. As a result, the demand for housing in competing areas is en-
hanced,42 raising the price of both new and used housing there. This
price increase, however, is tempered to the extent that there is a down-
ward shift in supply costs as owners of factors needed to build new
housing flee Eden to its environs.
A municipality's particular appeal to consumers may be a product
of its locational advantages in its metropolitan area. In that case the
major external beneficiaries of its exclusionary policies would be
owners of land and dwellings near its boundaries who could offer
similar locational advantages. The outsiders most hurt would be
tenants living at those locations since the excluded consumers would
bid up their rents. Another municipality's particular appeal may be
attributable to its public goods-e.g., an outstanding police force. Its
growth controls would primarily increase housing demand in suburbs
with similar comparative advantages in providing that public good.
Thus, if Scarsdale pulls up its welcome mat, housing owners as far
away as Great Neck may be able to join in the rejoicing.
The most important external allocational effect of a suburb's anti-
growth policy is an increase in the amount of housing built outside its
boundaries; the shifts in both external supply and external demand
combine powerfully to produce this result. This analysis therefore sup-
ports the common allegation that exclusionary suburbs force popula-
tion growth onto their less exclusionary neighbors.
a Profits Tax, I J. PUB. ECON. 73, 82 (1972). If one local government in a metropolitan
area were to adopt a mildly exclusionary policy while all the remaining ones were much
more stringent in their growth limitations, the value of vacant land in the easiest-entry
jurisdiction would likely be higher than it would be if none of these local governments
was attempting to control growth at all.
The more comprehensive approach (general equilibrium analysis) is well beyond my
limited skills in economics. I leave it to those who are more adroit. There is widespread
agreement that it is the more profound and reliable analytical mode. See generally A.
HARBERGER, TAXATION AND WELFARE (1974). The difference between the two approaches
is best illustrated by the literature on the incidence of property taxes. Partial equilibrium
analysts tend to treat taxes on land improvements like excise taxes and conclude that
they fall largely (some say entirely) on tenants. The general equilibrium analysts believe
the component of property taxes on improvements that is common to most jurisdictions
falls mainly on owners of capital. See H. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX 18-55
(1975); R. MUSCRAVE &. P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 412-21
(1973); Ladd, The Role of the Property Tax: A Reassessment, in BROAD-BASED TAXES:
NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 39 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973); Mieszkowski, supra; Symposium:
The Property Tax: Progressive or Regressive?, in Papers and Proceedings of the 86th
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 64 Am. ECON. REV., May 1974,
at 212-35.
42. Cf. R. MuTH, supra note 15, at 67-69 (illustrating effect of shifts in demand in
one location on demand and price in another location).
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II. Homeowners v. Landowners: The Politics of Growth Controls
Designing legal rules to control the actions of suburbs is difficult
unless one knows how suburbs tend to behave. Part I's theory of
municipal housing markets therefore needs to be supplemented with
a theory of municipal politics. This Part presents two polar models of
the suburban political process and suggests the land-use policies one
would expect under each.43
Both models rest on a general theorem that an individual's political
behavior is motivated by self-interest. A first corollary is that a voter
always votes for the candidate who favors policies that will most enrich
the voter. A second corollary is that officeholders are power-maximizers
(not profit-maximizers) exclusively concerned with winning reelec-
tion.44 Under both models, the attitudes of both voters and elected
officials toward growth policies are determined by the distributional
effects of those policies. Part I has shown that the primary beneficiaries
of exclusion are owners of existing housing units.45 These homeowners
and landlords share the revenue from development charges, and (where
a suburb has unique characteristics) can also obtain monopoly profits
by curbing the entry of competing housing sellers. A central feature
of local politics is that all homeowners (and some landlords) are
residents and thus generally eligible to vote in local elections.
The costs of antigrowth measures principally fall, in contrast, on
persons who lack the local franchise. Potential immigrants not only do
not have the vote in practice but may be constitutionally barred from
ever getting it. 4" When owners of undeveloped land are nonresidents,
they too are usually not permitted to vote.47 Of course, some costs are
43. The discussion in this Part assumes there are no legal constraints on a municipal-
ity's choice of policies.
44. For more elaborate models of the political process based on similar assumptions,
see, e.g., A. Dowxs, AN ECONOnc THEORY OF DEMNocRAcY (1957); R. MUScRAVE & P.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 41, at 92-98; Davis & Haines, A Political Approach to a Theory of
Public Expenditure: The Case of Municipalities, 19 NT'L TAX J. 259 (1966). See gen-
erally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
45. See pp. 400-01 supra.
46. The "one-person, one-vote" principle might well be construed to preclude local
governments from enfranchising nonresidents in general elections. See Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (electoral power in units of general local government must
be allocated in proportion to resident population). Cf. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7
Cal. 3d 942, 963, 501 P.2d 537, 551, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297, 311 (1972) (dictum: "It is open to
question whether the state can give nonresidents a vote equivalent to that of residents.")
47. It is clear that nonresident landowners have no constitutional right to vote in
local general elections. Reeder v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Md. 261, 305 A.2d 132 (1973).
However, a number of cases have sustained city charter provisions that voluntarily ex-
tended the franchise to nonresident landowners. Glisson v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 346
F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1965); Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 207 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Ga.),
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not politically externalized in this way. Residents who rent, who
supply factors employed to build housing, or who plan to move up to
a better house in town may on balance all suffer from exclusionary
policies.
A. The Majoritarian Model: The Portrait of an
Exclusionary Suburb
A majoritarian model48 of politics predicts that an individual's in-
fluence over governmental decisions is proportionate to his voting
strength at general elections. This conception of a pure democracy is
at best a bit naive and is apt to be highly inaccurate when applied to
large and complex governments. If the majoritarian model reflects
reality anywhere, however, it is in small municipalities.
As Madison warned in a famous Federalist paper, a small govern-
ment confronting a single issue is the surest breeding ground for majori-
tarian oppression.49 The fewer the voters, the easier it is for a majority
to establish a common ground for agreement and to monitor the
behavior of elected officials. Likewise, an absence of multiple issues
reduces the need for candidates to build coalitions by promising favors
to minority interests.
Small municipalities combine the majoritarian building blocks of
single issues and few voters. Since local public schools in the United
States are usually managed by independently elected school boards, the
only major discretionary function left to officials of general-purpose
aJJ'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 206 (1962). In addition, the allocation of votes to landowners
(and only landowners) has been permitted in elections conducted by certain special dis-
tricts. E.g., Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist,, 410 U.S.
743 (1973) (per curiam); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719 (1973).
48. I have adopted the terms "majoritarian model" and "influence model" from a
perceptive essay by Professor Neil Komesar. Komesar, Housing, Zoning and the Public
Interest, in B. WEISBROD et al., PUBLIC INTEREST LAw: AN EcoNOI-.Ic ANALYSIS OF AN
INsrITUTIONAL INNOVATION (forthcoming; 1978).
49. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number
of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they
are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other.
THE FEDERALISr No. 10, at 53, 60-61 (Mod. Library ed. 1941) ('. Madison).
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units of local government is land-use planning. As a result, this issue
often dominates municipal election campaigns5 °
The demography of small municipalities similarly militates in favor
of majoritarianism. In the United States, 70%, of suburban households
live in owner-occupied housing units.51 These homeowners have a
common interest in exclusion. 59 Prodevelopment interests are far out-
numbered and can hope to achieve political influence only if the home-
owner majority is splintered on land-use issues-5 or poorly organized.
Even when outnumbered by renters, homeowners are frequently able
to dominate municipal politics. They tend to be wealthier, more
sophisticated politically, and less transient. As owners of capital assets,
they are concerned about housing values for many years in the future
(while tenants are not) and thus have more reason to invest time and
energy in local politics. Thus while municipalities seldom discriminate
against homeowners, they often, even with large numbers of renters,
deny services to tenants5a or impose higher taxes on rental buildings.r 5
50. Cf. 0. WILLIAMS et al., SUBURBAN DIFFERENCES AND METROPOLITAN POLICIES 187
(1965) ("[A] perusal of suburban weeklies in the Philadelphia metropolitan area suggests
that of all municipal activities, zoning changes command the greatest attention of local
residents.")
51. Of the 22.7 million occupied units inside Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSAs) and outside central cities, 15.9 million are owner-occupied. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR
METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1960 TO 1970 at 82 (Ser. PHC (2)-1, 1971).
52. Owners of units in cooperatives and condominiums (and, for that matter, long-
term lessees with the right to sublet) all share this interest.
53. Homeowners with different incomes have potentially conflicting interests. As
housing units are only slowly moved from one quality level to another, an individual
homeowner might seek both to prohibit the construction of new units that would com-
pete with his current dwelling and to encourage additional production in the next higher
price range. The latter policy might lower the cost to the homeowner of moving up a
notch in the local market. Thus the less iomogenous the quality of homeowner housing,
the harder it will be for homeowners to agree on the most desirable system of exclusion.
54. To use an earthy example, Denver and Washington, D.C., provide free garbage
collection services to single-family residences but deny those services to apartment houses.
D. YOUNG, How SHALL WE COLLECT THE GARBAGE? 69 (1972). This practice has been held
illegal in two New Jersey cases. Teagen Co. v. Borough of Bergenfield, 119 N.J. Super.
212, 290 A.2d 753 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); Boulevard Apartments, Inc. v. Mayor of
Lodi, 110 N.J. Super. 406, 265 A.2d 838 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970). But see Goldstein
v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1974) (denial of city garbage collection services
to large multifamily condominium does not violate equal protection); Burner v. Wash-
ington, 399 F. Supp. 44, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1975) (refusing to invalidate Washington, D.C.'s
discrimination against residential structures with four or more dwelling units in provi-
sion of garbage collection services).
55. Suburbs have imposed special occupancy fees on rental units. See, e.g., Boulevard
Apartments, Inc. v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 86 N.J. Super. 189, 206 A.2d 372
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965), aff'd, 90 N.J. Super. 242, 217 A.2d 139 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1966) (per curiam) (annual fee of .550 per rental unit not authorized by statute requiring
licenses for lodging and eating establishments). There is some evidence that apartment
buildings are assessed for property taxes at higher fractions of market value than
single-family units. See H. AARON, supra note 41, at 59-61; D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF
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Thus the ideal environment for a homeowner majority to work its
"plans of oppression," to use Madison's phrase, is a small suburb of
mostly well-to-do homeowners" who confront the single issue of urban
growth.57 In such a suburb, the political process is stacked against those
who benefit from new housing construction.
B. The Influence Model: The Conditions for
Developer Manipulation
Under an "influence model" of politics, the strength of an interest
group is purely a function of its ability to contribute money, man-
power, or other political assets to election campaigns. The most power-
ful groups are those that can best organize to raise campaign contribu-
tions and those whose members have the greatest wealth. Madison's
analysis suggests that the influence model becomes increasingly more
accurate than the majoritarian model as an electorate increases in size
and issues become more numerous. As governmental complexity in-
creases, majority sentiment on any single issue is less likely to prevail;
organized minorities become ever more able to engage in logrolling
and to take advantage of majority disorganization5 8
With the possible exception of municipal labor unions, land-devel-
THE PROPERTY TAx 30, 78-79 (1966). The most obvious fiscal discrimination occurs at
the state level through substantial homeowner exemptions from the property tax. See,
e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. 13, § 3(k) ($7,000 of full value of owner-occupied homes exempt,
unless dwelling is receiving another real-property exemption).
The disparity in tax treatment is not easily explained as a device for making renters
pay the full costs of local services they consume. Since tenant families tend to contain
fewer school-age children, apartments are in fact more likely to pay their own way
through property taxes than are, say, modest single-family units with many bedrooms.
Cf. T. MULLER & G. DAWSON, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL DE-
VELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY 83 (1972) (showing higher ratio of governmental receipts to
governmental expenditures for apartments than for single-family homes); R. MACE & W.
WIcKER, Do SINGLE-FAMImy HormrFs PAY THEIR WAY? 8 (Urb. Land Inst. Research Mono-
graph No. 15, 1968) (expenditures allocated to single-family homes likely to exceed
revenues where government relies heavily on property tax and level of state aid is
relatively low).
56. If an individual's income is positively correlated with his political sophistication,
rich suburbs should be more adroit exclusionists than blue-collar suburbs. In addition, to
extend the analysis in note 53 supra, residents of a modest suburb have less interest in
excluding new housing because they are likely to consider even the bottom end of the
new housing market a step upward.
57. An econometrician trying to explain the incidence of exclusionary behavior by
suburbs should thus hypothesize that the following variables are positively associated
with that behavior: (1) percentage of households in owner-occupied units; (2) median
dwelling-unit value; (3) median family income; and (4) rate of metropolitan growth. He
should hypothesize as negatively correlated: (I) population; (2) land area; and (3) degree
of Variance in value of owner-occupied dwelling units.
58. For a contrary view, see Bergin, Price-Exclusionaly Zoning: A Social Analysis, 47
ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1972) (arguing that landowners can bargain more successfully
with small governments than with large ones).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 385, 1977
opment interests appear to be the largest investors in municipal poli-
tics in the United States.59 Basic economic principles would suggest
that this investment is made because it garners a rate of return com-
petitive with alternative investments. Developers may have a compara-
tive advantage in making campaign contributions to candidates for
municipal office. Successful homebuilders are relatively well-heeled;
highly leveraged ones can borrow against the gains that will flow from
political favors. Fear of free-riders need not deter a single developer
from individual lobbying; a solo contributor need only ask for an
individualized development approval, not a broad program of general
benefit to his industry.
Developer influence should be at its greatest in a large, 60 complex,
local government whose voting population includes many tenants and
whose homeowners represent a wide range of income classes. 61 Most
central cities and many of the older suburban counties have these
characteristics. Elected officials in these places can be expected to sell
zoning favors for relatively low prices (either in bribes or above-board
campaign contributions). These officials are in greater need of money
for their campaigns and would suffer less severe voter retaliation if
the sale were discovered. Zoning graft does seem to be more common in
large political units; among smaller municipalities one would expect
more graft in the less-elite suburbs, where homeowners tend to be less
sophisticated and to have less to gain from exclusion.02
59. Thirty-nine percent of the 694 lobbyists who registered between 1967 and 1971
under Los Angeles's pioneering lobbyist registration ordinance indicated "planning,
zoning and subdivisions" as an area of interest. "Building and safety" was indicated by
39.8%, "labor relations" by 8.9%. L.A. Times, Oct. 12, 1971, § II, at 1, col. 2, and 8, col. 3.
60. In some large cities land-use decisions are determined by a system of "council-
manic courtesy": all members of the elected governing body informally agree to follow
the decision of the member from the district where the land-use problem has arisen.
One cannot be certain, a priori, if this system promotes "influence" or "majoritarian"
control. On the one hand, it reduces homeowners' organization costs by, in effect,
reducing the size of the political unit; on the other hand, it lowers the administrative cost
to developers of acquiring influence by limiting the number of political decisionmakers
who must be approached.
61. See note 53 supra.
62. I have maintained an informal file of newspaper clippings on zoning graft
incidents between 1970 and 1976. The localities involved in the incidents can be broken
down into the following rough categories:
Large local governments: Long Beach, Cal.; Los Angeles, Cal.; San Diego County, Cal.;
Santa Barbara County, Cal.; Dade County, Fla.; Chicago, Ill.; Cook County, Ill.; Prince
Georges County, Md.; New York City, N.Y.
Working-class suburbs: Carson, Cal.; Cudahy, Cal.; Irwindale, Cal.; Chicago Ridge, Ill.
Middle-class suburbs: Hoffman Estates, Ill.; Wheeling, Ill.; Fort Lee, N.J.
Small cities: Champaign, Ill.
Elite suburbs: None.
This list is by no means a systematic sample. It has been determined by the newspapers
I have happened to read and no doubt has been influenced as well by the priorities of
public prosecutors and newspaper editors and the capacity of various types of local of-
ficials to disguise their deals.
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C. Implications of the Models
The influence model best fits central cities, and the majoritarian
model, elite suburbs. The dichotomy is obviously somewhat artificial.
All public officials face the conundrum of whether or not to serve
lobbyists who come to call at the expense of unorganized masses of
voters. In fact, one should not be startled to discover that the land-use
policies of large elite suburbs like Fairfax County, Virginia, and
Montgomery County, Maryland, seem to cycle regularly between pro-
development and antidevelopment phases. 63 These counties control
sufficiently large areas to have some monopoly power over housing
prices. The well-to-do homeowners who live there have an exclusionary
interest that should dominate county politics whenever the majority
can stay sufficiently organized to retain control. But successful anti-
growth policies in these counties eventually become self-destructive. As
housing prices rise, owners of underdeveloped land offer larger and
larger sums to candidates who repudiate the exclusionary policies.
When they can offer enough, a prodevelopment cycle begins.
The foregoing political analysis has several important implications.
Each large metropolitan area is likely to contain some true "tight little
islands" that are permanently and steadfastly exclusionary-a Weston,
Massachusetts; a Kenilworth, Illinois; or a Rolling Hills, California. Its
central city and some of its larger and less-elite suburbs, however, are
usually vulnerable to developer influence, and many of its middle-
class suburbs may occasionally be manipulable. As a result, it is highly
unlikely that local land-use controls have distorted the allocation of
population or activities among metropolitan areas in the United
States. Where there is strong market pressure for a specific land use,
a developer should be able to manipulate some government in the
metropolitan area to allow it. Municipal land-use policies may, of
course, cause what one might call "micromisallocations" in the location
of activities. But for major misallocations to occur, a homeowner
majority would have to find a cartel manager with power at the
metropolitan, regional, or state level-say a state environmental agency
or land-planning commission.04 Eventually, however, the complexities
of state government would tend to make even those agencies more
responsive to the better organized interest group-prodevelopment
forces.
In sum, homeowner domination of suburban politics will lead to
63. Social choice theorists as far back as Condorcet have suggested that polities
dealing with a variety of issues also will be characterized by cyclical majorities. See K.
ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 93-96 (2d ed. 1963).
64. This ominous possibility is discussed in greater depth at pp. 434-35 infra.
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enactment of growth controls and the imposition of development
charges. Political domination by developers will lead to a different,
but also troublesome, set of political outcomes: for example, graft and
the unwarranted subsidization of development. Because this article
focuses on the former set of potential abuses, the succeeding analysis
usually portrays suburbs as falling within the majoritarian model, i.e.,
as being governed by officials who act as perfect agents for a home-
owner cartel. One should not forget that some suburbs never behave
this way and that some may do so only intermittently.
III. A Calabresian Definition of the Legal Issues Posed by
Growth Controls
Armed with these theories about how suburban housing markets
and municipal political processes work, I now turn to my central ob-
jective: devising legal rules to resolve controversies over antigrowth
measures. The first task is to establish an agenda for the legal analysis.
If one plunges immediately into the current swamp of doctrine, the
possible legal approaches quickly become restricted by precedent and
obscured by doctrinal complexity. This Part therefore defines the
legal questions posed by growth controls in purely functional terms by
making use of an analytical scheme developed by Calabresi and
Melamed in their seminal article.6 5 Their approach has the virtue of
keeping remedial issues at center stage, instead of pushed off to the
wings.
Calabresi and Melamed distinguish between the use of "property
rules" and "liability rules" to protect entitlements.," When the owner
of an entitlement has the protection of a property rule, he can enjoin
interferences with his entitlement. When he is protected solely by a
liability rule, he can only collect damages. The distinction between
property rules and liability rules is critical in the ensuing analysis.
Indeed, a major theme of this article is that the courts' frequent failure
to pay close attention to the simple question of how to protect entitle-
ments has led to great confusion in land development law.
One of the parties to all civil litigation over growth controls is
obviously the local government imposing the controls. 7 As the prior
65. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
66. Id. at 1105-06, 1115-23.
67. Instead of constraining municipal practices through the threat of private litiga-
tion, one could of course rely on other forms of control-for example, criminal sanctions
against local officials or administrative review of the substance of local ordinances by
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analysis has indicated, both suppliers of new housing and housing
consumers may be injured by antigrowth measures. The basic legal
questions that growth controls pose can thus be identified by arraying
the possible rights and remedies of both housing suppliers and housing
consumers against local exclusionary measures. The first sections of
this Part develop the arrays for these two groups in turn. The last
section suggests goals for choosing from the two arrays. This rather
abstract discussion lays the groundwork for the substantive analysis in
later Parts that strives to identify the appropriate boundaries within
which particular remedies should be available.
A. The Range of Legal Entitlements Between Local
Governments and Landowners
The discussion hereinafter assumes that of the factors employed in
new housing production, land is the only one whose value is sufficiently
affected by growth controls to make it efficient to provide owners of
the factor with entitlements against municipal abuses. This assumption
allows the analysis of the issue of the rights of housing suppliers to be
boiled down to that of the rights of landowners. 8
Suppose the Tacky Development Company owns a parcel of land in
the suburb of Eden on which it would like to develop a mobile home
park. Unsophisticated observers often mistakenly conceive the po-
tential conflict between Tacky and Eden as simply posing a problem
on the boundary between what Calabresi and Melamed call the two
"property-rule" solutions: either Tacky must have what will be called
an "absolute privilege to develop" or the suburb of Eden must have
an "absolute right to control." If Tacky challenged a quota, mora-
torium, or development standard imposed by Eden, a court that
succumbed to this misconception would choose either to grant Tacky
an injunction against enforcement of part or all of the measure or to
deny Tacky all relief.
Liability rules, which are generally more flexible than property
rules, broaden considerably the range of possible legal solutions. A
liability rule protecting Eden would entitle it to collect damages if
Tacky developed its mobile home park. A liability-rule approach im-
plies a means of measuring damages in specific cases. Thus if Eden
designated state agencies. For a pessimistic assessment of the political feasibility of the
latter approach, see Ellickson, Ticket to Thermidor: A Commentary on the Proposed
California Coastal Plan, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 715, 728-31 (1976); see also pp. 473-75 infra.
68. One should recall that owners of other inelastically supplied factors may also be
injured. See p. 401 supra. For the proposition that landowners are the chief group that
would be negatively affected, see R. MuTji, supra note 15, at 57-58.
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imposed a development charge-a form of damage payment-of $500
per space on Tacky's mobile home park, even a court that recognized
that Eden had a right to impose valid development charges would also
have to decide if Eden had charged too much. If it had, the remedy to
Tacky consistent with the liability-rule approach would be a refund
of the excess charged. Note, however, that refunds would never be
available to developers if the municipality had an absolute right to
control and voluntarily traded permission to develop in return for
cash or the dedication of public facilities. The owner of an entitlement
protected by a property rule can sell it for whatever the market will
bear. Therefore, the right to levy unlimited development charges pre-
supposes an absolute right to control.
The last of the four legal rules available is a liability rule protecting
the landowner. If this rule applied, Eden could impose restrictions on
Tacky provided that it compensated Tacky in damages.69 A suburb
voluntarily chooses "compensated controls" of this type when it ac-
quires development rights through eminent domain; it has this rule
forced upon it whenever a court decides that a particularly onerous
restriction constitutes a taking of property for which compensation
must be paid. One of the complexities of the law of land-use controls
is that the amount of damages a court may require a municipality to
pay a landowner depends in part on the scope of municipal rights both
to enact noncompensated controls and to impose development charges.
Any such municipal rights limit the landowner's initial bundle of
rights and thus influence the amount of compensation he receives
when he is further restricted.
In summary, to decide disputes between landowners and municipali-
ties, one must identify three legal boundaries: (1) when a municipality
loses property-rule protection and thus is required both to compensate
those it regulates and to limit its development charges; (2) when a
municipality is no longer entitled to impose any development charges;
and (3) when a landowner begins to have an absolute privilege to
develop, i.e., the right to enjoin municipal eminent domain actions to
acquire his development rights.
B. The Range of Legal Entitlements Between Local
Governments and Housing Consumers
As noted in Part I, consumers may be injured by growth controls in
two different ways. First, local ordinances that dampen development
69. This is not a revolutionary idea. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass.
476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899), afj'd sub nom. Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903) (sustaining
building height restriction program involving compensation of affected landowners).
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activity may raise housing prices. Second, a suburb may damage a
particular subgroup of housing consumers by enacting a residency
restriction that forbids those consumers from living in a particular
part of town.70 The scope of this discussion is limited to the first and
more frequently encountered phenomenon.
Perhaps surprisingly, given an allocation of legal rights between
municipalities and landowners, consideration of consumer rights to
housing raises only one additional key legal question: When should
consumers be entitled to collect damages from suburbs? There is no
good reason to allow consumers to enjoin certain antidevelopment
practices, for example, while at the same time landowners are denied
70. Residency restrictions raise fascinating questions about the scope of the freedom
of settlement. Restrictions based on race are clearly unconstitutional. Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Residency restrictions based on age and family composition
have been the subject of considerable litigation. See notes 9 & 10 supra. The Soviet
Union apparently uses ideological classifications to decide who shall have access to a
particular housing market, with enforcement provided by means of "internal passports."
Thus, as part of his harassment, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was denied permission to move
to Moscow, the home of his new wife. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 6. A bill
introduced in the 1975 session of the Hawaii legislature would have required immigrants
to obtain permits in order to reside in Hawaii. Bosselman, Growth Management and
Constitutional Rights Part 11: The States Search For a Growth Policy, 11 URa. L. ANN.
3, 21 (1976). (The sale of nontransferable residency permits would obviously be a lucrative
strategy for the present residents of any unique jurisdiction. See note 123 infra.)
Courts confronting legal challenges to residency controls generally conceive their choice
to be limited to upholding the restriction (i.e., applying a property rule in favor of the
municipality) or invalidating it (i.e., applying a property rule in favor of the restricted
consumers). Again, liability rules are available. A liability rule protecting consumers
would entitle them to collect damages (but only damages) if they were individually
barred from entering potentially advantageous housing transactions in a community. A
liability rule protecting a suburb would permit it to impose residency charges on "sub-
standard" residents to compensate the suburb for the environmental and fiscal burdens
arising from their substandard characteristics.
Retroactive residency restrictions are much harsher than prospective ones. Expulsion
is usually regarded as more traumatic than denial of entry because of the costs of
relocation and the higher likelihood of a substantial loss in surplus. Coerced exporta-
tions are hardly unknown in totalitarian countries (remember Phnom Penh) and have
not been beyond the imagination of local government officials in the United States.
In April 1974, a city councilman in St. Petersburg, Florida, introduced a proposal to
limit the city's population to 235,000, a figure 30,000 below the city's population at
the time. Rights to remain in the city were to have been allocated by seniority of
residence. C. HAAR, LAND-UsE PLANNING 579 (3d ed. 1976). The proposal was not enacted
and the councilman was shortly thereafter defeated in his bid for reelection. Wash.
Post, Mar. 17, 1975, § A, at I, col. 1, and 2, col. 3. In 1890 San Francisco ordered its
Chinese inhabitants within 60 days either to leave town or to move to a designated
district. See In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1890) (striking down ordinance under,
inter alia, Fourteenth Amendment).
Those with a paternalistic bent might argue that a consumer's freedom of settlement
(where recognized) should be inalienable in order to bar a government from buying up
residency rights from voluntary sellers. (For discussion of inalienability, see Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 65, at 1111-15). Such a rule would have forced Michigan to halt con-
sideration of a proposal to pay welfare recipients q5,000 each to leave the state. See L.A.
Times, July 13, 1975, § I, at 6, col. 5.
The Yale Law Journal
that remedy. 71 In addition, litigation to recover excessive development
charges can be more efficiently conducted by developers than by home-
buyers, and it is in fact in a homebuyer's interest that a developer have
the exclusive right to pursue that remedy. 72
Landowners are not good intermediaries for protecting housing con-
sumers, however, when the applicable legal rule permits a suburb to
control development provided it compensates those it injures. The
damages suffered by consumers as a result of an antigrowth ordinance
are measured by the drop in consumers' surplus, while damages to
landowners by the drop in producers' surplus. To entitle landowners
to recover consumer damages resulting from the high prices induced
by growth controls would be arbitrarily to enrich landowners at the
expense of consumers.
C. Goals to be Promoted by the Allocation of Legal Rights
I suggest that the legal doctrines developed to resolve growth con-
trol issues be designed to promote three principal goals: efficiency,
horizontal equity, and vertical equity.73 Efficient legal doctrines help
ensure that new housing developments and population shifts that are
not cost-effective do not occur and those that are cost-effective do
occur. Deviations from optimal allocational efficiency in urban devel-
opment involve "allocative costs." '74 "Administrative costs" (the public
and private costs of framing, publicizing, enforcing, and transferring
legal entitlements) are also relevant to efficiency. To assess the overall
efficiency of various legal solutions, one must add their allocative
71. Although one could imagine entitling consumers, and not landowners, to enjoin,
say, a sewer hook-up moratorium, that approach would provide exclusive standing to the
group that is least likely to be seriously injured and most likely to be unable to enforce
its rights effectively. See pp. 425-27, 479-80 infra. Thus all property rules that constrain
suburban land-use controls should be enforceable by landowners. But cf. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 512-14 (1975) (landowners may not assert rights of third parties to defeat
exclusionary zoning). Whether consumers should also have standing to enforce those
rules should hinge on the normal considerations that determine standing, e.g., the likeli-
hood that the case will be litigated effectively.
72. See pp. 479-80 infra.
73. On the issue of whether these goals pay proper respect to concerns for individual
liberty, see Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 688 11.21, 740-41, 748-51 (1973) (citing sources)
[hereinafter cited as Alternatives to Zoning].
74. Under my definition, "allocative costs" are created whenever a change in policy
causes a deadweight loss of producers' or consumers' surplus. Rigorous economists
would not be comfortable with this definition. See note 17 supra. The definition is also
potentially confusing because administrative costs clearly affect the allocation of resources,
and thus those costs could well be regarded as a subset of allocative costs, not as a
distinct category. Nevertheless, the distinction clarifies the exposition.
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costs to their respective administrative costs. The candidate with the
lowest sum is the most efficient. 75
Equity is not quantifiable and is thus harder to discuss satisfactorily.
Horizontal equity requires government to treat like persons alike. The
surface simplicity of this proposition is deceptive because "likeness" is
always a matter of degree. For example, are a suburb's tenants like its
homeowners because both groups are residents, or are they different
because their land tenure is different? Are would-be developers of
undeveloped land like nearby landowners who developed earlier, or
are they different because of the temporal difference? Despite its
operational difficulties, I will employ Michelman's test for horizontal
equity: requiring a person to bear a loss is not unfair if he should be
able to perceive that a general policy of refusing compensation to
people in his situation is likely to promote the welfare of people like
him in the long run.76
Vertical equity is the term employed in the public finance literature
to describe the fairness of the distribution of wealth among different
income groups. This goal would come sharply into focus, for example,
if a wealthy suburb's growth controls restricted the housing opportuni-
ties of poorer families. Because interpersonal comparisons of utility
are not possible, one can never in fact be sure that transferring wealth
from rich to poor (or vice versa) will enhance collective human hap-
piness. As a result, discussions of vertical equity tend to be about as
enlightening as debates over the relative merits of following the Cubs
or the White Sox. But surely concerns about the general distribution of
wealth cannot be wholly ignored.
The fruits of this Part can now be quickly summarized. A com-
prehensive set of legal rules governing growth controls would answer
these questions: (1) what sorts of developments may a local govern-
ment stop without risk of paying compensation? (2) when are land-
owners absolutely privileged to proceed with their developments? (3)
what development charges may a local government validly impose?
(4) when a local government enacts enforceable restrictions for which
it must nevertheless pay damages, how much does it owe landowners
and housing consumers? The next four Parts attempt to answer these
questions in light of the goals of efficiency and horizontal and vertical
equity. The suggested answers are summarized at the beginning of Part
VIII.
75. For analogous applications of this notion of minimizing a sum of costs, see G.
CALARES1, THi COSTS OF AccIDENTs 26-31 (student ed. 1970); Alternatives to Zoning, supra
note 73, at 688-90.
76. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1223 (1967).
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IV. When Should Landowners or Municipalities Be Protected by
Property Rules?
The first task is to develop doctrines to identify cases appropriate
for application of either of the two polar approaches: the absolute
privilege of a landowner to develop or the absolute right of a suburb
to control.
A. The Meager Scope of a Landowner's Absolute
Privilege to Develop
A landowner protected by a property rule is entitled to prevent a
suburb from using eminent domain to acquire his development rights.
Under current law the boundary of a landowner's absolute privilege
to develop is essentially determined by the "public use" limitation on
the exercise of eminent domain. In the usual case, a farmer can defeat
a suburb's plan to condemn his cow pasture for a greenbelt program
only by showing the acquisition would not be for public use. Given
the current state of the law, he has little hope of prevailing on that
issue.7 7 As a practical matter, a landowner in the United States today
is at the mercy of a municipality willing to acquire his land at market
value-a sum that may be less than what the landowner would demand
in a voluntary exchange.7 8
This diminution of private property rights is defensible because it
facilitates efficient municipal growth controls. A suburb's greenbelt
acquisition program, for example, would be efficient where the result-
ing benefits to its residents of open space, protection of "character," 79
and lower net congestion costs (e.g., less air pollution, less time lost in
traffic snarls) would exceed the costs of the program to victimized land-
owners and housing consumers. If a suburb were entitled to buy up
77. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Note, The Public Use Limitation
on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
78. There is an apparent tension between the lack of constraints on municipal use of
eminent domain and the doctrine that public utilities have a "duty" to extend services
to developers. (For a recent endorsement of this doctrine, see Note, The Thirst for
Population Control: Water Hookup Moratoria and the Duty to Augment Supply, 27
HASTNGS L. REV. 753 (1976).) This tension would be removed if a utility could decline to
serve a developer provided it compensated him in damages.
Imposing a "duty to serve" on organizations like public utilities and special districts is
nevertheless defensible. Municipalities and other general-purpose units of local govern-
ment are more politically accountable and thus (absent an emergency) should be the
only bodies authorized to halt new development. For more on the duty to serve, see
note 211 infra.
79. Claims by long-term residents of a small community that rapid growth would
damage the character of their town are genuine if, as a result of growth, the residents
would reduce their subjective valuations of their houses. That loss of surplus is a true
welfare loss, albeit one not reflected in market prices.
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development rights only from consenting sellers, it might be dis-
couraged from embarking on an efficient growth-control program by
the fear that some landowners would decide to hold out for the highest
possible price regardless of their valuation of their property. In addi-
tion, if eminent domain were to be available to a municipality to
acquire sites for, say, recreational facilities, but not for greenbelt areas,
difficult factual questions of motive would be introduced into con-
demnation suits. Lastly, the availability of a collectively established
benchmark price (market value), at which both parties know a suburb
can force a sale, may reduce the resources devoted to settlement
negotiations for land transfers. In brief, the efficiency rationale for
granting local governments extensive authority to condemn develop-
ment rights is to reduce the administrative costs of their implementing
efficient growth-control programs.s0
This curtailment of landowner rights also has some appeal from a
distributional standpoint. A rule that makes landowners unable to
insist on more than the market value of their land in effect gives
priority to the surplus current residents have in the existing character
of their town over any personal pleasure a landowner might get from
development. In particular, it helps channel the efficiency gains re-
sulting from a growth-control program to local residents and away
from landowners who successfully pursue holdout strategies. 81
An absolute privilege to develop should be recognized, however,
when it is needed to prevent municipalities from deliberately using
80. In another article I offered a similar list of justifications for why a landowner
generally should not have the protection of a property rule against nuisance activities
carried on by neighbors. See Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 73, at 742-47. That
article argues for the efficiency advantages of liability rules in considerably greater detail.
Authorizing suburbs to exercise the power of eminent domain does pose an allocative
risk. The loss in surplus suffered by the condemnees may exceed the efficiency gains
obtained by the residents of the suburb. Although the program would then be in-
efficient, the condemnees probably would not be able to organize to pay the suburb not
to enact it. Yet the situation hypothesized is a rare one; those who hold land for develop-
ment are unlikely to value it subjectively at much above market value.
81. An example may help illustrate these points. Suppose, after valid development
charges are taken into account, (I) the market value of certain unused development rights
(if traded among developers) would be X, (2) those rights are subjectively valued by
their owner at 3X, and (3) current residents subjectively value the damages resulting
from development at that site at 7X. If a landowner has an absolute privilege to develop
(and local political processes work smoothly), the development rights would be sold to
the suburb in an arm's length transaction for an amount between 3X and 7X. The
landowner would thus be compensated for his surplus and, if he were a skillful bar-
gainer, might also share in the efficiency gains from the program. If eminent domain
were permitted, the landowner would receive only X, and local residents would secure
all the efficiency gains from the program and also capture some of the landowner's
surplus.
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eminent domain to exclude racial and ideological minorities.s-2 In
such situations, the individual liberties of the victims warrant priority
over the possible efficiency gains of local residents.8  By the same
token, if a court finds that the application of a development restriction
is motivated by racial or ideological discrimination, it should not
merely find a taking and thereby entitle those injured to damages
(which I propose should be the usual remedy) but should invalidate
the restriction. 4 Few occasions will justify this exceptional remedy of
an injunction against a municipal program. By and large, a local
government willing to compensate those it injures should be given
great discretion in shaping its future.
B. The Ample Scope of a Municipality's Absolute Right to
Prohibit Nuisances
A local government should be entitled, moreover, to prevent a large
variety of land uses without paying compensation. Property-rule pro-
tection, in short, should be provided much more readily to municipali-
ties than to landowners. The constitutional provision that marks the
limit of the absolute right to control is, of course, the "taking" clause.
Since no issue in modern property law has been more heavily de-
bated,85 the discussion here will be kept rather brief.
82. Compare Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d
850 (1961), judgment on remand aff'd, 26 Ill. 2d 296, 186 N.E.2d 360 (1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 968 (1963) (permitting condemnation of site of planned racially integrated
housing project) with Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (barring city from designating site of a
planned low-income housing project as park area).
83. Cf. Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 73, at 740-41, 748-51 (discussing role of
these considerations in private nuisance litigation). Eminent domain actions should also
be enjoined if they are procedurally defective, tainted by improper influence, or beyond
the delegated powers of the would-be condemnor.
84. See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a! 'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th
Cir. 1972) (mandating issuance of building permits for "turnkey" public housing projects
that county had denied because potential tenants would be low-income blacks). Com-
pare the extraordinarily broad holding in United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (plaintiff relying on § 804(a) and
§ 817 of Title AIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3617 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975), is granted injunction against zoning ordinance that had racially discrimina-
tory effect, without having to show discriminatory motive). But see Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
On potential ideological discrimination, see, e.g., Farrell v. Township of Teaneck, 126
N.J. Super. 460, 315 A.2d 424 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) and Peltz v. City of S.
Euclid, 11 Ohio St. 2d 128, 228 N.E.2d 320 (1967) (invalidating blanket prohibitions on
political signs). See generally Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amend-
ment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 179 (1975).
85. The leading work is Michelman, supra note 76. For a more recent discussion, see
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165 (1974).
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1. Suggested Doctrines for Deciding Whether Municipal Land-
Use Controls Constitute Takings
When a landowner challenges a suburban antigrowth measure as a
taking, the trial court's first step should be to decide whether or not
the land-use activity regulated can be characterized as being less
than normally desirable to neighbors-i.e., as being a nuisance.,, When
the challenged ordinance is one that restricts nuisance activities, a
landowner should be able to prevail on a taking claim only when he
can prove that the ordinance is grossly inefficient-that is, that its
costs vastly exceed its benefits.
On the other hand, when a municipal enactment has prohibited a
landowner from carrying out a land-use activity that cannot be char-
acterized as a nuisance, his prima facie case for a taking should be
much less onerous: merely proof that the restriction has caused a sub-
stantial drop in the market value of his land. (As we shall see, this
proof is harder than one might think if damages are properly cal-
culated.8 7) Even when a landowner succeeds in showing such a plunge
in land value, a local government should be able to defeat his taking
claim by successfully invoking Michelman's fairness test as a defense. 8
That defense is established if the municipality proves both: (1) that
the challenged restriction on nonnuisance activities is efficient; and
(2) that the landowner should be able to recognize that as a taxpayer
his own long-term self-interest in avoiding the administrative costs of
minor compensatory payments makes it fair to deny him compensation.
Any reader who has dipped into the literature on the taking issue
should immediately recognize that the doctrines recommended have
their roots in the venerable harm-prevention/benefit-extraction test
for takings. That test, whose principal academic supporters have been
Freund and Dunham, states that a government need not compensate
injuries arising from regulations designed to prevent harms but must
make reparations for losses from regulations attempting to extract
benefits. 0 This article does not propose that this traditional test be
adopted whole but rather that it be given a new twist. Instead of
using the harm/benefit (i.e., nuisance/nonnuisance) distinction to
86. The term "nuisance" is used here to describe all subnormal land uses, including
those not sufficiently noxious to be deemed "nuisances" under traditional common law
doctrine.
87. See notes 359 9- 360 infra.
88. See p. 415 supra.
89. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE PowaR 546-47 (1904); Dunham, A Legal and Economic
Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 663-69 (1958). Forecrs tf this view,
see Michelman, supra note 76, at 1196-1201, 1235-45; and Berger, supra note 85, a-172-75.
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decide a taking claim, the approach advocated would employ it only to
vary the prima facie case and defenses to be applied. Thus, a program
aimed at preventing harms could still be held to be a taking if it were
grossly inefficient, and a program that forced landowners to confer
benefits would not result in an award of compensation if the munic-
ipality could make out its defense based on Michelman's fairness test.
2. The Proposed Taking Doctrines Justified
A legal doctrine that compels a government to compensate those
injured by one of its programs can perform two-useful functions. First,
it can prevent the costs of a public program from being arbitrarily
imposed on one group of individuals but not on another, ethically in-
distinguishable group. Here the function of the doctrine is horizontal
equity-treating like people alike. Second, the doctrine may serve the
very different purpose of deterring legislatures from enacting inef-
ficient programs.90 When municipal officials are able to deflect the
costs of a public measure to those who lack the right to vote in mu-
nicipal elections (or who are vastly outnumbered at the polls), a rule
requiring compensation, by shifting the costs back to the electoral
majority, may help induce these officials to weigh more accurately
the costs and benefits of alternative measures. Because the costs of
suburban antigrowth measures fall principally on nonvoters and mi-
nority factions, the taking doctrine can be a valuable vehicle for
achieving efficient land use in the suburbs. 91
The doctrines just proposed have been designed to promote the
goals of both horizontal equity and efficiency. The intuitive appeal of
the traditional harm/benefit test for takings springs from its protec-
tion of horizontal equity. When a legislature enacts a standard of
conduct that forces some individuals to confer benefits, it is holding
them to a standard that most other persons are not only not forced to
meet but are known to fall below. To use Justice Holmes's phrase,
such an enactment produces no "average reciprocity of advantage"
90. Rules that constrain municipal land-use regulations are also likely to enhance
vertical equity-i.e., lead to greater equality in the distribution of wealth. Consider this
statement by some thoughtful economic analysts of zoning:
Indeed, we believe that it is quite likely that the aggregate effect of zoning in U.S.
cities is to lower the utility of relatively poor apartment dwellers as a class and to
increase the utility of relatively affluent single-family dwelling owners as a class.
OhIs, Weisberg & White, Welfare Effects in Alternative Models of Zoning, 3 J. URB.
EcoN. 95, 96 (1976).
91. The taking doctrines proposed in this article have been designed for application to
challenges to suburban land-use controls. No opinion is ventured on whether they might
also be appropriate in other contexts (e.g., where the political process is less stacked
against the victims of the public measure).
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among the populace. 92 Unless a legal remedy is provided, one has the
Orwellian result that all citizens are equal, but some citizens can
impose extra duties of citizenship on others. However, a rule requiring
compensation of anyone who is forced to confer benefits would exces-
sively exalt the principle of horizontal equity. Even those chafing
under the discriminatorily high standard of conduct have an interest
in removing barriers to implementation of efficient government
programs. They therefore should appreciate the proposed defense
based on Michelman's fairness test, because it is a bow to their own
long-term concern that resources be efficiently allocated.
By contrast, when a government program merely requires that all
laggards come up to the standards of normal behavior, citizens do
share a reciprocity of burdens, and the program does not violate-in
fact it promotes-horizontal equity. Yet again the concurrent goal of
efficiency requires rejection of a blanket doctrine. A rule that ordi-
nances prohibiting harms can never be held to effect takings would
provide no remedy when the nuisance activity prohibited would have
been cost-effective-that is, when the benefits to the sponsor of an
ongoing or prospective subnormal activity would exceed the resulting
nuisance damages to his neighbors. Municipal prohibition of a cost-
effective nuisance is particularly likely when the victims of the
nuisance can easily outvote those who benefit from it. The most
activist solution to this problem would be a doctrine holding that all
inefficient local land-use controls constitute takings. That doctrine,
however, would do great violence to the general judicial inclination
to defer to social and economic legislation. The opposite extreme-a
policy of complete judicial deference to antinuisance measures-would
ignore the awesome allocational mischief that a suburb dominated by
a homeowner majority can work. A rule entitling landowners to
recover compensation when antinuisance measures are grossly inef-
ficient enables courts to deter the worst instances of municipal waste.94
92. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
93. Cf. Michelman, supra note 76, at 1235-37 (another attempt to defend the harm/
benefit distinction on grounds other than efficiency).
94. In an earlier article, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 73, I sharply criticized the
current employment of zoning as the mainstay of land-use control. I urged increased
reliance on more decentralized systems like private nuisance suits, covenants, and fines.
I continue to adhere to those views.
The earlier article dealt essentially with the private-law problem of the allocation of
rights among neighboring landowners. This article deals with public-law issues in which
government is always a party to the controversy. A careful reader of both articles will
note that I concede municipalities considerably greater latitude in stopping nuisances
than I allow private nuisance plaintiffs. For example, I argued that, except in rare cases
in which his fundamental liberties are threatened, a neighbor who seeks an injunction
against a cost-effective nuisance should be granted it only if he is willing to corn-
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3. Making the Nuisance/Nonnuisance Distinction Operational
Even those who have advocated that the distinction between pro-
hibiting harms and exacting benefits be used to decide takings cases
have been concerned whether public measures can in fact be classified
as doing one thing or the other3 In an earlier article I defended the
distinction by arguing that empirically derived expectations about
normal conduct determine the usage in ordinary language of the ad-
jectives "harmful" and "beneficial."96 A harmful land-use activity (i.e.,
a nuisance) is one that falls below the standards normally met by land-
owners.
In urban areas, residential structures are the predominant land use.
Those who build residential structures of normal quality cannot be
accused of doing something harmful; they are simply repeating what
many others have done. A litmus test for the harm/benefit distinction
thus emerges. A municipality should be deemed to be exacting benefits
when it imposes development standards-on lot size, floor area, archi-
tectural quality, or whatever-in excess of the actual attributes of
residential structures of median quality in the area in question. By
contrast, restrictions designed (1) to prevent residential uses from fall-
ing below median quality, or (2) to prohibit commercial or industrial
uses (which are generally subnormal neighbors) should be construed as
antinuisance measures.
If one is judging a Webster Groves, Missouri, ordinance that re-
stricts the use of lots in a particular cul-de-sac, should the standard of
normal residential use be determined by prevailing uses in that cul-
de-sac, in that suburb, or in the entire St. Louis metropolitan area?
If the preeminent goal is to protect horizontal equity, the proper
focus is on the residential uses within the boundaries of the govern-
ment whose ordinance is challenged.0 7 An aggrieved landowner war-
pensate the nuisance-maker for his resulting losses. See id. at 738-48. The taking
doctrines advocated in this article would require a suburb that stopped a cost-effective
nuisance to make reparations only when the stoppage would result in gross inefficiency,
rather than in all cases. The desirability of allowing some legislative discretion is the
reason for the difference.
95. Professor Allison Dunham expressed his doubts on this score in a conversation
with me in the spring of 1975.
96. Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 73, at 728-33.
97. I have argued for a uniform metropolitan-wide rule for identifying nuisances
when there is litigation between private landowners. Id. at 732. Deference to legislative
processes has persuaded me to give local governments greater scope than private land-
owners to protect hypersensitive land uses (like exclusive neighborhoods).
A consistent metropolitan standard for deciding when ordinances force benefits might
wel be more efficient than the locality-by-locality approach proposed: separate standards
would not have to be worked out for each suburb and landowners would be less con-
cerned about who might annex their lands. In addition, localized determinations of
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rants sympathy only if a suburb forces him to build residences of
higher quality than those occupied by the suburb's current residents.
If an elite suburb is merely trying to maintain its eliteness, those who
own undeveloped land there have no claim that the suburb's voters
or officials are guilty of a double standard.
The legal doctrines just outlined will be applied to some familiar
controversies in Part X; nevertheless, a few brief illustrations may
serve as a helpful preview. Suppose the Tacky Development Company
would like to build apartments on a tract of land that the suburb of
Eden has zoned for single-family units on large lots. Assume also that
most Eden residents live in single-family units on considerably smaller
lots. The minimum lot-size requirement can then be identified as an
attempt to compel benefits. Eden is liable for any substantial reduc-
tion in Tacky's land value resulting from the excessive lot-size require-
ment unless it can show that the restriction was efficient and fair. In
this example, however, Eden's insistence on single-family units should
be characterized as an attempt to prohibit nuisances.98 Tacky would
therefore only be able to recover for the drop in value caused by the
prohibition on apartments if it could show that that prohibition was
normal land uses make it easier for elite suburbs and suburbs on the urban fringe to
dampen the production of new modest-quality housing. These are the costs of allowing
a degree of local autonomy.
98. There is considerable evidence that apartments are not good neighbors. One
regression analysis found that homeowners will pay a significant premium to live in
communities predominantly single-family in character. Stull, supra note 38, at 549.
The example in the text oversimplifies the difficulty of identifying normal residential
uses. Normality technically should be judged not by the internal quality of a dwelling
(i.e., the quality of a dwelling as perceived by its occupants) but rather by its external
quality (i.e., its quality as a neighboring use). A dwelling unit's market value is an
excellent proxy for internal quality but perhaps not for external quality. Real estate
brokers, however, believe that the two types of quality are closely related-i.e., the market
value of neighboring homes reflects their value as neighboring uses. Real estate brokers
therefore advise homeowners not to "over-improve" houses in modest neighborhoods-an
implied assertion that modestly priced houses can be no more than modestly desirable
neighbors and therefore the improxements will not be reflected fully in market price.
Thus a rough measure of normal residential uses might be the characteristics of housing
units of median market value in the suburb in question.
This formula may itself be difficult to apply. Suppose half the units in a populous
suburban county are single-family detached, 40% are in multi-family structures, 5% are
rental townhouses, and 5% are mobile homes. A good shortcut in this situation would
be to estimate median family housing expenditures in the county and then determine
what one would get for that amount in the four submarkets. County ordinances that
required developers to match the basic characteristics of the units identified in this way
should not be construed as extracting benefits. Thus if the county completely barred
mobile homes but permitted a landowner to build single-family units, high-quality apart-
ments, or high-quality townhouses, the county could still be viewed as prohibiting
nuisances. If the county zoned some areas exclusively for modest-quality single-family
units, it would be forcing benefits in this instance but should still survive a taking
claim if it shows that the prohibition of high-quality apartments and townhouses in those
areas is efficient and fair.
The Yale Law Journal
grossly inefficient. 0 What if Tacky aspired to build a warehouse or
shopping center in a single-family zone? Although restrictions on
nonresidential uses are virtually always properly classified as anti-
nuisance measures, a landowner may be able to prove gross inefficiency
when industrial uses are forbidden near railroad tracks, 10 0 when com-
mercial uses are forbidden at major intersections, 101 or when non-
conforming businesses are forced to shut down immediately. 0 2
The land-use controls of most American suburbs go well beyond
prohibiting nuisances. Typical suburban zoning provisions-not to
mention moratoria and quotas-compel owners of undeveloped land
to comply with development standards far in excess of the standards
met by existing residences of median quality.02 Thus in most actual
growth control controversies, a landowner pursuing a taking claim
would only have to show that the challenged ordinance substantially
decreases his land value in order to shift to the suburb the burden
of proving that the restriction is efficient and fair.
V. A First Attempt to Set Limits on Development Charges and to
Protect Consumers from Monopoly Housing Prices
The subtler legal issues raised by antigrowth measures are difficult
to dissect without resort to economic models of suburban housing
markets. I here introduce two simple models and show that the
suburban policies predicted by the models are in fact frequently ob-
served. Discussion of the models highlights several potential abuses by
99. For a more detailed discussion of this example, see pp. 493-500 infra.
100. Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (only portion of
tracts abutting railroad tracks had been zoned for industrial use).
101. Cf. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (city had zoned other corners of intersection for
commercial use).
102. Cf. Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding ordinance shutting
down brick-making business).
103. Courts recently invoking the harm/benefit test for takings have unfortunately
misapplied it. The court in Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n,
400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975), rebuffed a taking claim against a five-year moratorium
on sewer hook-ups. The moratorium was characterized as an effort to prevent the harm
of water pollution. This was inaccurate because all existing homes were still being
permitted to emit sanitary sewage. New dwelling units (which presumably would emit no
more sewage than existing units) were thus being held to the higher standard of no
effluent at all.
The infamous case of Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.WN.2d 761 (1972),
held that a rural landowner could be prohibited without compensation from filling in
swampy land near a lake. The court quoted Freund's version of the harm/benefit test,
id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767, and then apparently concluded that any change in the
natural character of land could be regarded as a harm. The normal owner of rural
Wisconsin land is hardly so passive as to leave it untouched.
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suburbs; it thus lays the groundwork for a preliminary attempt to
articulate a consumer remedy against homeowner cartels and to resolve
the thorniest legal problem of all-setting limits on development
charges.
A. The Case of Perfect Competition Among Uncongested Suburbs
Los Angeles County has 77 municipalities; the six-county Chicago
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) has 256; even a rela-
tively small SMSA like Columbus, Ohio, includes 43 municipalities. 04
Many of these suburbs-particularly the smaller ones-lack distinctive-
ness; that is, a consumer can readily duplicate their main attributes
in another suburb. Demand for housing in a suburb that has perfect
substitutes is perfectly elastic-in other words, the demand curve is
horizontal. 1°5 When a fungible suburb imposes development charges
or wasteful development standards on its homebuilders, those home-
builders are unable to pass on any of those costs to housing consumers.
Why should a homebuyer pay more when he can purchase an equally
good house at the old price in another essentially identical suburb?
When suburbs are perfectly competitive, the burden of municipal
antigrowth programs falls entirely on producers' surplus-the economic
rents of owners of supply factors.
Figure 2 illustrates the housing market in a suburb facing a perfectly
elastic demand curve. SS" represents the supply curve for new housing,
UU' that for used housing.1 6 The following discussion of the market
in Figure 2 is based on three assumptions: (1) that the market is free
of both net congestion costs and benefits, i.e., that there are no costs or
benefits resulting from increased population density in the community;
(2) that new development would impose no purely fiscal impacts on
the suburb, i.e., that it would neither create new tax burdens nor
confer new revenue benefits; and (3) that used housing is perfectly
inelastically supplied, i.e., that the UU' curve is vertical.' 0 7 Since posi-
104. 5 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 38, 60, 114 (1975). The
264 SMSAs that were recognized by the census in 1972 contained a total of 5,467 munic-
ipalities and 3,462 townships. Id. at 3, 18.
105. One study of housing prices in the Boston area found that consumers perceived
most suburbs as having close substitutes. Schnare & Struyk, Segmentation in Urban
Housing Markets, 3 J. UiuB. ECON. 146, 164 (1976).
106. Because it is already standing, used housing is assumed to be more inelastically
supplied than new housing. For sources discussing the elasticities of supply and demand
in housing markets, see notes 14 & 15 supra.
107. The supply of used housing is portrayed as being wholly inelastic in order to
simplify the geometry of the figures. This shortcut should not affect the validity of the
analysis. It does, however, unquestionably impair richness in insight by concealing the











tive or negative externalities 08 from growth are thus assumed not to
exist, the intersection of the demand curve (DD') and the aggregate
supply curve for new and used housing (UVW) must be the point of
optimal resource allocation. This market equilibrium is denominated
E. (The next two Parts of this article will allow for the existence of
both congestion and fiscal externalities, thus reintroducing the appro-
priate measure of complexity.)
As already indicated, the central feature of the housing market
illustrated in Figure 2 is that the market price of housing must remain
at P, regardless of the suburb's land-use policies. Municipal officials
potential importance of urban renewal, housing code enforcement, and similar local
programs that can influence tile supply of used housing. For discussion of a market
where the used housing supply does respond to price, see pp. 394-97 & notes 19-26 supra.
108. Externalities are the effects of an activity on parties other than the individual
or individuals engaged in the activity. Their presence may cause inefficiency whenever
these third parties would be willing to pay the sponsor of the activity enough to
persuade him to modify his behavior but are prevented from doing so by high transac-
tions costs.
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thus cannot raise housing prices by restricting construction. In addi-
tion, since the present discussion assumes there are no net external
costs from growth, city officials would not hear complaints from
current residents about crowding or fiscal impacts. The upshot is
that homeowners in a suburb like the one pictured in Figure 2 have
nothing to gain from stopping development, but much to gain from
allowing it. If legal rules permit, their profit-maximizing strategy will
be to allow as much development as the market forces will generate
and to capture as fully as possible the economic rents of housing
suppliers.
These rents are represented by the triangle FEV in Figure 2. To
capture them in their entirety, the suburb would have to charge each
landowner exactly the opportunity cost he would incur if he were
forced to shift the prospective use of his land from residential develop-
ment to his next most valued use of the land. That amount would vary
from developer to developer. To maximize income to the homeowner
cartel, the suburb would have to vary its development charges and, to
allow this price discrimination to work, also prohibit the transfer of
development approvals from one site to another. Lastly, wise suburban
officials would require that development charges be paid in cash, not
through the dedication of tangible lands or facilities. When the
developer's cost of supplying a facility exceeds its value to suburban
residents, there is a deadweight loss that both parties should want to
bargain to eliminate. For example, if it costs Tacky Development
$100,000 to dedicate a park site that Eden residents value at only
$60,000, both should prefer an $80,000 cash transfer.1 9
The profit-maximizing policy just outlined-the granting of non-
109. Two California cases illustrate both the potential inefficiency of in-kind exac-
tions and the inclination of highway departments to exaggerate the urgency of street
improvements.
The famous case of Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949), upheld the
conditioning of subdivision map approval on the dedication, inter alia, of an 80-foot
right-of-way for an internal street the city of Los Angeles thought should be improved to
secondary highway standards. Twenty-eight years later, the city is currently providing
only a 36-foot pavement in that 80-foot right-of-way. Most of the balance is devoted to
two virtually useless (and largely grassless) 17-foot wide parkways between sidewalk and
curb.
In Sommers v. City of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1967), the
applicant for a building permit to remodel a gas station was required to dedicate strips
along the streets abutting his corner lot to provide land needed to upgrade those streets
to their master-planned role as secondary highways. The appellate court concluded "the
evidence is ample to establish an immediate need" for this exaction. Id. at 616, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 531. Neither street was widened, however, in the seven years following the
decision, and the widening does not appear on the city's five-year capital-improvements
program ending 1978-1979. Interview with Alfred Liff, Director of the Los Angeles
Bureau of Assessments, in Los Angeles (June 27, 1974) (notes on file with Yale Law
Journal).
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transferable development approvals in return for variable cash develop-
ment charges-closely corresponds to the current practice of many small
suburbs in the United States. The typical scenario is as follows. The
suburb deliberately imposes excessive development standards-on lot
sizes, lot frontages, parking spaces, and the like. The suburb in fact
has no interest in promoting the deadweight loss that would result
if homebuilders complied with these wasteful standards. 110 The stan-
dards are designed, rather, to make strict compliance economically
infeasible for developers. This gives the suburb maximum leverage in
the subsequent bargaining. The suburb then proceeds to sell waivers
of the excessive standards in the form of rezonings or approvals for
flexibly designed planned-unit development (PUD) layouts."' A de-
veloper should be willing to bid up to his loss from an excessive
standard to have it removed; how close the sales price of a waiver is
to that amount depends on the parties' relative bargaining skills. In
any case, both parties gain by negotiating the elimination of the dead-
weight loss. 112 The zoning amendment process is consistent with this
theory of suburbanite profit-maximizing because suburbs price-dis-
criminate when they sell zoning changes (by varying cash and in-kind
donations required) and because the development approvals granted
are not transferable from site to site..13
Another phenomenon that lends empirical credibility to the model
is the high incidence of variances to moratoria on growth. As one
author has noted, the enactment of a sewer connection moratorium is
frequently followed by an accelerated pace of sewer connections."14
110. As Jan Krasnowiecki has sagaciously observed, to discern a municipality's zoning
"plan," one should examine not the grand scheme initially enacted, but rather the
pattern of amendments the municipality has approved. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation-
How to Win Without Really Losing, in INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT
DOMAIN 1, 3-4 (Sw. Legal Foundation 1976).
111. For a general discussion of PUDs, see Symposium: Planned Unit Development,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 3 (1965).
112. George Sternlieb has found that the fastest growing suburbs in New Jersey have
had continuously dec:ining per-capita municipal outlays. G. STERNLIEB et at., HOUSI.G
DEVELOP ENT AND MUNICIPAL Cosis 313 (Center for Urb. Pol. Research 1973). This find-
ing might be partly explained by their successful use of land-use controls to exact de-
veloper donations.
113. Because devices such as PUDs are essentially post-1960 phenomena, there remains
the puzzle of why local governments did not develop a system of variable development
charges before that. The most plausible hypothesis is that legal uncertainties about
both constitutional constraints and the scope of standard enabling acts slowed the evolu-
tion of these techniques.
114. See Rivkin, supra note 5, at 10. Consider also the following from a report of the
County Executive's staff in Montgomery County, Maryland: "'The results [of the sewer
moratorium] have been disappointing. The increase in sewage flows has not tapered off.
The residential construction rate has actually increased.'" U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, LAND USE 63 (1974).
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One hypothesis for explaining this phenomenon is that the agency
imposing the moratorium in fact has no interest in slowing growth,
but is simply trying to enhance its ability to collect development
charges. As an illustration, the city of San Diego recently declared a
moratorium on new construction in its Mira Mesa district but then
agreed to lift it for four homebuilders who promised to contribute
school busing costs and $750 per resident pupil.11 The price for
purchasing a variance often appears explicitly in the text of the
moratorium measure. For example, a San Jose initiative barred resi-
dential rezonings in areas with crowded schools unless the owner of
the land to be rezoned agreed to provide temporary school facilities.116
Suburban practices often deviate from the profit-maximizing strat-
egy just outlined. In-kind exactions are still common. When cash
charges are levied, they are frequently set at flat rates and not varied
from developer to developer. Los Angeles, for example, has its $200-
per-dwelling-unit construction tax and off-site sewer charge of $348
per single-family home.117 The moratorium waiver fee of $750 per pupil
established by San Diego is also so inflexible that it may not com-
pletely absorb the available producers' surplus. These deviations
probably arise from perceived legal constraints. The collection of
unequal charges may violate landowners' rights to due process and
equal protection. Unequal treatment is rather readily disguised when
in-kind exactions are collected (for instance, all park sites differ) but
not when cash, the more efficient form of payment, is called for. If a
suburb does prefer to receive cash, flat rates may be advantageous both
to minimize legal challenges and to avoid the administrative costs of
deciding how to vary fees.
A municipality recognized as having an absolute right to control
will obviously be free to capture all developer surplus available; that
right will give it sufficient leverage for fruitful bargaining. In addi-
tion, even when taking doctrines constrain municipal regulations, a
suburb may still succeed in exacting all developer surplus so long as
the legal ceiling on development charges is high enough-i.e., so long
as it exceeds the maximum the suburb would have to charge to capture
the economic rent of the landowner most interested in development.
In short, in order to prevent suburbs from unfairly seizing the eco-
nomic rent of developers, one must devise legal doctrines that protect
developers both from wasteful land-use regulations and from excessive
115. HousE & HoMIE, May 1972, at 34.
116. See Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr.
158 (1975), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976).
117. See p. 398 & notes 28 & 29 supra.
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development charges. A court that did one but not the other would
be acting like Yossarian, who innocently treated the minor wound in
Snowden's thigh without noticing the mortal injury under the flak
jacket.
But why bother to protect developer surplus at all? A second lesson
of the model in Figure 2 is that there is no strong efficiency reason to
place tethers on the discretion of fungible suburbs." s Their growth
controls are bluffs-mere bargaining ploys to achieve their true end of
fundraising. Under the assumptions of Figure 2, a fungible suburb
with complete discretion not only cannot impair the welfare of housing
consumers, but also will be led by the self-interest of its homeowners
to allow the natural rate of growth. On the other hand, the model
hardly suggests that allowing suburban discretion is essential to achieve
more efficient land use. Quite the contrary. If there are no externalities
from growth (as has thus far been assumed), growth controls cannot
possibly enhance efficiency. Where the model in Figure 2 is accurate,
legal rules have, by and large, only a distributional impact; they decide
who shall enjoy the surplus in land suited for residential develop-
ment-those who own that land or those who own homes and apart-
ments then existing in the community.-19 That is essentially an issue
of horizontal equity.' 20
B. The Case of Imperfect Competition Among Uncongested Suburbs
Suburbs without perfect substitutes pose more complicated issues.
Demand for housing is apt to be downwardly sloped (not perfectly
elastic) in suburbs that have unique topographic or cultural features,
that offer unusual public services, or that have special locational ad-
vantages. For example, Baltimore County and Prince Georges County,
Maryland, are both so large in area that no other suburb can com-
pete perfectly with them. These counties may be able to adopt policies
that raise housing prices above competitive levels. When demand is
downwardly sloped, the burdens of antigrowth measures no longer fall
118. In this context I am calling an outcome "inefficient" if it would involve a dead-
weight loss. A wealth transfer from housing suppliers to suburbanites involves no such
loss, except for the administrative costs of accomplishing the transfer. This is not a
rigorous definition of economic efficiency. Because it impairs the welfare of housing
suppliers, the wealth transfer is clearly not a Pareto-superior move. See note 17 supra.
119. Who benefits from the revenue from development charges depends on how the
money is spent. If increased services are provided to resident tenants, those benefits will
be capitalized in increased rental payments and thus will accrue to landlords. If some
revenues are devoted to reducing taxes on site values, some net benefits could accrue to
owners of undeveloped land who would enjoy no producers' surplus from residential
development.
120. See pp. 438-40 infra.
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exclusively on housing suppliers, but are shared by both housing sup-
pliers and housing consumers.
Figure 3 illustrates the housing market in a suburb without perfect
substitutes. The figure incorporates the three assumptions underlying
Figure 2-chiefly that all economically feasible amounts of new de-
velopment would impose no congestion or fiscal costs on existing
residents. As before, the efficient equilibrium is E, the intersection of
the demand curve (DD') and the aggregate supply curve (UVW).
If a unique suburb under the political control of a homeowner
cartel were conceded unfettered discretion, it could be expected to
behave like any other entrepreneur with monopoly power. The profit-
maximizing strategy of any monopolist is to raise price by restricting
output. A monopolist's preferred output is established by the intersec-
tion between his marginal-revenue curve and his marginal-cost (supply)
curve. Below the demand curve in Figure 3 has been drawn the
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with it.121 The location of the marginal-cost curve is a bit trickier. A
homeowner cartel can profit from two basic types of housing transac-
tions in this market: the sale of used housing units (which its members
own) and the collection of development charges from suppliers of new
units. If a suburb captures all available producers' surplus through
variable charges, it, in effect, has commandeered all developers as
wholly-owned subsidiaries. The cartel's marginal-cost curve is there-
fore the aggregate supply curve in the housing market, namely UVJV.
The monopoly equilibrium is consequently G, the point on the
demand curve directly above K, the intersection of the marginal-
revenue and marginal-cost curves.122 The suburb's profit-maximizing
strategy in this case is thus (1) to limit new housing construction to
the quantity Q, minus Qf, and (2) to collect from landowners variable
developme It charges equal to the area of the trapezoid HGKV. 12 3 The
simplest way to collect those charges would be to impose quotas,
moratoria, and wasteful development standards, and then sell relief
from those ordinances for variable prices. 124 One result of such a
policy would be that housing prices would rise from P, to P.
This seems to be roughly the strategy adopted by both Petaluma
and Ramapo. The Petaluma quota of 500 developer units per year
121. The text uses the standard procedure for finding a monopoly equilibrium. This
method is completely accurate only when a monopolist consumes none of his own out-
put. But many members of a homeowner cartel are likely to continue residing in their
houses for a number of years after they establish a monopoly housing price. When the
monopolist does consume part of his product (as a homeowner cartel does), locating the
monopoly equilibrium is more complex. The additional revenues made possible by
monopoly pricing are of no benefit to a monopolist to the extent that he consumes part
of his output. The profit-maximizing output for such a monopolist should therefore be
determined by the intersection of his supply curve and what might be called his "margi-
nal benefits curve," i.e., the marginal revenuc curve adjusted to exclude the bogus revenue
that is merely a wealth transfer from himself as consumer. This marginal benefits curie is
located above the marginal revenue curie. The monopoly equilibrium in Figure 3 is thus
technically not at G (as the text states), but rather at some point between G and E.
122. If the marginal-revenue curve had intersected the UVW curve between U and
V, rather than between V and TV, the monopoly equilibrium would be F. In that case,
the suburb would either completely ban development or impose development charges or
standards so harsh that no one would build.
Since the supply of used housing is not in fact perfectly inelastic, achieving the
monopoly equilibrium may call for programs to demolish part of the used stock (e.g.,
urban renewal) or to restrict its expansion (e.g., building bulk restrictions, occupancy
limitations, or prohibitions on conversions to residential use).
123. A totally unbridled suburb might also try to capture the consumer surplus of
entrants by selling them nontransferable residency permits at variable prices. This would
shift the marginal-revenue curve and move the monopoly equilibrium toward E. For
more on residency permits, see note 70 supra.
124. For a similar hypothesis that zoning tends to be used to cartelize supply and
raise revenue, see White, The Effect of Zoning on the Size of Metropolitan Areas, 2 J.
URB. EcoN. 279 (1975).
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apparently restricts new housing production to an amount well below
the market equilibrium.125 Much of the quota allotment is also
reserved for multifamily units and subsidized developments-two hous-
ing types not likely to compete with the single-family units occupied
by 83% of Petaluma households. 2 To the extent that they allow new
development, Petaluma homeowners have no reason to let landowners
keep any surplus, much less share in the gains from cartelization of
the housing supply. They have, therefore, apparently adopted the
profit-maximizing strategy of selling quota allotments for variable
prices and, to enforce the price discrimination, have prohibited the
transfer of those allotments from site to site. Developer payments are
basically made through the dedication of facilities. A 17-member
Residential Development Evaluation Board applies a point system to
assess a developer's application for an allotment. The projects that
earn the most points are those that require the lowest local expendi-
tures on street, water, sewer, drainage, fire, and school systems; this
approach induces developers to finance those facilities by themselves.
A Petaluma subdivider can likewise earn points by providing open
space, pathways, bicyclepaths, equestrian trails, schoolrooms, or similar
facilities of community-wide benefit.127
The highly publicized Ramapo plan'2 also seems to be designed
both to slow growth and to exact maximum surplus from those
permitted to develop. Ramapo's 18-year staged growth program is
certainly partly bluff; the ordinance explicitly states that a developer
can purchase variances from the town's timetable by providing major
roads, off-site sewer and drainage facilities, park improvements, school
sites, and firehouses. Those dedications help build up the "develop-
ment points" he needs. But the Ramapo plan is apparently not
entirely for fundraising. The sales price for variances has been set high
enough to reduce the amount of development.' 29 Thus the plan has
the twin earmarks of the optimal strategy for homeowners in a unique
125. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 900-02 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). As indicated in note 6 supra, the 500-unit figure
applies only to buildings or subdivisions that have five or more units. Even so, the Ninth
Circuit assumed that the quota would inhibit Petaluma's rate of growth.
126. Id. at 900-01.
127. Petaluma, Cal., Resolution No. 6113 N.C.S. (Aug. 21, 1972), reprinted in Land-
man, No, Mr. Bossehnan, the Town of Ramnapo Cannot Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World: A Reply (Part 1), 10 TULSA L.J. 169, 193 n.43 (1974).
128. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 178,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (upholding plan).
129. An attorney for the National Association of Home Builders has asserted that
Ramapo's growth rate has slowed by 75% on account of its plan. Wall St. J., Jan. 31,
1975, at 1, col. 1, and 21, col. 5.
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suburb-a partial restriction on supply coupled with a means to capture
the surplus of the owners of land where development occurs.130
A suburb can enhance its monopoly profits by allying itself with
similar suburbs to restrict housing construction. For example, the
simultaneous takeover of Fairfax, Montgomery, and Prince Georges
counties by antidevelopment politicians in the early 1970s may explain
in part the astounding increase in Washington, D.C., area housing
prices that followed.' 3 ' Voluntary cartel arrangements, however, are
notoriously unstable. If a dozen elite suburbs join in curtailing new
development, one of them is likely to cheat on the implicit agreement
in order to collect the lucrative development charges made possible by
the monopoly prices. Moreover, as housing prices rise, landowners
have more and more incentive to invest resources in electing pro-
development candidates in any given suburb. Voluntary antigrowth
cartels thus tend to unravel, dissipating potential monopoly profits.
What the conspiring suburbs need is a cartel manager able to coerce
all members to comply with stipulated output restrictions. A higher
government is obviously the best candidate to perform this function.
For example, a regional body with the authority to enforce a sewer
connection moratorium 132 can effectively police the output of new
housing within many suburbs. State government is another good cartel
manager. Two practiced observers believe that Hawaii's stringent state-
wide planning controls have been a major factor in causing the phe-
nomenally high housing prices there.133 The federal government seems
130. A monopolist hardly has an easy time determining how much to restrict output.
All price-setters have imperfect knowledge of supply and demand conditions, and are
forced to use trial-and-error to approach the monopoly equilibrium. Suburban home-
owners face particularly severe problems. Since no homeowner cartel is perfectly homo-
geneous, conflicts over strategy are inevitable. For example, since moratoria and other
short-lived antigrowth devices cause only temporary price increases, they will tend to be
favored more by homeowners about to move away than by the deeply rooted. In addi-
tion, the benefits of achieving an increase in housing prices may be offset in part by
higher property taxes owed larger governmental units that include the suburb.
131. The average sales price of new homes in the Washington metropolitan area
jumped 101% between 1968 and 1975, easily the largest increase over that period in any
major metropolitan area examined by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. (The median
metropolitan increase was 57%.) Local observers attribute the Washington phenomenon
to state and county antigrowth policies and to the generosity of federal government pay
scales. Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1.
132. E.g., Morshead v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., 45 Cal. App.
3d 442, 119 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975) (sustaining sewer connection moratorium imposed by
regional body).
133. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUrION IN LAND USE CONTROL 25-27
(1971) (study done for Council on Environmental Quality); Bosselman, Can the Town of
Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, I FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234,
246-47 (1973).
Hawaii's unique racial mix and isolated location create an unusually inelastic demand
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to be increasingly involved in coordinating antigrowth efforts. On
several occasions, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency
has deliberately withheld sewerage construction grants in order to
induce local officials to stop increases in local sewerage inflows. 34
National growth restrictions are the surest means for boosting housing
prices; Sweden, for instance, to the great benefit of its current home-
owners, has in effect restricted its production of single-family homes
by failing to expand output to meet the rising demand.135
C. Alternative Legal Rules Considered
When consumer demand is perfectly elastic, as in Figure 2, there is
no strong efficiency reason for constraining suburban discretion. This
ceases to be true when the demand curve for housing is downwardly
sloped. "Public" monopolies are as allocationally mischievous as
"private" ones. If the suburb pictured in Figure 3 achieved its monop-
oly equilibrium of G, a deadweight social loss equal to the triangle
for its housing. Given the opportunities for extraordinary monopoly profits, it should
not be surprising that state land-use planning originated there.
The ownership of undeveloped lands in Hawaii is largely concentrated in a few giant
estates. See F. BOSSELNIAN & D. CALLIES, Stpra at 13-15. If there is a cartel behind Hawaii's
controls, it may consist of these large landowners, not the owners of existing structures.
The estate owners would certainly profit by coordinating their output and by suppressing
competition from smaller developers. If they control the state land-planning agency, one
would expect the development charges imposed on them by the state agency to be rather
small so that they themselves could reap the surplus made possible by monopoly housing
prices.
134. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1975, § I, at 3, col. 5 (L.A., Cal.); N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1974,
§ IV, at 9, col. 2 (Ocean County, N.J.).
135. The chronic national housing shortage, particularly acute in Stockholm, has
led to an emphasis-in the satellite centers as well as elsewhere-on the construction
of multi-family industrialized housing. The growing market demand for single-
family detached housing has been largely unmet, except through proliferating
summer houses.
A. STRONG, PLANNED URBAN ENVIRONMENTS xxiii, xxix (1971).
Regional, state, and national growth restrictions, however, are hard to maintain. As the
unit of government becomes larger and more complex, its decisionmakers tend to be-
come more vulnerable to the influence of land-development interests. See pp. 407-09 supra.
The pattern of state land-use programs seems to support this theory of politics. The
state programs with the most antidevelopment teeth have been enacted in relatively
small states. See, e.g., HAWAII Rxv. STAT. §§ 205-1 to 205-15 (1968); ME. RFv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 683-685C (West Supp. 1975); id. tit. 38, §§ 481-488; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6001-6091 (1973).
The pattern in the more populous states seems to be different. Florida's program is in
some ways prodevelopment. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.11 (Harrison 1975) (in cases
governed by statute, state agency is authorized to review local denials of development
approvals). The original California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, after being consistently
rejected by the state legislature, was finally enacted by initiative, a process harder for
prodevelopment forces to influence. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West Supp.
1975).
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KEG would result. 13 6 That area represents the additional surplus that
would accrue to producers and consumers if they were permitted to
trade the optimal quantity of housing, Q.
1. Protecting Housing Consumers Against Monopoly Pricing
The two models just considered provide a strong argument for
adopting legal doctrines to protect housing consumers from suburban
monopolization efforts. Such doctrines would not only improve re-
source allocation, but would also prevent the distributive injustice of
early arrivals to a municipality enriching themselves at the expense of
later arrivals. 37
A critical lesson of Figure 3 is that suburbs will not necessarily be
deterred from inefficient monopolistic practices simply by taking doc-
trines that entitle landowners to damages. Suppose a municipality that
adopted exclusionary policies only had to compensate landowners. If
there were many tenants in the suburb, or if most residents planned
to sell their houses promptly, a homeowner cartel might nevertheless
still want to achieve its monopoly equilibrium (G in Figure 3). Re-
stricting production to Q, would cost the suburb's taxpayers a maxi-
mum of KLG in payoffs to landowners. 38 That cost might be less than
136. The Coase theorem asserts that if transaction costs are zero, this deadweight loss
will be eliminated by market transactions. Those injured by the monopolistic practice
would successfully bargain for its elimination. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). In the case of suburban exclusion, land developers frequently
do bargain; by paying HGKV in development charges to relieve growth restrictions, they
move the suburb from point F in Figure 3 to the less socially wasteful G. However,
housing consumers, the other injured group, are more numerous than developers and
less knowledgeable and organized. As a practical matter, they arc not able to bargain
for abandonment of a cartelization policy.
137. When earlybirds have done something creative, it is efficient to reward them and
thereby provide incentives for innovation. This is, of course, the rationale for rewards to
finders and for the patent and copyright systems. Early settlement in a suburb, however,
is not an activity that will wither away unless specially rewarded. It is more analogous
to early establishment of a bridge or ferry at a river crossing. Cf. Proprietors of the
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (re-
fusing to protect proprietors of old bridge from competition from new bridge). Granting
monopoly power in these contexts does not promote efficiency in either the long or
short run.
Current residents might try to defend the horizontal equity of policies that injure
newcomers by invoking the widespread acceptance of queues to allocate scarce resources.
The rejoinder should be that the policy of allocating wealth by queue is being estab-
lished in this case by those who know they are first in line.
138. This assumes that landowners whose development rights are condemned are
entitled to "project enhanced" value-in this context, the increment in land values
created by the monopolization program. Cf. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)
(excludes from condemnee's compensation the increase in land value caused by con-
demnor's project after its final authorization); Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme,
4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971) ("project enhanced" value may be
436
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis
the present value to cartel members of the monopoly profits resulting
from the increase in housing prices from P, to P,. By analogy, if John
D. Rockefeller had had the power of eminent domain over competing
oil companies, he might indeed have found it in his interest to acquire
them and shut them down. So might a suburb decide to pursue an
expensive green-belt acquisition program in order to extinguish all
competing development rights. To assure the attainment of the op-
timum equilibrium, E, it is thus necessary to entitle consumers either
to enjoin monopolization efforts or to collect the damages they suffer
from monopoly pricing, namely, at G, damages equal to P, minus P,.
If only the damages remedy were provided, it would have to be given
both to consumers who buy new housing and, more importantly, also
to current tenants and future purchasers of services in the used stock
of housing.' 39 Establishment of either the injunction or the damages
remedy for consumers would ensure that monopolization efforts would
never be in a suburb's interest. Articulation of such a consumer remedy
is the key for preventing enactment of inefficient land-use controls. So
long as consumers are provided an effective remedy, it does not matter
from an efficiency standpoint whether landowners are given any
remedy at all.
Which remedy or remedies should consumers have? Despite the
great difficulty of measuring them, the exclusive remedy of damages is
the best candidate. The uncertainties and inhibiting effects of injunc-
tions have already been summarized.140 When an exclusionary suburb
is fungible (as many are), its policies do not injure consumers. 141 If
there are net congestion costs from growth, the efforts of a unique
suburb to restrict housing production can promote efficiency.' 42 Allow-
ing consumers to obtain injunctions against municipal programs in
these situations would be a mistake. If injunctions are to be provided
only in the remaining cases in which growth restrictions both are inef-
ficient and injure consumers, desirable suburban land-use ordinances
or land acquisitions would be under a pall of uncertainty.
Restricting consumers to the damages remedy thus has the virtue of
not impeding a suburb's freedom to control its land uses. The chal-
lenge is to make damages a workable remedy as an administrative
considered if it accrues to property prior to time when it was reasonably probable that
property would be taken by government). I will later suggest that landowners should not
recover this increment. See notes 170 & 8360 infra.
139. In addition, someone should be entitled to recover the damages suffered by the
consumers who refuse to buy because of monopoly prices. See note 360 infra.
140. See pp. 416-17 and note 80 supra.
141. See pp. 425-26 supra.
142. See pp. 444-45 infra.
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matter. The problems of measurement involved are intimidating, but
certainly not unique; they are exactly those encountered in consumer
suits for antitrust damages. As will be explained more fully later, the
necessary administrative shortcuts include the use of class actions, the
rough approximation of damages, and restraint in actually distributing
awards to individual consumers. 145 To prevent wasteful litigation,
consumer representatives should be required to bear an initial burden
of proving that there has been more than de minimis injury. In ad-
dition, a suburb should be entitled to invoke Michelman's fairness
test 144 as a defense against a consumer complaint. A suburb would thus
prevail if it could prove that its growth-control program was efficient
and that the long-run self-interest of consumers makes it fair that
damages not be awarded.
Consumers suing typical suburbs will not often prevail in these
damage actions. In Warth v. Seldin 45 the Supreme Court was un-
questionably correct in being skeptical of consumer allegations of
harms from a suburb's exclusionary policies. 1 46 The antigrowth mea-
sures of most small suburbs do not injure housing consumers. It is, of
course, possible that several neighboring suburbs will successfully
pursue parallel exclusionary policies that in aggregate do result in
monopoly price levels.' 47 In that case, consumers pursuing a damages
suit should join these suburbs as defendants.
2. Who Should Reap Developer Surplus?
As long as consumers are entitled to recover their damages arising
from municipal restrictions on housing production, there is no com-
pelling efficiency reason to prohibit a suburb from using growth con-
trols or development charges to capture landowner surplus. In Figure
3, for example, it is not allocatively harmful for the suburb to collect
143. See p. 500 infra.
144. See p. 415 supra.
145. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (low-income consumers living elsewhere lack standing to
attack exclusive suburb's land-use policies, at least so long as they have no concrete
interest in any particular development project).
146. Many courts have reached the merits in cases of this nature. See, e.g., Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555, 561-63 (1977) (con-
sumer interested in particular project has standing to attack suburb's restriction on that
project; no constitutional violation); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467
F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972); Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster, 63 N.J. 591,
311 A.2d 177 (1973) (overturning lower-court decision not to permit excluded individuals
to intervene in suit by developer challenging suburb's allegedly exclusionary zoning
regulations); cf. Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting
on merits a consumer attack on exclusionary zoning).
147. As noted, self-interest will tend to break up this conscious parallelism unless a
larger government can be found to act as cartel manager. See pp. 434-35 supra.
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development charges from landowners equal to the trapezoid HGKV,
provided that it thereafter compensates consumers of new housing by
an amount equal to Q, minus Qf multiplied by the difference be-
tween P, and P,. There is, however, at least one efficiency considera-
tion that might weakly support immunization of landowner surplus
from capture. If suburbs impose variable development charges, the
relative administrative costs of this local revenue-raising device will
probably exceed the administrative costs of collecting other types of
local taxes. But there is a countervailing consideration; although de-
velopment charges may be administratively expensive, they may be
allocatively superior to other local taxes.148 If the development charges
imposed on any landowner do not exceed the surplus that he derives
from development, those charges fall entirely on economic rents and
thus cause no misallocations; local excise taxes, in contrast, usually
curtail consumption of the taxed good and lead to a deadweight ef-
ficiency loss.' 40 But these allocative advantages of development charges
should not be overdramatized. Higher property taxes are in fact the
most likely substitute for development-charge revenue; the allocative
distortions of the property tax system are now not thought to be
particularly great.1 50
Equity is thus the critical consideration. Who has the more just
claim-a landowner who would obtain surplus from development or
the owners of already existing structures who would like to capture
those gains for themselves? For the models now under discussion,
horizontal equity definitely cuts in favor of developers. No local
government strives to capture through taxes the entire surplus of
owners of single-family homes (or other residential properties). That
would hardly be politically popular. Development charges, by con-
trast, are widely used by small suburbs because they cream off the
surplus of a particular group of landowners who have little political
power.' 5' To cast the practice in its worst light, it is as if a suburb
adopted Henry George's system of stiff taxes on site values0 2 but then
decided to apply those taxes only to properties owned by nonvoters.
Horizontal equity justifies the adoption of legal doctrines to protect
148. For my somewhat idiosyncratic distinction between administrative and allocative
costs, see p. 414 & note 74 supra.
149. Economists generally consider narrow excise taxes to be allocatively inferior to
broad-based taxes. See, e.g., A. HARBERGER, supra note 41, at 25-28, 47-53. They fear
that in most markets the elasticities are such that excise taxes affect the quantities
consumed.
150. See Mieszkowski, supra note 41, at 82-90; Ladd, supra note 41, at 65, 73, 79.
151. See pp. 405-07 supra.
152. H. GEORGE, PROcRESS AND POVERTY 328-30, 403-07 (Fiftieth Anniversary ed. 1929).
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tiny minorities from politically expedient efforts to seize their surplus.
Developers would not deserve this legal protection, however, if the
element of discrimination against the voteless and vote-poor were not
present. Thus if a suburb adopted Henry George's site-value taxation
scheme in toto, thereby subjecting resident homeowners themselves to
loss of surplus, developers could hardly complain of horizontal un-
fairness. -53
The goal of vertical equity probably cuts slightly the other way.
Where owners of underdeveloped land are rich and owners of existing
structures poor, development charges will tend to equalize the distribu-
tion of wealth. But how certain can one be that this is true? Do the
farmers and speculators who own undeveloped land tend to be
wealthier than those who own homes and apartment buildings in the
suburbs? Perhaps so, but one at least would want empirical support
for the proposition. Moreover, this is a fight between two relatively
privileged classes and consequently not one that should arouse the
passions of those most concerned about the distribution of wealth.
The goal of horizontal equity--the equal treatment of all landowners
-seems paramount. That goal points to the adoption of a legal rule
forbidding a suburb's use of charges that fall only on the surplus of
owners of undeveloped land.
This Part has thus led to the formulation of two still tentative legal
doctrines. The first is that consumers should be entitled to recover
damages arising from suburban programs that raise housing prices.
The second is that development charges tend to be an unjust system
for raising municipal revenue and, therefore, should not be allowed.
However, both of these doctrines were fashioned through analysis of
models that assumed that suburban growth imposes no net congestion
costs or fiscal burdens on existing residents. The next task is to see
whether the tentative doctrines remain viable when those simplifying
assumptions are abandoned.
153. The issue is when it becomes unfair for a government to tax some economic
rents but not others. For an extended analysis concluding that it is fair to tax the
surplus of only slum landlords for the benefit of poor tenants, see Ackerman, Regulating
Shm Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and
Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1160-74 (1971).
Some authors have even questioned the justice of Henry George's system of taxing the
surplus of all landowners because it leaves other forms of surplus untaxed. See, e.g., R.
LIPsEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMIcS 384 (4th ed. 1975). This concentration of tax burdens on
landowners seems defensible, however, at least when local governments are doing the
taxing. If a small jurisdiction tries to tax an owner's surplus in a mobile resource
(like labor), the owner can export the resource to evade the tax. Since taxes on surplus
are the most efficient taxes, and since the ownership of land is reasonably widely
distributed, landowners have no strong claim that local site-value taxes of general
application are unjust.
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VI. Legal Treatment of the Congestion Costs of Growth
New development threatens to impose three different types of costs
on those who already reside in suburbs. The first type, nuisance costs,
arise when a new housing project is subnormal in quality. Mobile
home parks, garden apartments, and federally subsidized tract housing,
for example, may be far below prevailing aesthetic quality levels and
cause the value of nearby land to fall. As already noted,1a 4 a suburb
should be entitled to forbid the nuisance features of these projects,
and, when it does, it should be held liable for a taking only when a
developer can prove the antinuisance restriction to be grossly in-
efficient. 1' 5
Suburbanites who favor moratoria, quotas, and the like are usually
not trying to curb nuisance costs, however. The new housing they
would like to inhibit often would be superior in quality to most cur-
rent housing in their neighborhoods. 15 Arguably, they are instead
trying to prevent the congestion costs that may arise from growth.
Even luxury developments can contribute to air pollution and traffic
tie-ups. Congestion costs usually pervade a community; nuisance costs,
in contrast, usually impinge only on immediate neighbors.
Fiscal costs are the third type of potential detriments resulting from
urban growth. They arise when the incremental costs to municipal
taxpayers of servicing a new development exceed the incremental
municipal revenues the development would engender. This Part con-
siders how the possible presence of congestion costs should influence
the law of suburban growth controls. Fiscal costs will be taken up in
the next Part.
A. The Theoretical Basis for Growth Controls
Urban economists, led by George Tolley and Harry Richardson,
have in the past few years produced a significant literature on the
welfare economics of urban growth 5"a The essence of their analysis is
easily summarized. The locational decisions of firms and households
154. See p. 419 supra.
155. This should not be construed as praise for ordinances that ban specified nuisance
activities. See note 94 supra.
156. New housing tends to be located initially at the upper part of the quality
spectrum for all housing and then to filter downvard as it ages. See generally W.
GRIGSBY, HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY 99-110 (1963).
157. See H. RICHARDSON, THE EcoNoMiCS oF URBAN SIZE (1973) (includes wondrously
complete bibliography); Tolley, The Welfare Economics of City Bigness, 1 J. URB. ECON.
324 (1974); Symposium: The Agglomeration Process in Urban Growth, 9 URB. STUD. 263
(1972); Symposium: Economic Research and National Urban Development Strategies, id.
at 3.
The Yale Law Journal
can impose both external costs and external benefits on a community.
The costs, like air pollution and traffic congestion, tend to be more
obvious than the benefits, like contributions to the critical mass
necessary to support a wholesale plumbing outlet, daily newspaper, or
professional football team. If entrants are free to settle where they
want (and, implicitly, no one pays entrants to stay out), entrants will
take into account not the marginal costs and benefits they create but
only the average costs and benefits inherent in a given city size. If
urban growth is characterized by increasing net congestion costs, cities
will be too large because the marginal costs created by a new entrant
will exceed the average costs that the entrant bears. On the other
hand, if there are increasing net congestion benefits from growth, city
sizes will be too small because entrants will consider only average, not
marginal, benefits.'0 s
In his important article, Tolley explicitly assumes that the costs of
urban congestion exceed the benefits of that congestion.159 That as-
sumption leads him inexorably to his conclusion that big cities tend
to be too big. But his initial assumption is hardly unassailable. Al-
though the available evidence shows positive correlations between city
size and such costs as noise, air pollution, traffic congestion, and
length of journey-to-work, these correlations are often weaker than
one might suppose.'0 0 It is not at all clear that large cities are less
healthy, more stressful, or more crime-ridden than small ones; those
who have tested these plausible hypotheses have had surprising dif-
ficulty proving them. There may be diseconomies of scale in providing
158. The famous "case of the two roads" propounded by Pigou and later elaborated
by Frank Knight can be used to illustrate this theory. See A. Picou, THE ECONON11cs OF
WELFARE 194 (Ist ed. 1920); Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38Q.J. EcoN. 582, 589-90 (1924). Two parallel roads connect two cities. One road is wide
enough to carry all traffic without congestion; this wide road is so poorly graded, how-
ever, that speeds on it can never exceed 25 m.p.h. The second road is an expressway on
which vehicles can travel at 70 m.p.h. when there is no congestion; but the expressway
is narrow and readily congested by the usual flow of traffic between the cities. Pigou
noted that travelers would take the expressway as long as it offered speeds greater than
25 m.p.h. They would consider the average congestion costs on the expressway, because
that would affect their own speed, but they would not consider the additional congestion
costs they would impose on others. The result would be a clear case of misallocation of
resources: speeds on the expressway would fall to 25 m.p.h., and that resource would be
completely wasted since travel at 25 m.p.h. was always attainable on the wide, slow road.
Now substitute the town of Ramapo for the expressway and New York City for the wide,
low-speed road. If the analogy is apt, allowing population to flow to Ramapo will
completely waste the advantages of that municipality without producing any improve-
ment in living conditions in New York.
159. See Tolley, supra note 157, at 334.
160. For compilations of the empirical evidence on the external costs and benefits of
urban agglomerations, see H. RICHARDSON, supra note 157, at 21-119; and Hoch, Income
and City Size, 9 UR. STuD. 299, 308-25 (1972).
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public services like police, education, and refuse collection,'' but this
is far from certain.' 6 2 In addition, increasing costs of this sort may be
simply a function of gross population (as opposed to population
density), and thus may be avoided through creation of special districts
or through contracting for private services.
The benefits of size are less obvious because (unlike many costs)
they do not assault the senses. The per-capita costs of some local public
services-water and sewer systems, for example-generally fall as popula-
tion density rises. 16 3 Large cities may also provide scale economies in
the provision of private services like entertainment and cultural
activities. Increased city size tends to enhance production possibilities
by giving both entrepreneurs and workers more specialized opportuni-
ties. Because more goods are internally traded in large cities, transpor-
tation costs for goods and services may fall.
Enactment of growth controls would not necessarily deprive residents
of a suburb of these benefits of size. First, many economies of scale are
a function of the metropolitan area's population, not of one suburb's
population. Second, some growth controls-for example, greenbelt
programs-may reduce a suburb's total population but at the same
time increase the density of its developed areas; these measures could
actually enhance the efficiency of municipal utility systems.
The evidence on the relative costs and benefits of urban growth is
still fragmentary. There is consequently no consensus among econ-
omists on whether urban areas tend toward overconcentration.' 64 For
purposes of analysis it is assumed here that the costs of growth may in
fact exceed the benefits of growth, and that this is true not only for
an entire metropolitan area but also for an individual suburb. 65
161. See W. HIRSCH, URBAN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 326-34 (1973).
162. See H. RICHARDSON, supra note 157, at 85-96 (contends most studies examine only
correlations between expenditures and size and thus fail to recognize differences in
quality of services).
163. See, e.g., Anderson, Community Improvements and Services Costs, 99 J. URB.
PL~N. & DEv. Div., PROC. Am. Soc'Y CIv. ENGINEERS, Mar. 1973, at 77; Hufbauer & Severn,
Municipal Costs and Urban Area, 2 J. URn. EcoN. 199 (1975).
164. At least three distinguished observers-Harry Richardson, William Alonso, and
Edwin Mills-dispute Tolley's assumption that cities suffer increasing net congestion
costs. H. RICHARDSON, supra note 157, at 2-3, 17, 122; Mills & deFerranti, Market Choices
and Optimum City Size, in Papers and Proceedings of the 83d Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association, 61 Am. ECON. REV., May 1971, at 340, 341-44; cf. Mills,
Welfare Aspects of National Policy Toward City Sizes, 9 URB. STUD. 117, 123 (1972)
(proposals to discourage growth of large cities in U.S. misguided because racial minorities
receive better public services in metropolitan central cities than obtainable in rural South,
from which they migrated). Other respected urban economists agree with Tolley. See, e.g.,
Hoch, supra note 160, at 307; Thompson, The National System of Cities as an Object of
Public Policy, 9 URn. STUD. 99, 99-102 (1972).
165. One might suspect that the existence of net congestion costs or benefits could
be detected by examining the influence of city size on wage rates. If the disadvantages
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B. Alternative Legal Approaches to the Problem of Congestion
Figure 4 shows the housing market in a unique suburb that is
vulnerable to net congestion costs from growth. The net congestion
costs begin to arise at quantity Q. They become more serious as more
housing is produced, a trend indicated by the increasing divergence
between lines CX and CW. All congestion costs that arise are initially
assumed to be internal to the suburb in question; this assumption is
relaxed in the last section of this Part. The optimal equilibrium in
this market is again designated as E; beyond point Q, the benefits to
consumers of another unit of housing no longer exceed the sum of
the private and social costs of its production. In all other respects
Figure 4 is similar to Figure 3.
1. The Inefficiency of the Extreme Legal Solutions
Figure 4 clearly reveals the danger of giving absolute rights to any
of the parties to growth-control disputes. If a suburb had an absolute
right to control, it would, as before, seek its monopoly equilibrium of
of big-city living outweigh the advantages, one would expect to find higher wages in
large cities to compensate workers for the net disamenities. In fact, in all countries and
during all historical periods, wages consistently have been higher in large cities than
elsewhere, and this remains true even if one adjusts for differences in the make-up of
city and non-city populations. See H. RICHARDSON, supra note 157, at 49-51; Hoch, supra
note 160, at 310-11.
Tolley's model, however, shows that this wage differential is not solid evidence that
there are net congestion costs. He argues that the combined costs of housing and transpor-
tation must be higher for households in large cities because higher land rents evolve to
ration the relatively scarce central locations. Since workers must receive compensation
for this added housing-plus-transport cost (otherwise they would leave for another labor
market), the labor costs of producing all personal services and all locally traded goods
are higher in large cities than in small cities; these higher labor costs are reflected in
higher prices for these goods and services. Thus the increased cost of housing-plus-access
in large cities has a general multiplier effect on the local cost of living. Tolley shows
that disamenities from net congestion costs or poor climate would also increase wage
rates with a multiplier effect. See Tolley, supra note 157, at 325-31.
In 1967, per-capita income in the New York SMSA was 35% above the United States
average. Hoch estimates that only an 8% differential could be accounted for by the
composition of New York's population. Hoch, supra note 160, at 315. Tolley's theory
would indicate that the balance of the differential (27%) would be due to a higher cost
of living in New York resulting from the multiplied effects of (1) higher housing-plus-
transport costs, and perhaps (2) net congestion costs and (3) disamenities of living in
New York unrelated to congestion. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) consumer price
index, however, showed New York prices at that time to be only 9% higher than the
national average. Id. Tolley would presumably attribute this discrepancy to the fact that
the BLS cost-of-living index ignores travel time and other hard-to-measure factors that
make big-city living expensive. While it is clear that New York area residents are
receiving compensatory wage payments for something, Tolley's theory does not compel
the conclusion that their higher wages are made necessary, even in part, by net conges-
tion costs. Higher housing costs or an unappealing climate might be responsible for the
entire wage differential.
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G.'0 6 This would result in a deadweight social loss of GECK. On the
other hand, if the suppliers and consumers of housing could enjoin all
antigrowth measures, the result would be a market equilibrium of B-
the intersection of the demand curve and the private-cost curve. 67 B is
also suboptimal. The housing units produced between Q, and Qb
would create net congestion costs of EZBN. The gains in producers'
and consumers' surplus from that added production is only EBN.
The difference between the two, EZB, is a deadweight social loss. 168
166. See pp. 431-32 supra. When external costs are present, it is possible that the
monopoly equilibrium will be at or beyond the optimal level of output. Edelson,
Congestion Tolls Under Monopoly, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 873 (1971).
167. This assumes that fear of holdouts would deter suburbs from trying to buy up
consumers' and landowners' rights to enjoin efficient antigrowth programs.
168. In a prior article I argued that market forces would produce a better distribu-
tion of population than governmental planning. Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 73, at
769-71. If one had no choice but to grant absolute legal rights to one side or the other,
I would continue to prefer that the property rule favor consumers and landowners as
opposed to the government. My prior article failed to discuss the intermediate legal rules
I 1 I I
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In short, the optimal amount of housing in Figure 4, Q, cannot be
achieved unless the law of growth controls relies on liability rules or
otherwise places limits on the applicability of property rules.
2. An Appraisal of the Current Doctrinal Candidates
Analysis of the somewhat simpler housing market models led to
the nomination of the following team of legal rules: (1) a suburb
cannot impose development charges; (2) a suburb that enacts growth
restrictions must compensate both landowners'69 and consumers for
their resulting damages unless it can make out a successful defense
based on Michelman's fairness test.
If Petaluma were the suburb illustrated in Figure 4, how would it
behave if these legal rules were in effect? To maximize the welfare of
current residents, Petaluma officials would promulgate quotas or
moratoria on new construction that would limit housing supply to
the optimal level, Qe. This policy would provide benefits of EZBN in
lower congestion costs.
If fairness dictates that compensation be awarded, Petaluma would
pay RBN to the landowners the policy prevented from building,170
and EBR to consumers deprived of housing opportunities.' 71 These
compensatory payments would total EBN, considerably less than the
suburb's countervailing benefits of EZBN. The great appeal of mak-
available and thus oversimplified the legal choices presented by growth controls. For
another criticism of my prior position, see Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Ac-
commodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75
COLUM. L. Rav. 1021, 1028-32 (1975).
169. Since growth controls typically prohibit activities that are not subnormal, land-
owners would rarely be required to prove that the control is grossly inefficient. See
p. 424 supra.
170. This assumes that injured landowners should not receive compensation for their
loss of opportunity to benefit from the price increase resulting from the curtailment of
housing production. Not awarding that extra compensation is the efficient rule so long
as someone else is entitled to recover for losses suffered by consumers at the margin. See
also note 138 supra & note 360 infra. The opposite rule would entitle frustrated land-
owners to receive ELBN in compensation.
This less generous measure of landowner compensation helps assure that only those
landowners who would have built in the absence of any antigrowth measure actually
receive damage awards. These landowners are those who lie on the supply curve betweenQ, and Q,. If growth restrictions limiting housing to Q, were to take effect, landowners
who lie on the supply curve between Qb and Qj might erroneously claim that they are
injured by the antigrowth restriction since they could profitably sell housing at price P,.
There is no reason to compensate these landowners. They would not have built had
the suburb not controlled growth, because housing prices would have remained at P5 .
171. For simplicity of exposition, the text does not repeat the earlier conclusion that
Petaluma tenants and other residents who suffer from the increase in housing prices from
Pb to P, should also have a prima facie claim for compensation. See p. 437 supra.
This possibility should not greatly affect the suburb's incentives. The residential property
owners who would largely bear the costs of this compensation would generally perceive
these costs as offset by their gains from the higher housing prices.
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ing suburbs liable for damages is that the suburb's self-interest would
lead it to restrict growth to the optimum point, Q,, but no further. If
it reduced output below Q,, its marginal liabilities would begin to
exceed its marginal benefits.
Since Petaluma could prove that restricting housing production to
Q, is efficient, it would not have to pay damages to anyone if it could
make out the balance of the defense based on Michelman's fairness
test-namely that both groups of claimants should be able to under-
stand that their long-run self-interest lies in the denial of compensa-
tion. As usual, this determination would depend in part on the
severity of their damages and on the administrative costs of making
compensatory payments. 172 However, if Petaluma restricted growth
too much-i.e., to an amount below Q,--it should always be liable
for the damage resulting from the excessive restriction. Since that
excess would be inefficient, the Michelman defense would never be
available to the suburb.
The introduction of congestion costs into the model thus, if any-
thing, bolsters the viability of the tentative slate of legal rules. They
are admirably suited both for enabling a suburb to enact efficient
growth restrictions and for discouraging it from going too far.
3. Other Plausible Legal Approaches
a. Development Charges Equal to Marginal Net Congestion Costs
Economists in the Pigovian tradition are likely to consider conges-
tion taxes imposed on new development to be the obvious solution to
the model in Figure 4.17- If there were no ceiling on these taxes,
suburban officials would be tempted to impose a minimum per-unit
development charge equal to the vertical distance GK in Figure 4,
thereby achieving the suburb's monopoly equilibrium of G. To pre-
vent this sort of misallocation, those who favor imposition of conges-
tion charges would desire to limit them by law to the net congestion
costs caused by the marginal housing unit produced. If this were done,
the largest per-unit charge the suburb in Figure 4 would be entitled
172. See p. 419 supra.
173. For two endorsements of the employment of development charges equal to
marginal costs of congestion, see Adelstein & Edelson, supra note 34, at 162; Blair, "Op-
timum City Size: Some Thoughts on Theory and Policy": Comment, 51 LAND ECON. 284,
285-86 (1975).
Pigou reports that Alfred Marshall suggested "'that every person putting up a house
in a district that has got as closely populated as is good should be compelled to con-
tribute towards providing free playgrounds.'" A. PIGou, supra note 158, at 168.
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to collect is represented by the vertical distance EN, the exact amount
appropriate for "internalizing" the social cost and achieving Q, the
optimal output.
The principal difference between congestion charges and the team
of rules previously nominated is not allocational but distributional.
The prior approach provides for compensation of those damaged by
growth controls; the congestion charge approach does not. Horizontal
equity is better served by compensation. If congestion results from
the achievement of some critical population size, the first household
to reside in a suburb contributes as much to the problem as the last
to come in. Senior residents contribute as much to smog and highway
snarls as do new entrants. The latter are singled out for taxation
because of their political weakness, not for any ethically relevant
difference in their behavior. 17 4 Similarly, landowners who develop
later rather than earlier would be understandably aggrieved if their
surplus were to be singled out for capture.
Some might defend the fairness of a legal rule granting early
residents a special distributional preference. Are not late arrivals to
crowded elevators and lifeboats regularly sacrificed for the welfare of
those already on board? There are several rejoinders. While this may
indeed be the custom for elevators and lifeboats, that does not mean
the custom is fair; when not limited by law, the early arrivals simply
may be ideally situated to use their muscle against latecomers. Second,
when congestion arises suddenly and without warning (as in the case of
lifeboats and off-peak-hour traffic jams on elevators and highways),
paying latecomers to stay out is not likely to be administratively work-
able. The only conceivable transfer payment in these situations is one
paid by entrants. When congestion develops slowly, however, as with
housing in suburbs, those already on board have time to organize
to make a payment in the other direction. A last consideration is that
the horizontal fairness of congestion charges depends in part on who
benefits from the revenue. If the proceeds go to a neutral treasury,
those who pay the charges may be persuaded that the taxes were
designed to promote efficiency and not simply to transfer wealth.
When the revenues go into the pockets of senior residents who also
contribute to the congestion, the practice is not likely to be perceived
as fair.
Although horizontally unfair, congestion charges would be cheaper
to administer in some situations than rules requiring suburbs to in-
demnify injuries from growth controls. For example, fewer payments
174. See also note 137 supra.
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might be involved. But these potential administrative advantages
should not be exaggerated. The proposed team of rules would not
require compensation whenever an antigrowth program was efficient
and the administrative costs of payment were intolerably high. In
that case Michelman's defense would be available.
Arming suburbs with the right to impose congestion charges would
risk serious allocative harm. The sparse evidence available indicates
that a suburb's housing prices usually rise when its vacant land is
converted into more subdivisions of single-family homes.173 Thus one
doubts whether most suburbs are in fact threatened by net congestion
costs from growth. Equally important, it is also doubtful that net
congestion costs are a linear function of the number of housing units
(or standard house equivalents)-the relationship indicated in Figure
4. If air pollution and traffic tie-ups are the chief forms of congestion,
suburbs should levy their congestion charges on the acquisition of
automobiles, not on the construction of new housing.176
Since there appears to be no compelling efficiency advantage in
having the corrective payment made by new entrants rather than
established residents, horizontal equity should be the decisive con-
sideration. The rules nominated earlier would prohibit all develop-
ment charges-and a fortiori congestion charges-and therefore need
not (yet) be amended. If a suburb faces congestion, it will have to pay
to prevent it.
b. Injunctive Relief Against Excessive Growth Restrictions
The remaining legal alternative that apparently promises to lead to
optimally sized suburbs is a limited property rule entitling land-
owners and consumers to enjoin inefficient growth control measures.
In Figure 4, for example, this remedy would prevent a suburb from
restricting output below Q,, but would allow its less stringent (ef-
ficient) growth restrictions to stand.
If this were the sole remedy available to consumers and landowners,
it would inadequately cure prejudgment injuries177 and would raise
horizontal equity concerns: existing residents would be favored over
potential residents and landowners who have not yet developed their
175. See Stull, supra note 38, at 551.
176. Cf. H. RICHARDSON, supra note 157, at 192 (for abating pollution, taxes on
pollutants are generally preferable to policies designed to control city size); Mills, supra
note 164, at 123 ("I conclude that proposals to discourage the growth of large cities in
the United States are misguided. Appropriate public policies should be aimed at the
specific reasons for resource misallocation.")
177. See pp. 492-93 infra.
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property.'7 8 If it were provided in addition to the damage remedies
that have been nominated, it could prevent a suburb from enacting an
efficient program to protect the special subjective values of its residents
from erosion. 179 Because the suburb would be hard-pressed to prove
that residents would reduce their reservation prices for their houses if
more growth occurred, 8 0 a court might sometimes invalidate a pro-
gram as inefficient even though suburban residents in fact would be
willing to compensate those injured by it.1S1 Thus a limited right to
injunctive relief should not be added to the proposed consumer and
landowner remedies.
C. The Relevance of Extraterritorial Congestion Effects
The discussion has proceeded under the thoroughly implausible as-
sumption that all good and bad congestion effects resulting from a
suburb's development are internal to its housing market. Yet it is clear
that the exclusionary policies of a suburb force growth on its neigh-
bors.8 2 To make local officials consider all the costs of their antigrowth
policies, a suburb must be held prima facie liable for all substantial
damages its growth controls inflict on consumers and landowners who
lie beyond its boundary lines.'8 3 In addition, to make out the ef-
ficiency branch of the Michelman defense, municipal officials should
have to prove that a contested antigrowth measure is efficient not from
a local perspective, but after all regional costs and benefits are taken
into account.' 8 4 Growth controls that are good for Boulder, Colorado,
may well be bad for the Denver SMSA. 35
VII. Legal Treatment of the Fiscal Impact of Growth
Suburbanites hate to pay municipal taxes. Their attitude toward any
proposed new development in their town is thus apt to be heavily
178. See note 137 & p. 448 supra.
179. See p. 401 supra.
180. But cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 65, at 1109 n.38 (discussing potential use
of self-assessed taxes to smoke out subjective valuations).
181. For identification of other potential disadvantages of injunctions, see pp. 416-17
& note 80 supra.
182. See p. 403 supra.
183. The outside group most likely to be hurt would be tenants living in similar
communities. See p. 403 supra.
184. Spillover effects may, of course, be interstate. Antigrowth programs in Oregon may
on balance be efficient for Oregon landowners and consumers but undesirable from a
national perspective. A massive migration of Californians northward might improve life
in California more than it harms conditions in Oregon.
185. See Singell, Optimum City Size: Some Thoughts on Theory and Policy, 50 LAND
EcoN. 207, 212 (1974) (concludes local residents will be apt to restrict city size below
regional or national optimum). For criticism of Singell's model, see Blair, supra note 173.
450
Vol. 86: 385, 1977
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis
influenced by whether the marginal revenues to the suburb arising
from that particular development will exceed the suburb's marginal
costs of serving it.186 If service expenditures would be greater than
revenues, the new development would impose "fiscal costs" on current
residents. Municipal politicians therefore direct their planning staffs
to undertake revenue-expenditure analyses"'- of various types of land
uses to see which are apt to pay their own way and which are likely to
become fiscal parasites.
The fiscal impact of a particular type of development is not exoge-
nously determined. It depends entirely on municipal policies for sup-
plying and financing services. A suburb can skew the net fiscal impact
in its favor by denying services to newly developing areas or by sub-
jecting landowners in those areas to special taxes or charges.'88 Subur-
ban officials usually assert that they are simply trying to protect them-
selves from fiscal costs when they impose utility hook-up charges, park
exactions, bedroom taxes, and the like. But there is no reason to think
that they would voluntarily stop charging developers at the point
where their fees became fiscally inequitable. So long as they can
capture more surplus for their homeowners, suburban municipalities
186. One recent visitor to Mount Laurel, New Jersey, came away convinced that that
suburb's exclusionary policies were mainly fiscally motivated. See Trillin, U.S. Journal:
Mount Laurel, N.J., NEW YORKER, Feb. 2, 1976, at 69. However, a more systematic survey
found no evidence that fiscal considerations motivate suburbanite efforts to segregate by
income class. See Branfman, Cohen & Trubeck, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use
Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 500-02 (1973).
187. For examples of these efforts, see R. MACE & W. WICKER, supra note 55; T.
MULLER & G. DAWSON, supra note 55; James & Windsor, Fiscal Zoning, Fiscal Reform,
and Exclusionary Land Use Controls, 42 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 130 (1976); Zelinsky,
The Cities and the Middle Class: Another Look at the Urban Crisis, 1975 Wis. L. RFv.
1081; cf. G. STERNLIEB, HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND MUNICIPAL COSTS (1973) (ambitious
study of relationship between housing development and municipal costs).
Revenue-expenditure analysis remains dreadfully primitive. Analysts usually ignore
numerous secondary effects of growth on a community. For example, since new residen-
tial developments bring in households containing consumers and workers, they often
later attract stores and factories, thus perhaps overcoming what might initially appear
to be a fiscal deficit. Second, to the extent that new additions to a locality's housing
stock produce offsetting removals (or higher vacancies) in other parts of town, expendi-
tures on services elsewhere will decline. Lastly, too little is known about the scale
efficiencies of municipal services to take that factor properly into account. See pp. 442-
43 9. notes 161 & 162 supra.
188. Where the influence model of politics (see pp. 407-08 supra) is the more ac-
curate, one would expect developers to obtain fiscal advantages at the expense of existing
residents. Yet only a very small number of reported cases show the pattern of "under-
charging" of developers that would be consistent with the influence model. See Lipford
v. Harris, 212 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1968) (rejecting challenge to use of public funds to build
interior streets of subdivision); Morse v. Wise, 37 Wash. 2d 806, 226 P.2d 214 (1951)
(upholding sewer finance system that favored new areas of city over old ones); cf. Wine
v. Boyar, 220 Cal. App. 2d 375, 33 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1963) (rebuffing taxpayer claim that
county should not have paid for construction of major highways in subdivision). The
paucity of cases may be due in part to free-rider problems that discourage citizen suits
to recapture the developer's fiscal profit for the local treasury.
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can be expected to pursue what a perceptive economist, Michelle
White, has called "fiscal squeeze zoning."'' 89
The normal profit-maximizing strategy of a suburb dominated by
a homeowner majority is to discourage construction of modest-priced
housing suitable for occupancy by families with school-age children' 90
and to attract blue-chip fiscal assets like light industrial plants.' 9 ' One
should recognize that these particular policies are dictated by two
significant constraints on municipal fiscal choices contained in state
constitutions: the requirement that children be provided with "free"
elementary and secondary education, and the requirement that prop-
erty taxes be uniformly assessed. These constitutional provisions pro-
hibit alternative fiscal strategies like charging tuition in public schools
or imposing heavier property taxes on houses suitable for occupancy
by families with many children. 19 2
Suburban fiscal-squeeze strategies raise legal issues of enormous
practical importance and great theoretical difficulty. To achieve a
comprehensive law of growth controls, it is necessary to specify legal
limits both on development charges and on the circumstances in which
a municipality may deny services. Otherwise, if consumers are not
entitled to recover for the damages they suffer from suburban anti-
growth measures, municipal fiscal policies could become instruments
of housing monopolization efforts. 93 In addition, even when monopoly
is not threatened, preventing unjust discrimination among landowners
is still an important pursuit. 94
189. See White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metropolitan Areas, in FISCAL ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS 31, 31 (E. Mills & W. Oates eds. 1975). The most lucrative strate-
gies for both fungible and unique suburbs are described at pp. 425-35 supra.
190. One increasingly encounters ordinances that explicitly prohibit child residents
in specified neighborhoods. See note 9 supra. Developers specializing in building retire-
ment communities learned many years ago that suburbs are more likely to rezone land
to permit high-density residential uses if the petitioning landowner agrees to limit
occupancy to households without children.
191. In the famous case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 162-63, 336 A.2d 713, 719, appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
423 U.S. 818 (1975), the township had zoned 29.2% of its land (4,121 acres) for light in-
dustrial use; at the time of trial no more than 100 acres were actually occupied by in-
dustry.
192. The models in the prior Parts of this article employed Richard Muth's concept
of "standard house equivalents" to homogenize housing units of varying quality. While
illuminating many aspects of suburban housing policy, Muth's model obscures the fact
that suburbanites are indeed concerned about the absolute quality of new housing units
-that is, about the number of standard house equivalents per house. The most obvious
reasons for this concern are the fiscal considerations discussed in the text, particularly
the uniform property tax limitation. Minimum quality standards for housing may also
be a crude way to help ensure that new residents have the social status that current
residents want them to possess.
193. See pp. 436-38 supra.
194. Suburbs may try to rationalize development charges as offsetting either the
nuisance costs, congestion costs, or fiscal costs arising from new development. See p. 441
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A suburb's fiscal policies determine both what its constituents pay
into the treasury and what services they get in return. Issues of
fiscal equity are vastly complicated by the fact that local governments
raise revenues in two conceptually distinct ways. The great bulk of a
suburb's income is general revenue raised from property taxes, sales
taxes, and other broad-based sources like subventions from higher
governments. 195 A much smaller, but still significant, portion of
municipal revenue is raised through benefits charges that municipali-
ties collect in exchange for the delivery of specific services. Common
forms of benefits charges include special assessments, subdivision exac-
tions, and utility charges.
The courts have adopted quite different views on the fair distribu-
tion of services that are "generally" financed compared to those that
are "specially" financed by benefits charges. This Part will examine
the doctrines of fiscal fairness that are appropriate: first, in a juris-
diction that relies solely on general revenues; then in one that relies
entirely on benefits financing; and finally in the real-world case of a
municipality that uses a mixture of both.:19
The preeminent concern in cases of alleged fiscal discrimination
should be to ensure horizontal equity among landowners.197 Land-
owners, not households, are the proper focus because differentials in
supra. A municipality should be entitled to prohibit nuisances without paying com-
pensation, except where such a prohibition would be grossly inefficient. See p. 419
supra. As a consequence, it should also be entitled to waive a valid antinuisance restric-
tion in return for whatever the market will bear. But it must be noted that many,
if not most, of the new housing projects that are subjected to development charges have
no subnormal (nuisance) features. In these cases suburbs cannot justify their charges as
legitimate tribute exacted from nuisance-makers.
A suburb should never be permitted to defend its development charges as anticonges-
tion measures. Rather, it should pay to prevent congestion. See pp. 448-49 supra. This
Part attempts to determine when the principles of fiscal equity allow suburbanites to
rationalize their development charges simply as revenue-raising devices.
195. About 60% of all local general revenue is derived from property taxes. See 0.
OLDMAN & F. SCHOEMrLE, STATr AND LOCAL TAxES AND FINANCE 44-48 (1974). About half
of the costs of local public schools are now borne by federal and state government. Id.
at 946.
196. For an insightful odyssey through these same issues, see F. MICHELMAN & T.
SANDALOW, supra note 34, at 533-38.
197. The case law is hardly unanimous in its acclaim of the principle of horizontal
equity among landowners. The first of a series of reported Massachusetts cases on street
watering is the frankest in its rejection:
We see no reason why the Legislature may not authorize a city to water some of its
streets at the public expense, and to assess benefits for the watering of others upon
abutters, as it deems best. As a result, some landowners get the benefit of watering
streets adjacent to their estate without paying for that special benefit. But perfect
equality in the distribution of public burdens is not attainable.
Sears v. Board of Aldermen, 173 Mass. 71, 80, 53 N.E. 138, 140 (1899).
For cases in which the courts have been sympathetic to the goal of horizontal equity,
see notes 276-277, 292, 307-308, 317 & 323 infra.
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service levels and taxes in small municipalities are generally capitalized
in land values. 198 Thus if a court orders the upgrading of municipal
services in a neighborhood primarily occupied by black families, the
bulk of the benefit is likely to redound to landowners in that neigh-
borhood, not to the tenants who live there. 99 Development charges
may, of course, also affect both the vertical equity of municipal
finance and the efficiency of resource allocation.
A. Fiscal Equity in a Municipality That Never Uses Benefits Charges
If the suburb of Eden raised all its revenue through general taxes
and subventions from other governments, the two fundamental issues
of fiscal fairness would be whether the burdens of its taxes were
equitably distributed and whether it dispensed its services in fair
shares. Perhaps surprisingly, the law of municipal finance has treated
these two issues as entirely independent. When general financing is
used, a taxpayer who has paid more than usual is not regarded as
having an entitlement to receive extra services. As a result, when a
municipality uses general taxes to finance services, it inevitably re-
distributes income among its citizens. The function of legal rules in
this context is not to forbid such redistributions (that would be to ban
general financing), but rather to ensure that the beneficiaries and
victims of municipal wealth redistribution programs are determined
in a horizontally fair manner.
1. Limitations on General Taxes on Development
The clauses in state constitutions that require uniform property
taxation reflect an important tenet of fiscal fairness-that broad-based
taxes must treat both resident and nonresident property owners
alike.200 Absent such a legal constraint, the homeowners who politically
dominate a suburb would be tempted to impose discriminatory prop-
erty taxes on owners of undeveloped land. Suburban officials would
also find general taxes on housing construction particularly appealing
because the burdens of those taxes fall primarily on landowners and
housing consumers who are unlikely to be able to vote.20'
198. See note 38 supra.
199. Cf. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en bane, 461
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (sustaining claim by "Negro citizens" that town's failure to
supply municipal services in black neighborhoods violated equal protection clause).
200. In most states the property-tax base is riddled with dubious exemptions and
deductions. For a description of the homeowner's exemption in California, see note 55
supra.
201. See pp. 399-405 supra.
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The first doctrine of fiscal equity to be proposed, therefore, is that
a general municipal tax that falls entirely or primarily on a politically
helpless minority is prima facie202 unfair. General taxes on land-
development activity are thus inherently suspect. Of course, if a local
government were to enact a broad-based general tax that attached to
many local businesses (including, as it happens, land developers) the
element of discrimination against the unenfranchised would be absent.
For example, a broad-based sales tax that applied, among other things,
to building materials could not be characterized as horizontally in-
equitable. The case law generally is in accord with these principles.
The courts strike down general taxes that impinge solely on new
development but usually uphold general taxes when their reach is
broader.203
2. The Duty of Municipalities to Provide Equal Services
When a municipality finances a service from general revenues, it is
usually obligated to distribute the benefits of that service in roughly
equal shares, irrespective of the general taxes the individual citizen
may have paid. Legal doctrines that follow this principle include the
municipal "duty to serve" new subdivisions, the state constitutional
command that free schools be provided all children, and the holding
in the leading case of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw20 4 that racially cor-
related disparities in the provision of generally-financed local services
violate the federal equal protection clause.
20 5
To establish an entitlement to "equal benefits" from generally-
financed municipal services, one must resolve two key ambiguities.
First, what constituent unit under municipal jurisdiction is to be
entitled to an equal share of services? Must distribution be equal per
202. This modifier is necessary because a local government perhaps should be entitled
to defend such a tax on efficiency grounds. See pp. 463-65 infra.
203. See pp. 475-76 & notes 276-79 infra.
204. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
205. Cf. Burner v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1975) (plaintiff's equal pro-
tection claims dismissed because of failure to show discrimination in provision of munic-
ipal services). In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 & n.12 (1976), the Supreme
Court disapproved Town of Shaw to the extent that the latter case implied that proof
of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary to sustain an equal protection claim.
It is possible to downplay the racial element in Town of Shaw and interpret the case
as broadly requiring per-capita equality in the distribution of local services. For a
powerful economic critique of that interpretation, see Note, Equalization of Municipal
Services: The Economics of Serrano and Shaw, supra note 34. But cf. Fessler & Haar,
Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure,
6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 441, 463-65 (1971) (acceptability of Shaw-type claims and proofs
should not be restricted "to cases alleging a denial of equal protection predicated on
racial discrimination").
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capita? Per dwelling unit? Per unit of land value? The proper defini-
tion may vary from service to service. One might decide that school
services, for instance, have to be provided equally per child, 20 6 but
fire protection services equally per dollar of property value.207
The second ambiguity is how the quantum of services a municipality
distributes to each constituent unit is to be measured. Here there are
two leading choices. One could measure the inputs the municipality
provides-that is, the expenditures it makes on behalf of a constituent
unit.20 Or one could measure outputs-that is, the absolute state (e.g.,
a water hook-up, a neighborhood free from muggers, a command of
geometry) reached by each constituent unit as a result of the municipal
program. The case of Manjares v. Newton20 9 is a wonderful illustra-
tion of the difference between these two measures of equality. There a
school board had refused to provide free school busing to children
living in remote sections of its district, but in lieu thereof had given
them (actually their parents) cash payments to help defray transporta-
tion costs. The school board obviously thought that input equality-
in this case, equal expenditures per pupil for busing--was a fair
standard. The Supreme Court of California held, however, that the
school board's approach violated equal protection. The court implicitly
adopted output equality as the proper measure of horizontal equality;
it ordered that each child be given free transportation to school.
For purposes of this article, the issue may be narrowed to what
generally financed services a residential developer should be entitled
to receive. First, for most basic municipal services (especially utility
206. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 436-38, 495-99 (D.D.C. 1967), afj'd
sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (implicitly endorsing constitu-
tional standard of input equality per pupil in distribution of public school services).
207. Cf. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 53 Misc. 2d 970, 280 N.Y.S.
2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 968, 290 N.Y.S.2d 864, aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 666,
242 N.E.2d 745, 295 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1968) (under applicable statute, industrial plant's share
of garbage and refuse hauling services from special district should be roughly propor-
tionate to its share of total property taxes paid to district).
208. There are other, more complicated ways of measuring inputs. One could try to
measure the market value of the municipal service or perhaps even its subjective value
to the recipient. Combinations are also possible-for example, a municipality's expendi-
tures or the market value of its service, whichever is greater. That particular combina-
tion would entitle a suburb (rather than the constituent) to the savings resulting from
the fact that a constituent may be served at unusually low cost. In some situations,
however, such a rule would reduce the incentives of homebuilders to develop in optimal,
close-in locations.
Measuring benefits may be quite difficult when several parties gain from a single
municipal expenditure. In such cases some handy accounting system (like the "reaches"
system described in note 218 infra) must be employed. These difficulties are like those
of allocating the joint costs of producing several different goods. On that topic see, e.g.,
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970).
209. 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966).
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services), the unit entitled to an equal share can be defined as a
dwelling unit."10 To prevent discrimination against politically un-
represented landowners, this right to municipal services must attach
not only to each existing dwelling unit, but also to each prospective
dwelling unit. A municipality should thus have to spend as much per
dwelling unit on generally financed services in developing neighbor-
hoods as it does in established neighborhoods.
Second, for present purposes, the appropriate equal-benefits stan-
dard is input equality. Unlike the output-equality standard, it per-
mits a local government to reduce the absolute services provided to
dwelling units that by reason of location are unusually costly to
serve. This creates appropriate incentives against housing construction
in remote areas. Suppose Eden financed its entire sewerage system
from general revenues. If a homeowner in a far-flung location sought
to have a sewer main extended to him, the input-equality standard
should be interpreted to limit Eden's duty to offering that homeowner
his choice between either (1) accepting, in lieu of actual service, a cash
sum equal to Eden's average per-dwelling-unit expenditure on sewer-
age service, or (2) receiving sewerage service so long as he pays for all
service costs exceeding average service costs. 211
210. A dwelling unit is more accurate than a household because owners of currently
unoccupied units should be entitled to receive services. The dwelling-unit approach may
sometimes be inferior to a per-capita approach or (especially when services to non-
residential property arc in issue) all approach based on property values. See notes 206-207
supra.
211. The courts traditionally have applied only "property rule" solutions to duty-to-
serve cases. They either order the disputed service extended, as the Man ares court did,
or hold that the extraordinary municipal expense justifies a total denial of service. For
examples of the latter approach, see, e.g., City of Greenwood v. Provine, 143 Miss. 42,
108 So. 284 (1926) (sustaining refusals to extend water mains); and Rose v. Plymouth
Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (19.46) (same holding).
The approach suggested in the text would entitle a homeowner to average net benefits,
and let him decide which of the two "liability rules" is to be put into play. Giving the
homeowner this choice permits him to protect any special subjective pleasures he would
gain from the service. Cf. Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 73, at 738-48 (in nuisance
cases, plaintiffs should have choice between (1) collecting damages and (2) purchasing an
injunction against defendant's activity at price equal to objective value of defendant's
consequent losses).
It is unlikely that any such consumer surplus is at stake, however, when the landowner
seeking service is not an owner-occupant (or vendee) of a completed dwelling unit. To
permit general-purpose units of local government to control their rate of growth, un-
served landowners who are not owner-occupants should be limited to the remedy of
damages against municipalities. All landowners, however, should have the dual choice
suggested when the pureyor of services is not a general-purpose unit of government, e.g.,
when the supplier is a public utility or special district. See note 78 supra. Finally, all
landowner rights to compel services should be suspended during true emergencies.
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B. Fiscal Equity in a Municipality That Relies Exclusively
on Benefits Charges
The foregoing discussion suggests the allocative shortcomings of
relying on general taxes to finance municipal services. When munic-
ipal officials do not charge for services, they have no clear evidence of
how their constituents value public programs. This may lead either
to wasteful expenditures or to underfunding. Moreover, the prevailing
principles of horizontal equity make some redistribution of wealth
inevitable whenever a local government imposes general taxes. If the
redistributive effects vary from municipality to municipality, house-
holds will spend resources to investigate and exploit the relative fiscal
advantages of various communities. These expenses (e.g., the costs of
moving to exploit fiscal variations) are, from a social standpoint, dead-
weight efficiency losses..2 12 In addition, local governments are ineffec-
tive redistributors of wealth because most of their taxes are too easily
avoided. Most commentators therefore recommend that responsibility
for redistribution be assumed by the national government.2 13
Benefits charges promise to cure these sorts of inefficiencies created
by general taxes and thus tend to be favored by public finance
theorists.2 14 A priori, there is no reason to prevent a municipality from
relying entirely on benefits charges to finance its programs. It would
be odd to compel the least appropriate level of government to under-
take programs to redistribute wealth. Absent explicit constitutional
directives to the contrary (such as those requiring free public educa-
tion 215), the permissibility of benefits financing is well established in
the case law. The leading case, Hadnott v. City of Prattville,216 while
requiring that services financed with general revenues be provided
equally to all residents, expressly held that the distribution of specially
financed services could be limited to those who paid to receive them.
The main function of legal doctrine in a municipality relying ex-
212. There is widespread agreement among economists that fiscal variations can
create allocational problems. See Buchanan & Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility:
An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1972); White, supra note 189.
213. See E. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 236 (1972); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 41, at 623; Stigler, The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government, in F.
MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra note 34, at 91-92.
214. See generally PUBLIC PRICEs FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS (S. Mushkin ed. 1972); Vickrey,
General and Specific Financing of Urban Services, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURE DECISIONS IN
THE URBAN COMMUNITY 62 (H. Schaller ed. 1963).
215. Recent cases enforcing this policy include Paulson v. Minidoka County School
Dist., 93 Idaho 469, 463 P.2d 935 (1970); and Bond v. Public Schools, 383 Mich. 693, 178
N.W. 2d 484 (1970) (fees for school books violate state constitutional guarantee of free
education). Contra, Hamer v. Board of Educ., 47 Ill. 2d 480, 265 N.E.2d 616 (1970).
216. 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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clusively on benefits charges is not to curb that practice but rather
to ensure that charges imposed involuntarily (like some special assess-
ments) are fairly proportioned to benefits.2 1 7
C. Fiscal Equity in a Municipality That Uses Revenues
from Both General Taxes and Benefits Charges to
Finance a Specific Service
Despite their allocative advantages, voluntary benefits charges are
not a feasible system of finance when a municipality provides "public
goods" (e.g., ensuring public safety), when the administrative costs of
collecting benefits charges exceed the allocative gains of using them
(as is often the case for roads), and when a local government avowedly
wants to undertake a redistribution of income (e.g., by providing free
schools). Most major units of local government therefore employ both
general taxes and benefits charges. Moreover, they often finance a
specific service from both revenue sources; such a mixed system may
well be the most efficient approach when the administrative costs of
collecting benefits charges are low for some aspects of, say, sewerage
service, but high for others. When mixed financing of this sort occurs,
the issue of fiscal equity becomes extremely complex.
To help focus the analysis, suppose Jefferson owns an unimproved
lot in a remote valley of the suburb of Eden. Eden would have to
spend 55000 to extend a sewer lateral to Jefferson's lot.218s This 5000
outlay would far exceed the historic 51000 average cost of providing
sewer laterals to other dwelling units in Eden. How much should
Eden be entitled to charge Jefferson for sewerage service? This humble
example raises an issue of extraordinary importance to owners of
undeveloped land.
1. A Proposed General Test for Fiscal Equity When
General and Special Financing Are Mixed
Although no single legal doctrine can possibly decide all con-
troversies raised by municipal fiscal policies, the proposed general test
that follows usually succeeds in identifying when landowners have
217. For examples of how courts have wrestled with these issues, see pp. 472-73 &
notes 262-265 infra.
218. Under the "reaches" system of cost allocation, each lot owner is assigned the
proportion of the cost of each reach of pipe that equals his fraction of its subsequent
use. This means a lot owner is assessed the entire cost of a pipe that only he uses, and
one percent of the cost of a pipe he shares with 99 similar lot owners. For a discussion
of this system and of other alternatives for allocating costs, see American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co. v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 38 Cal. App. 3d 73, 78, 112 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974).
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been unfairly burdened by special development charges. Dwelling
units (including prospective dwelling units) should be designated as
the units entitled to equalization, and equality should be measured
by equality of inputs (i.e., municipal expenditures). -19 A landowner's
"net benefits" from a municipal service may be defined as: (1) the
municipality's expenditures in servicing his land, less (2) the benefits
charges collected from that landowner for that service. The standard
of input equality prima facie entitles each dwelling unit in a munic-
ipality to net benefits from a particular service equal to the average
net benefits received from that service by all other dwelling units in
that municipality. In other words, if a municipality mixes special and
general revenues in financing a service, the portion financed by
general revenues should presumptively be distributed equally per
dwelling unit.220
If this formula were applied to Jefferson's case, the sewer charge
Eden could impose would depend on how it had furnished and
financed sewers in its other neighborhoods. If Eden had consistently
financed the construction of sanitary sewer laterals from general
revenues, Jefferson would be entitled to $1000 in net sewer benefits-
the average received by other Eden households. Since it would cost
Eden $5000 to serve him, Eden should therefore be entitled to impose
a sewer connection fee of $4000. Jefferson's net benefits would then
be $5000 minus $4000, or $1000-the sum that would achieve input
equality per dwelling unit.2 2 ' If Eden charged Jefferson more than
219. For the reasons behind these choices, and examples of situations where other
choices might be appropriate, see pp. 455-57 & notes 206, 207 & 210 supra.
220. A current legal doctrine that appears at least partially aimed at preventing un-
just mixtures of general and special financing is the distinction in special assessment law
between "local" and "general" improvements. Special assessments are permitted for the
former (e.g., minor streets, sewer laterals), but not the latter. See, e.g., Ruel v. Rapid
City, 84 S. Dak. 79, 167 N.W.2d 541 (1969) (convention hall is general improvement);
Heavens v. King County Rural Library Dist., 66 Wash. 2d 558, 404 P.2d 453 (1965) (library
is general improvement). This doctrine prevents the injustice that results when a city
provides free libraries in some neighborhoods while employing benefits charges to
finance libraries in other neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, the doctrine is at best extremely crude. It does not compel the use of
benefits charges for local improvements and therefore does not prevent favoritism. (For
possible abuses of this sort, see note 188 supra.) Moreover, if a neighborhood is receiving
especially generous library services, there is no reason to bar the use of benefits financing
to defray the above-average portion of the cost.
221. Los Angeles officials adopted what was essentially an equal net-benefits test to
resolve a recent controversy. The owner of a plot of land located at the intersection of
Capitol Drive and Myler Street in the San Pedro district wanted to build an industrial
plant, a use permitted by the zoning ordinance. The tract was surrounded by middle-
income, single-family houses. Their owners beseeched city officials to acquire the land for
a park. The area, however, was already -relatively well-supplied with parks. To prevent
the homeowners from receiving above-average net park benefits, city officials insisted
that they pay for the park by means of special assessments. The special assessment
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that, he should be entitled to a refund for the excess. On the other
hand, if Eden had always used benefits charges to finance sewer
laterals, Jefferson would be entitled to no net sewer benefits, and
Eden could thus charge him for the entire $5000 construction cost.
2. Temporal Differences in the Delivery of Services
and the Assessment of Charges
This discussion of fiscal equity thus far has ignored problems of
timing. Apparent inequalities may arise, for example, when a munic-
ipality serves some dwelling units earlier than others or is erratic
about when it imposes its charges. The accepted technique for
neutralizing time differentials is to discount all figures to present
value. To determine the discounted net benefits received by a dwell-
ing unit, one therefore should (1) compute the present value of the
flow of municipal expenditures to provide a service to that unit, and
then (2) subtract the present value of all benefits charges imposed on
that dwelling unit for that service. In making these calculations one
should consider not only what the current owner of the dwelling unit
(or prospective dwelling unit) has received and paid, but also what
the unit's prior owners received and paid 22 and what future owners
will receive and will pay. If the first owner in a long chain of owners
happens to be at a net fiscal disadvantage during his tenure, but the
property will enjoy a foreseeable offsetting net benefit in the future,
the first owner will be compensated when he sells the property be-
cause his purchaser will anticipate the future fiscal advantages.
In our hypothetical case, Jefferson wanted to develop his lot many
years after other residents in Eden had already received sewerage
service. If one takes the present value of net benefits at a common
calendar day (e.g., January 1, 1977), the prior conclusion that Jefferson
should be entitled to receive $1000 in net sewer benefits would no
doubt have to be modified. If Eden had spent $1000 in 1947 to extend
district that was ultimately formed is the only one for parks Los Angeles has created
within recent memory. Interview with Alfred LifE, supra note 109. See generally Volpert,
Creation and Maintenance of Open Spaces in Subdivisions: Another Approach, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 830, 836-45 (1965) (suggesting that special assessments be used to finance
unusual amounts of open space in new developments).
222. If the matter is not expressly dealt with by contract between vendor and pur-
chaser, the courts must decide if claims for refunds from municipalities continue to lie
with the prior owner who was overcharged, or are enforceable only by the current owner.
Administrative costs should determine the answer. In the case of new subdivisions, it will
usually be cheaper to entitle the original subdivider to seek the refund. See pp. 479-80
& notes 285 & 286 infra. But if the overcharges continued over a long period of time and
the property overcharged is a type that changes hands frequently, it may be more
efficient to let only the current owner sue. The statute of limitations should, of course,
bar suits by either current or prior owners to cure stale injustices.
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a sewer lateral to Hamilton's lot, Hamilton would have received more
than Jefferson because $1000 in 1947 is worth more than $1000 in
1977. If a common calendar date were to be used for comparing net
benefits conferred, a municipality that financed some services partly
with general revenues might thus be required by the input equality
standard either to spend more for those services in new neighborhoods
or to impose lower benefits charges on late-developing landowners.
Horizontal equity hardly requires this result. A landowner (broadly
defined to include previous owners) has considerable control over
when he develops and thus over when his net benefits begin to accrue.
If the service is one that the municipality has traditionally offered, he
should have no complaint so long as the municipality treats his
dwelling unit the same as it treated other dwelling units when they
were at the same stage in their life-cycle.
In comparing the net benefits received from traditional services by
different dwelling units, one should therefore discount their particular
fiscal histories not to some common calendar date, but to some com-
mon event in the housing life-cycle-say, the date on which each
dwelling unit was first completed. This approach, of course, gives
some absolute advantage to owners of older houses. Hamilton's net
sewer benefits would be discounted to 1947, Jefferson's to 1977. If
their total net benefits were equalized under this method, Hamilton
would in fact be better off. But the important point from the stand-
point of horizontal equity is that Jefferson himself could have built
in 1947 and thereby could have received the same treatment as
Hamilton.
One last refinement is necessary. If a municipality today initiates a
new generally-financed service (like free day-care centers), or sharply
expands a traditional service (like doubling its park facilities), the
approach just suggested would permit it to deliver greater immediate
net benefits from those services to older neighborhoods. This follows
from the proposition that all dwelling units should receive the same
net benefits at similar stages in their life cycles. This sort of favoritism
hardly seems justified. The owners of older residential structures might
have been paying extra property taxes over the years to finance tradi-
tional generally-financed programs (like sewers) but not to fund these
new programs. Therefore the net benefits each dwelling unit receives
from a service should be discounted to the date the service was initiated
in the municipality, 23 or to the date the dwelling unit was first com-
223. In the not uncommon case in which a service has been gradually expanded over
a period of years, an administratively convenient middle date could be used.
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pleted, whichever is the more recent. As reformulated, the test would
require that newly offered day-care services, or expanded park facilities,
be provided equally in all existing neighborhoods.
Eden should thus be entitled to collect sewer hook-up charges from
Jefferson to the extent necessary to prevent him from receiving net
sewer benefits greater than the average received by Eden dwelling
units. Each unit's net benefits should be discounted to the date of the
unit's completion, or, for pre-sewer structures, to the date when sewer-
age services were first provided by Eden. In any real controversy the
precise calculation of that figure would be horrendously expensive.
Voluminous evidence on prior municipal practices would have to be
uncovered and synthesized. The applicable discount rates might vary
from period to period according to historic differences in the rate of
inflation and the real rate of interest. In actual litigation crude ap-
proximations and rough justice are the best that can be hoped for.
Despite all this, the proposed test can readily flag certain municipal
fiscal practices as prima facie unfair. For example, when a munic-
ipality that once provided free sewer connections begins imposing
hook-up charges in new neighborhoods, the test quickly identifies the
new policy as suspect.
D. When a Municipality Is Justified in Rendering Unequal
Net Benefits to Housing Units
The foregoing discussion has generated two basic doctrines to con-
trol municipal practices in raising revenues and furnishing services.
First, it is prima facie unfair for a municipality to raise general
revenues through taxes focused on land-development activity because
those taxes fall predominantly on persons who are, at best, weakly
represented in its political processes. Second, if a municipality finances
a particular service entirely or partly from general revenues, it is
prima facie obligated to provide equal net benefits from that service
to each of its current and prospective dwelling units. A unit's net
benefits are (1) the sum of all municipal funds spent on providing it
the service in question, less (2) the sum of all benefits charges for that
service collected from the owner of that unit, with all figures dis-
counted to the date of completion of the unit or the date the service
was first available in the municipality, whichever is the more recent.
Neither of these two principles should be ironclad. There are other
goals besides pure horizontal equality. A municipality should not have
to make a refund to a landowner when it can show that its apparent
discrimination against him does not violate the Michelman fairness
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test.2 24 This defense would prevail if the municipality could prove
both that the uneven fiscal policy enhances efficiency and that those
disadvantaged by the policy should be able to realize that the ad-
ministrative costs of correcting the fiscal unevenness would be so high
that their own long-term self-interest is served by nonequalization.
It is virtually inconceivable that a municipality could prove that a
general tax focused only on new development (such as a bedroom
construction tax) meets the Michelman fairness test. Because those
taxes could easily be extended to existing structures, it is difficult to
perceive any economic justification for singling out homebuilders for
taxation.
However, the Michelman defense could sometimes justify a munic-
ipality's uneven use of benefits charges on landowners. For example, a
suburb's most efficient fiscal strategy might be to use benefits charges
wherever feasible (in order to approximate market conditions), but
not in situations where those charges involve great administrative
costs. A landowner who received below-average net benefits as a result
of this policy might nevertheless be able to understand why it would
be in his long-term self-interest. No landowner should want legal
doctrines to compel municipalities either to provide costly services to
homeowners who do not value them or to forgo levying user charges
entirely because it would be too expensive to equalize perfectly their
incidence.
Nevertheless, the efficiency gains promised by municipal imposition
of benefits charges on developers are far from easy to prove. Benefits
charges are allocatively most advantageous when they are voluntarily
paid. Many development charges can hardly be considered voluntary.
When a developer pays a sewer connection fee, it does not neces-
sarily indicate he values sewerage service by that amount. If all new
houses are required to be hooked into the sewer system, it only
indicates that he values sewerage service plus permission to develop
by that amount. In most of the leading cases on development charges,
one could hardly characterize the charge in question as a good in-
dicator of market demand for the service that was to be financed. In
224. See p. 415 supra.
A municipality should arguably be entitled to a second defense-the right to set off
any above-average net benefits a landowner receives from other services against the
below-average net benefits he is receiving from the service at issue. Jefferson's raw deal
on sewers might, for example, be counterbalanced by his jackpot in parks.
This defense, however, would greatly complicate litigation over refunds and is probably
not worth its administrative costs. If Jefferson is receiving a jackpot in parks, his mu-
nicipality should be left to its option of subjecting him to special park charges. See note
221 supra.
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addition, when different municipalities pursue different fiscal policies,
there are likely to be serious "second best" problems.225 For example, if
Eden were to impose sewer connection charges on developers while
neighboring suburbs did not, Eden's seemingly efficient financing
policy might actually shift development to even more inefficient loca-
tions outside its boundaries. In the extremely imperfect world of
municipal finance, it will be difficult for a municipality to prove that
a specific set of benefits charges is actually efficient and fair. But the
argument here is that the municipality should at least be given a
chance to try.
E. An Application: The Escalation of Subdivision Exactions
One would expect a suburb dominated by a homeowner majority to
escalate its development charges over time in order to enrich its current
homeowners. This pattern is in fact what one observes.220 Street lights,
which were once commonly paid for from general funds, 227 are now
usually exacted from developers. 228 -Exactions for parks, school sites,
and firehouses have become much more common.2 2 9 More and more
suburbs are attempting to shift the capital costs of community-wide
utility facilities entirely to new connectors to those systems. 230 Los
Angeles, for example, imposes off-site sewerage charges designed to
generate enough revenue to fund the entire local share of its capital
budget for those facilities. These charges are imposed exclusively on
new subdivisions and new construction, although the benefits from
225. See generally Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11 (1956); Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in
Our Worse-than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Ap-
proach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 950.
226. Relatively little empirical work has been done on the use of benefits charges to
finance various improvements. The few sources include C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP & USE
857-58 (1968) (excerpting 1952 New York City area survey); R. MACE & W. WICKER, supra
note 55; and Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 389, 437-39.
227. C. BERGER, supra note 226, at 858.
228. See, e.g., Los Angeles City Council, Street Improvement Policies (file no. 115,320)
(undated) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Cf. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(1) (McKinney's
Supp. 1976) (authorizing planning boards to require that street lights be installed by
developers); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.21 (West Supp. 1976) (authorizing municipalities to
exact street lights from developers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10503 (Purdon 1972)
(authorizing local governments to exact street lights from developers).
229. See pp. 486-87 infra. Exactions for bicycle paths and traffic control devices
are on the horizon. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66475.1 (West Supp. 1976); L.A., CAL.,
CODE § 17.02 (1975).
230. One of the most dramatic examples of escalation in charges is reported in Rutan
Estates, Inc. v. Town of Belleville, 56 N.J. Super. 330, 152 A.2d 853 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1959). There, a town inaugurated special assessments for water mains when the
owner of the last large vacant tract in the town started development. The assessments
were held to be valid.
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these community-wide facilities often extend to neighborhoods where
little or no development is occurring.2 1
If Jefferson had paid Los Angeles an off-site sewerage facilities
charge of 53 48 2'2 in order to receive a building permit for his house,
he would have a strong claim for a partial refund. His lot would no
doubt be destined to receive only normal benefits from community-
wide sewerage facilities. But his burdens have been far above the
usual. Los Angeles has only been using off-site sewerage charges on
new dwelling units for a little over a dozen years, and the charges
were much smaller when they were first instituted.23 3 Jefferson could
therefore easily make out a prima facie case that his net off-site sewer
benefits would be substantially below the average for owners of Los
Angeles dwelling units.
The $348 charge should nevertheless be upheld if Los Angeles can
show that the unevenness in net sewer benefits satisfies the Michelman
fairness test. Since these sewerage charges are not paid wholly
voluntarily and are not used by many other municipalities in southern
California, it would be difficult for the city to show that the financing
system promised significant efficiency gains. The second prong of the
Michelman defense could also prove sticky. Either of two fiscal reforms
would provide Jefferson with net sewer benefits equal to the average
for the city: (1) the quashing of the sewer facility charge he paid to the
extent that it deprived him of average net sewer benefits; or (2) the
appropriate back-charging of owners of dwelling units that are in
existence but that were never charged for off-site sewerage facilities.23 4
231. See L.A., CAL., CODE §§ 64.11.2-.3 (1976). The city's charge on the recently-com-
pleted 62-story United California Bank Building was S321,000. Telephone Interview with
Joseph Lauer, Jr., Los Angeles, Cal., Bureau of Engineering (June 26, 1974) (notes on
file with Yale Law Journal).
232. L.A., CAL., CODE § 64.11.3 (1976) (rate for all new single-family dwellings).
233. Los Angeles apparently first began to levy these charges in the 1950s. See Long-
ridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1960).
234. Courts have permitted cities to back-charge for earlier improvements. E.g., Phillip
Wagner, Inc. v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207, 217 (1915) ("The doctrine established by this case
is that a subsequent assessment may be levied because of benefits conferred by the former
action of the city in improving in front of the lots assessed."); Dawson v. Town of
Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal. 3d 676, 688, 547 P.2d 1377, 1384-85, 129 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104-05
(1976); O'Malley v. Public Improvement Comm'n, 342 Mass. 624, 627, 174 N.E.2d 668,
670-71 (1961) (assessment of sewerage charges 2% years after connection is not unreason-
able).
There is precedent for a policy of back-charging for sewers in Los Angeles. In its early
years the city financed lateral sewers in local streets by floating general revenue bonds
secured by general tax revenues. These early laterals are now referred to as "bonded
sewers." Later the city adopted the practice of assessing abutting landowners for the
costs of laterals. Unless corrective action were taken, this switch in policy would ob-
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In light of the availability of the second option-one that would achieve
equality while preserving any allocative advantages of using benefits
charges for sewerage facilities-Jefferson would have a hard time seeing
why the city's policy of charging only new development was fair to
him.2 3 5 The principles outlined in this Part would undoubtedly
entitle Jefferson to a refund of much of the benefits charge.2 36
Some observers might argue that vertical equity should be the
decisive factor in evaluating the legality of development charges.
These observers might prohibit a suburb from discriminating against
a yeoman lot owner like Jefferson, but nevertheless permit it to
charge a corporate octopus like the Tacky Development Company to
the hilt. That particular distinction would certainly be wrong-
headed. As a practical matter, any entitlements given to an individual
lot owner like Jefferson will tend to be capitalized in the value of his
lot and thus redound to the benefit of the original subdivider, who is
apt to be someone like Tacky. More importantly, development charges
are ill-suited to achieve broad redistributions of wealth. No widely
shared ethical principle justifies programs to shift wealth from owners
of undeveloped land to owners of land already improved with struc-
tures.2 37 This capricious pattern of redistribution is popular only
because its benefits and burdens mesh nicely with who votes and does
not vote in municipal elections. In short, the deepness of a developer's
pocket should not affect his rights to be free from general taxes on
development activity and to receive equal net benefits from municipal
services.23 8
VIII. A Comprehensive Legal Approach to Municipal
Growth Controls
The legal approach suggested by the above economic analysis must
now be summarized and grounded in traditional state constitutional
doctrine.
viously be to the fiscal advantage of those who received sewerage service early. Los
Angeles's approach has been to impose a special charge of six dollars per front foot on
building permit applicants whose land is served by bonded sewers. L.A., CAL., CODE
§ 64.18 (1976).
235. He would be particularly aggrieved if back charges could be assessed and collected
cheaply (e.g., if they could be added to property tax bills).
236. A total refund would be too much because many Los Angeles landowners have
already paid these charges and are now barred from recovering them by the statute of
limitations.
237. For a fuller discussion, see pp. 439-40 supra.
238. Cf. note 307 infra (citing cases requiring equal treatment of subdividers).
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A. The Proposed Legal Rules
The last paragraph of Part III posed the four key questions of
growth-control law.239 The intervening discussion has been devoted to
constructing answers to each of those questions.
When should landowners be absolutely privileged to proceed with
their developments? Almost never. A suburb must be entitled to force
restrictions (sometimes cushioned by compensation) on landowners or
else it will not be able to implement efficient antigrowth programs.
Injunctive relief is appropriate, however, against a municipal program
motivated by discrimination against ethnic or ideological minorities.2 40
What kinds of development should a municipality be able to stop
without paying compensation to landowners? When a government
prohibits subnormal land uses, a landowner should be required to
prove that the prohibition is grossly inefficient in order to recover for
any resulting diminution in the value of his land. Most growth con-
trols restrict land uses that are not subnormal. When a suburban
restriction that dictates above-normal landowner conduct substantially
reduces the value of a person's land, that person should receive com-
pensation unless the suburb can affirmatively prove that its restriction
is both fair to that landowner and efficient.241
What development charges should a local government be entitled
to impose? Special charges that attach to new housing construction are
often horizontally unfair because they redistribute wealth without
ethical justification from persons largely unrepresented in the political
process to those who are political insiders. Therefore, development
charges designed to raise general revenue or to "internalize" the con-
gestion costs of growth should be prohibited. -4 2 To ensure that new
development bears its fair share of the costs of financing the urban
infrastructure, however, development charges levied on homebuilders
to finance a specific service should be permitted if the charges help
equalize the discounted net benefits each dwelling unit receives from
that service over time. In addition, development charges even greater
in amount should be permissible if the municipality can prove that
they will both promote efficiency and enhance the long-term self-
interest of those interested in housing construction.243
239. See p. 415 supra.
240. See pp. 417-18 supra.
241. See pp. 418-24 supra.
242. A suburb, however, should be entitled to waive a valid antinuisance restriction
in return for whatever the market will bear. See note 194 supra.
243. See pp. 459-65 supra.
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When a suburb enacts a restriction that is enforceable but for which
it is liable in damages, how much compensation should landowners
and housing consumers receive? The measure of damages differs for
the two groups. A landowner's compensation is determined by how
much the restriction reduces the market value of his land. In ap-
praising what the land valuation would be if there were no restriction,
one should take into account the valid development charges and un-
compensated use restrictions that the suburb might have enacted;
otherwise the landowner would receive compensation that would make
him better off than his neighbors. Consumers should be entitled to
recover (usually by class action) any damages they have suffered as a
result of a housing price increase attributable to a suburb's policies.
But damages should not be granted to consumers whenever the suburb
demonstrates that its growth controls are not only efficient but also
fair to them.244
Taken as a whole, the recommended rules make it relatively easy
for a genuinely aggrieved party to shift to the suburb the burden of
proving the efficiency and equity of suburban policies.2 4. The current
case law in many states, by contrast, attaches a presumption of validity
to municipal land-use policies and thus rarely puts suburbs to this
test.
Those convinced that the proposed legal rules are as fair and ef-
ficient as one can devise might nevertheless disagree on how the rules
should be put in force. Reform might be left exclusively to legislative
bodies, which could enact the principles by statute and perhaps set
up a specialized administrative body to enforce them.24 6 Experience
may prove this to be the only workable approach. The balance of this
Part, however, consists of a short brief in support of two propositions:
(1) that judges should adopt the suggested principles as a constitutional
matter; and (2) that in the usual case, i.e., where the conflict is intra-
state, the judicial remedy should be based exclusively on the state
constitution.
B. The Doctrinal Basis for Judicial Intervention
Most observers who have examined the exclusionary zoning problem
have argued that the most promising line of legal attack is to invoke
the federal constitutional rights to equal protection and freedom of
244. See pp. 436-38 supra.
245. For supporting sentiments, see Fessler 9: Haar, supra note 205, at 447-48.
246. For a proposal of this sort, see Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1437-41
(1969).
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travel of the members of the excluded households.2 47 The usual
remedy for a violation of one of these rights is the invalidation of the
offending portions of the municipal code. The present analysis has
suggested the general superiority of another remedy-damage awards
to landowners and consumers.
Since the taking clause has been the traditional constitutional justi-
fication for damage awards against government, it would probably be
the most readily accepted doctrinal basis for both landowner and
consumer damage suits against suburbs..24 8 A landowner who relied on
this clause hardly would be plowing new ground; even landowner suits
for the refund of excessive subdivision exactions typically have been
presented as taking claims. For consumers to invoke the taking clause,
however, would be unprecedented. Consumer damage actions against
monopolists normally have been based on antitrust statutes rather than
on any constitutional provision.249 Nevertheless there is no doctrinal
reason to forbid a consumer from pursuing such a taking claim. It
would be ironic in an era of consumer rights if taking clauses were
construed as only protecting producers' surplus and not consumers'
surplus. (Of course, if a court were reluctant to characterize consumer
injuries as takings, it could base the granting of damages on some
other substantive constitutional right of housing consumers. 250)
Both the federal and state constitutions provide remedies for tak-
ings. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
construed to restrict uncompensated takings by state and local govern-
ments251-the same restriction the Fifth Amendment imposes on the
federal government. In addition, 48 state constitutions contain taking
247. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Con-
stitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972); Note,
Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564 (1975);
Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning after Valtierra and Dan-
dridge, 81 YALe L.J. 61 (1971); see generally M. MANN, Tim RIC1T TO HOUSING 90-104
(1976).
248. Vhen suburbs are guilty of de jure discrimination against etlnic and ideological
minorities, the doctrinal bases for injunctive relief would be the equal protection clause
and the First Amendment respectively (or, preferably, their equivalents in the state
constitution).
249. Under traditional interpretations of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), local
governments would not be vulnerable to suits based on the federal antitrust laws.
250. Historically the Supreme Court has regarded major federal constitutional rights
as being protected by property rules, not by liability rules (to use Calabresi and
Melamed's terminology). The seminal decision of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), however, indicates that constitutional clauses other than the taking
clause can be used as a basis for damage actions. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. Rev. 1532 (1972); Note, Damage
Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HAR\v. L. R ev. 922 (1976).
251. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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clauses, and the remaining two states have established an equivalent
principle by judicial decision.25 2 When municipal antigrowth policies
inflict no significant injuries on out-of-state households or housing
suppliers, the basic tenets of federalism suggest that one not look to
the federal constitution to provide the doctrinal basis for a remedy.25
Unlike restrictions on freedom of speech and the right to vote, growth
controls do not evoke the federal concern for the integrity of state
and local political processes.
Professor Howard has suggested 254 that state courts should be able
to construe state constitutional provisions more broadly than identical
federal provisions where: (1) there is no need for national uniformity
in the law; or (2) the Supreme Court has clearly declared a "hands
off" attitude over a certain class of disputes; or (3) the states might,
in Justice Brandeis's language, "serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. ' 2 55 Growth-control issues fit into all three of Howard's cate-
gories. There is no apparent need for legal uniformity among states.
The Supreme Court has clearly abandoned the field (as will shortly
be demonstrated). And lastly, because the issues are complex and the
best legal path far from certain, the testing of a variety of legal ap-
proaches would probably be advantageous. Of course, federal con-
stitutional remedies are necessary in situations where antigrowth
policies cause important interstate spillovers; for example, federal
doctrines would certainly have to be called upon if Oregon or Fairfax
County began to exclude in earnest.
Recent decisions of both state and federal courts support the prop-
osition that conflicts over municipal growth controls are funda-
mentally issues to be handled under state law. The state courts most
active in policing local abuses-New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New
York-have not explicitly relied on federal constitutional provisions.250
252. For a recent review of the state provisions, see Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its
Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439,
1439 n.3 (1974).
253. For a discussion of the potential of state constitutional doctrines, see Brennan,
State Constittions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977);
Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 271 (1973).
254. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 V.-. L. REV. 873, 937-40 (1976).
255. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
256. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (relying on
state constitution); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (relies primarily on state decisional law to develop substantive due pro-
cess test; unclear whether decision rests on state or federal constitutional provisions);
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For its part, the Supreme Court seems to be trying (quite properly in
my view) to steer land-use cases out of the federal courts. In recent
years it has invoked standing requirements to avoid hearing one
case,257 and, when it has reached the merits, it has consistently rejected
constitutional attacks against specific zoning ordinances. 2,s Although
a few lower federal courts have relied on federal doctrines to in-
validate municipal growth controls, 2 59 most have declined to do so. 260
Indeed, federal judges seem to rely increasingly on the abstention
doctrine in order to force complaining landowners to seek relief in
state courts.
26 1
The evolution of the federal law of special assessments supports the
wisdom of not applying federal law to localized growth-control dis-
putes. Special assessments, of course, provide an ideal vehicle for one
group of landowners to discriminate against another group. A com-
mon abuse, for example, is to make abutting landowners pay for the
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965) (unclear whether decision rests on state or federal constitutional provisions;
opinion relies almost exclusively on state precedents).
257. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). But see Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555, 561-63 (1977).
258. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hots. Dcv. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555
(1977) (refusal by local authorities to rezone tract from single family to multifamily);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976) (ordinance requiring dis-
persal of "adult" theatres does not violate First or Fourteenth Amendments); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (ordinance prohibiting households of three or
more unrelated people); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance
regulating mine excaiations); cf. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426
U.S. 668 (1976) (city charter provision requiring land-use changes to be ratified by 55%
of voters does not violate Fourteenth Amendment).
259. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (ban on new
multifamily dwelling violates §§ 804(a), 817 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3617 (1970 & Stipp. V 1975)).
260. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), rev'g 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (plaintiff relied exclusively on federal con-
stitutional doctrines); Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding
federal constitutional validity of zoning ordinance restricting dwellings to single-family
units on one-acre lots); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanboruton, 469 F.2d 956 (Ist
Cir. 1972) (rebuffing federal constitutional attack on six-acre minimum lot-size require-
ments).
261. Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Comm'n, 537 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir.
1976); Santa Fe Land Improvcment Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 71 F.R.D. 573 (S.D. Cal.
1976); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 390 F. Supp. 1004 (C.D. Cal.
1975); Olinger v. City of Palm Springs, 386 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Cf. South
Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 (1974)
(due process and equal protection claims by landowner denied rezoning do not raise sub-
stantial federal questions). But see Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F.
Supp. 709, 719-20 (D.N.J. 1976); M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp.
354 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 398 F. Supp. 21 (D. Md. 1975).
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widening of a major street that will not benefit them. In 1898 the
Supreme Court federalized these conflicts by holding in Norwood v.
Baker "-' " that a special assessment substantially in excess of special
benefits was, to the extent of the excess, a taking of property in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. When this holding flooded the
federal courts with special assessment cases, the Supreme Court lost
no time in undercutting the Norwood doctrine..2 63 This withdrawal of
federal constitutional remedies has left the issues raised by discrimina-
tory special assessments to the state courts. They have since developed
a wide variety of doctrinal approaches to the problem.2 4 The Supreme
Court has not heard a special assessment case in over a generation.265
C. The Propriety of State Judicial Activism
Legislatures seldom explicitly authorize municipalities to pursue the
parochial land-use policies discussed in this article.2 0 Most enabling
acts that bestow planning and taxing authority are vague and open-
ended. 2 7 Where this is so, the propriety of active judicial scrutiny to
prevent discrimination against outsiders is unquestionable. State courts
262. 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
263. See, e.g., French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 344-45 (1901); Louis-
ville & N.R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 434 (1905).
264. For a sampling of the differences, see, e.g., Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills,
16 Cal. 3d 376, 547 P.2d 1377, 129 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976) (assessments should stand unless
legislature should have known that they were not proportional to benefits or that no
benefits would accrue); O'Malley v. Public Improvement Comm'in, 342 Mass. 624, 174
N.E.2d 668 (1961) (assessment cannot be made in excess of special benefits); Fluckey v.
City of Plymouth, 358 Mich. 447, 100 N.W.2d 486 (1960) (assessment invalid when abutter
receives no benefits); Quality Homes, Inc. v. Village of New Brighton, 289 Minn. 274, 183
N.W.2d 555 (1971) (assessments invalid whenever greater than benefits).
265. The last seems to have been Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control
Dist., 306 U.S. 459 (1939) (landowner not deprived of due process by lack of legislative
hearing oin question of benefits).
266. It is also rare for state statutes expressly to prohibit obviously discriminatory
practices. A conspicuous exception is Auz. REv. Sr.\T. § 9-463.01 (West Supp. 1975)
(locality can force subdivider to reserve lands for parks, schools, recreational facilities
and fire stations, provided it pays for those lands).
267. One example is Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.410(2) (Vernon 1971), which provides in
part:
[Local subdivision] regulations may provide for the dedication, reservation or acquisi-
tion of lands and open spaces necessary for public uses indicated on the city plan and
for appropriate means of providing for the compensation, including reasonable
charges against the subdivision, if any, and over a period of time and in a manner as
is in the public interest.
Delegations of general home-rule authority are equally nebulous. For example, Wis.
CONsT. art. 11, § 3 states, in part:
Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law are hereby empowered, to
determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and
to such enactments of the legislature of state-wide concern as shall with uniformity
affect every city or every village.
See generally F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra note 34, at 308-10.
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have traditionally shown considerable respect for Dillon's Rule, which
calls for the strict construction of municipal powers under enabling
acts.26s This judicial approach would have doomed the renowned anti-
development ordinances of Ramapo and Walnut Creek, both of which
required a stretched interpretation of municipal powers.- 9 Most state
courts are not reluctant to use statutory interpretation to curb munic-
ipal parochialism and indeed prefer that ground to avoid reaching
constitutional issues.2 7 0
Where a judicial decision against a suburb could not be grounded
in statutory interpretation, some might argue that the state courts
should remain passive and thereby leave the correction of municipal
excesses to state legislatures. Neither experience nor political theory,
however, justifies the state courts' opting out. Vigorous judicial review
of municipal antigrowth measures performs a classic constitutional
function. The political processes of small suburbs are systematically
biased against the interests of outsiders injured by growth-control mea-
sures.27 1 Courts have traditionally used constitutional doctrines to stem
legislative provincialism. For example, the Supreme Court has in-
voked a variety of federal constitutional clauses to annul state and
local legislation that has discriminated against individuals who reside
out of state.272 The Court has acted spontaneously on its perception of
268. See I J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55 (5th ed. 1911).
269. The two programs are discussed at pp. 433-34 supra & pp. 483-85 infra, respec-
tively. See also Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d
442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (ambiguous state statute interpreted to
authorize exactions for parks and schools).
270. See, e.g., Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954)
(subdivision map act did not authorize local government to disapproxe subdivision on
grounds of threatened municipal service overloads and fiscal burdens); Daley Constr. Co.
v. Planning Bd., 340 Mass. 149, 163 N.E.2d 27 (1959) (subdivision control law did not
permit planning board to disapproie subdivision plan on grounds of town's water short-
age); Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City of East Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 100 N.W.2d 301 (1960)
(park exactions not authorized by statute); West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean,
48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966) (school exactions not authorized by statute).
271. See pp. 404-07 supra.
272. A recent example is Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975), holding that
a New Hampshire income tax levied exclusively on commuters from another state
violates the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. The Court stated:
Since nonresidents are not represented in the taxing State's legislative halls, ...
judicial acquiescence in taxation schemes that burden them particularly would remit
them to such redress as they could secure through their own State; but "to prevent
[retaliation] was one of the chief ends sought to be accomplished by the adoption of
the Constitution."
Id. at 662. The commerce clause is, of course, the Supreme Court's usual doctrinal peg.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (local ordinance permitting
only local processors to sell pasteurized milk held to violate commerce clause).
These two cases involved de jure discrimination-legislative classifications that ex-
pressly singled out outsiders for different treatment. Antigrowth measures, in contrast,
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its constitutional role, not as a result of any mandate from Congress.
By analogy, the state courts need not await any directive from their
legislatures. In the rare event that a state statute explicitly authorized
a municipality to carry out a policy in conflict with the rules suggested
in this article, state judicial intervention to promote efficiency and
horizontal equity would still hardly be unthinkable. Why else do state
constitutions contain taking clauses? As the subsequent case analysis
will demonstrate, the state courts are increasingly willing to use con-
stitutional doctrines to temper the worst varieties of municipal anti-
growth measures.
IX. The Law of Development Charges
The balance of this article will elaborate the recommended legal
doctrines, compare them with those that now prevail, and apply them
to illustrative problems. This Part discusses the law of development
charges; the next Part, the law of development restrictions.
A municipality may subject landowners to cash and in-kind exac-
tions as a condition for any sort of development approval. The most
common occasions are those in which a developer needs a zoning
change, subdivision map approval, building permit, or utility hook-up.
Any legal doctrine designed to protect landowners from fiscal inequi-
ties must be capable of preventing suburban excesses of all forms. For
example, if a court strictly limits subdivision map approval exactions
but refuses to scrutinize utility hook-up charges, a suburb will simply
shift its fund-raising efforts to the utility connection stage. 2 73 What are
needed are legal tests that focus on the entire fiscal treatment of a
landowner over time.
A. Taxing Development to Raise General Revenue
Municipalities should not be permitted to enact general revenue
measures that primarily burden the land-development industry. Such
taxes may be used to cartelize housing supply and are in any case in-
equitable because they fall upon landowners and housing consumers
who command little voting strength in municipal elections.27 Since
the Supreme Court normally defers to legislatively chosen tax classifi-
involve de facto discrimination against outsiders, a brand usually regarded as somewhat
less tainted. See generally Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent
and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
273. Thus towns in Illinois have been able to sidestep judicial restrictions on sub-
division exactions by imposing their levies at other points. See notes 288 & 310 inIra.
274. See pp. 454-55 supra.
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cations, 2 75 one may be surprised to learn that most state courts have
been active in protecting the homebuilding industry from discrimina-
tory general revenue measures. Indeed, the reported cases unanimous-
ly follow the leading New Jersey decision of Daniels v. Borough of
Point Pleasant276 in forbidding the use of building permit fees by mu-
nicipalities to raise general revenues.2 7 7 Perhaps because of this cold
reception, relatively few suburbs have dared to enact overt general
taxes on residential development. Even the California courts-which
are exceeded by none in their insensitivity to the nuances of land-
development law-have split on the issue of the validity of overt hous-
ing-construction taxes.2 7 8 Of course, if a broadly applicable local tax
happens to include land developers within its net, the element of dis-
crimination against political weaklings is absent, and the tax should
stand.27 9
275. See, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1973)
(rejecting contention that exemption of individual, but not corporate, personal property
from ad valorem taxes violates equal protection clause). But see Austin v. New Hamp-
shire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (invalidating commuter tax). See generally Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1246 n.129, 1285-86
(1970).
276. 23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957) (fee revenue would have exceeded borough's
costs by 700%).
277. See Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.W.2d 144 (1959) (30%
of city's general fund revenue had been obtained from fees); Colonial Oaks West, Inc. v.
Township of E. Brunswick, 61 N.J. 560, 296 A.2d 653 (1972) (fee revenue would be four
times direct costs); Bon Air Estates, Inc. v. Village of Suffern, 32 App. Div. 2d 921, 302
N.Y.S.2d 304 (1969) (presumption of validity overcome if fee revenue three times direct
costs); Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866
(1971) (city admitted fee was general-revenue measure).
278. Compare Newport Bldg. Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26
Cal. Rptr. 797 (1962) (S50-per-lot "business license fee" on new residential subdivisions
violated subdivision map act) with Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Newark, 18
Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971) (upholding tax keyed to number of bedrooms
in proposed building); cf. 45 CAL. Ops. A-r'y GENERAL 23 (1965) (concludes city may
levy tax based on number of bedrooms in new building).
Other California municipalities have begun to exploit the City of Newark precedent.
See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CAL., CODE §§ 16000-08, 16100-08 (1976) (total tax tinder these provi-
sions of $330 per new single-family dwelling); Walnut Creek, Cal., Ordinance No. 1142
(July 31, 1972).
279. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 764, 256 P.2d 305
(1953) (sustaining application of city's general gross-receipts tax to homebuilder).
Similar issues arise when taxes are levied on tenants (who are usually less likely to
vote), or on the transfer of land by nonresident landowners. On the former problem, see
Boulevard Apartments, Inc. v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 86 N.J. Super. 189, 206
A.2d 372 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965), aff'd, 90 N.J. Super. 242, 217 A.2d 139 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1966) (per curiam) (annual fee of S50 per apartment unit, expressly designed
to make apartment houses bear "fair share" of municipal costs, violates state statute
restricting license fees); notes 54 & 55 supra.
On the latter, consider Vermont's new capital gains tax on the sale of land, a program
brilliantly designed to discriminate against nonvoters. The tax exempts the first five
acres of land transferred so long as it includes, or will include, the principal residence of
the transferor or transferee. Most Vermont domiciliaries will thus be exempt, while most
out-of-staters who own vacation homes will not. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10002 (Supp.
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B. Benefits Charges on Landowners
Although only a handful of reported cases touch on the issue of the
general taxation of development activity, there are hundreds dealing
with utility charges, subdivision exactions, special assessments, and
similar municipal efforts to force developers to fund the provision of
specific services. These cases are inconsistent and highly unpredictable,
however, indicating the want of a coherent analytical foundation.
Counsel must often be uncertain how to advise a developer who is
threatened by the exaction of a school site or the sharp escalation of
water main hook-up charges.
In light of the numbing variety of benefits charges that may be
used, it will help to focus the initial discussion on a single problem.
Suppose the suburb of Eden exacted an unimproved site for a neigh-
borhood park from the Tacky Development Company in return for
approving Tacky's normal residential subdivision. In addition, sup-
pose that Eden, pursuant to a recently enacted ordinance, subsequent-
ly conditioned Tacky's building permits on a $200-per-dwelling-unit
contribution to finance city-wide park acquisitions. How would this
case come out under the doctrines I have proposed,280 and how would
my disposition of it differ from those under the traditional legal tests?
1. A Detailed Application of the Recommended
Approach to Park Exactions
a. The Developer's Prima Facie Case
I have argued that horizontal equity among owners of land suited
for residential use is achieved if each existing and prospective dwell-
ing unit would receive the same net benefits over time from municipal
services. These net benefits are to be measured by calculating the
present value of the flow of service expenditures on a dwelling unit
and subtracting the present value of the flow of benefits charges as-
sessed against it. Because this formula provides an integrated assess-
1976); Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974) (upholding tax against equal
protection and other constitutional challenges).
Vermont legislators haic also been unable to resist de jure discrimination against
non-Vermonters. A recently enacted property tax credit is only available to those elderly
persons who were "domiciled in this state during tle entirety of the taxable year." VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5967(b)(1) (Supp. 1976).
Because these Vermont taxes discriminate against out-of-staters, they are appropriate
targets for attack under the Federal Constitution. Cf. Note, Freedom of Travel and
Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, supra note 247, at 1579-83 (implying that Vermont
capital gains tax should be held to violate federal right to freedom of travel).
280. See pp. 459-65 supra.
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ment of all fiscal policies over time, it can be used to test the fairness
of benefits charges levied at any stage of the development process.
A landowner attacking a benefits charge for a service should have to
prove as his prima facie case that his net benefits per dwelling unit
from the service would be less than the average for all dwelling units
in the city. Thus Tacky would have to show that its per-house net
park benefits would be below Eden's mean. In addition, to weed out
trivial cases, the plaintiff should have to show that his loss from fiscal
discrimination is a substantial one.
Assume in our hypothetical that Eden had always rendered park
services equally to resident households. In that case the decisive issue
would be how Eden had financed land acquisition for its other parks.
If Tacky could show that Eden had always used general revenues to
fund those purchases, 281 Tacky could make out a prima facie case that
it should be compensated for the land it had been required to dedicate
and that Eden should refund the park fund contributions Tacky had
made. Since Tacky's homebuyers would receive only average park ben-
efits, the recommended formula would require that their lots be sub-
jected only to Eden's historic average burden of benefits charges for
parks-namely, no burden at all. The outcome would change if the
evidence showed that Eden had consistently used special assessments,
subdivision exactions, and the like to fund the acquisition of park
sites. In that case Tacky could only make out a case for the refund
of its $200-per-unit park fund contribution; requiring it to dedicate
a park site actually would promote horizontal equity. Finally, if
Tacky's development, when completed, would be unusually blessed
with municipal parks, its prima facie case might fail entirely; the extra
burden of the park fund contributions might be entirely offset by
special park benefits.2 s2
b. The Municipality's Defenses
Even if Tacky could prove that its lands would receive below
average net park benefits, Eden could reduce its liability to the ex-
281. State and federal grants-in-aid, which are of considerable significance in munic-
ipal park-acquisition programs, should be classified as general-revenue financing. See
p. 453 supra.
282. Except for grants-in-aid and an occasional special assessment (see note 221 supra),
Los Angeles currently meets its entire capital budget for parks through interrelated levies
on subdividers and on those who construct or improve residential buildings. Interview
with Skip Marvick, supra note 27. See L.A., CAL., CoDE § 17.12 (1973) ("little Quimby"
park exaction ordinance); id. § 21.10 (dwelling unit construction tax). Unless newly built
residential communities will receive special park benefits, these recently enacted ordi-
nances are prima facie discriminatory.
478
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tent that it could prove, as a defense, that its policies were consistent
with Michelman's fairness test. The suburb first would have to show
that its park charges would enhance efficiency. Eden's best evidence
on this score would be that such charges make developers consider
whether the new development is worth the cost of providing sufficient
park facilities-the usual allocational advantage of user fees. This rea-
soning might conceivably justify Eden's exaction of a specific park
site in Tacky's subdivision2 83 but could not possibly support the cash
levies for city-wide parks. The latter charges are not directly related
to the demand for parks created by the new development. To complete
the Michelman defense, Eden would also have to show that Tacky
should be able to perceive that its treatment in this case fits into an
overall policy that is in Tacky's long-term self-interest. 284
c. Remedy
If Tacky's claim were deemed meritorious, the proper remedy would
be the quashing of any of Eden's prospective charges that would be
excessive and the refund to Tacky of any charges already paid to the
extent necessary to achieve fiscal fairness. A homebuilder should be
entitled to keep the entire amount of any refund even if he has sold
the houses or lots for which he paid the excessive fees. Two recent
New Jersey cases unfortunately have confused this issue; they required
developers to share their refunds with their homebuyers to the extent
that the illegal excess had been passed on in higher housing prices. 28 5
283. Because subdivision exactions are not used by some municipalities and, even
where used, tend to be involuntarily paid, a suburb may find it difficult to produce
cidence that a user fee enhances efficiency. See pp. 464-65 supra.
284. As a general proposition, Eden should not be entitled to prevail on the theory
that Tacky, by "voluntarily" paying the park charges, waived its rights to a refund (or is
estopped from asserting those rights). Landowners are at the mercy of local officials
during the development process and must agree to illegally imposed exactions to avoid
costly dela)s. Virtually all courts have recognized that development charges are collected
under duress, and thus that a developer who pays them should not be held to have
relinquished voluntarily his rights to fiscal equality. See, e.g., Newport Bldg. Corp. v.
City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1962); Rosen v. Village of
Downers Groic, 19 I1. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960); Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City of E.
Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 100 N.W.2d 301 (1960); S.S. & 0. Corp. v. Township of Bernards
Seweragc Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973). But cf. Board of Educ. v. Surety
Deselopers, Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 638, 321 N.E.2d 99 (1974), afj'd on other grounds, 63 Ill.
2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975) (otherwise invalid exaction may be enforced if agreed upon
in contract with school board). In addition, the running of the statute of limitations must
be tolled for the period the developer is under duress, or else the passage of time may
enable a suburb to win by force.
285. Colonial Oaks West, Inc. v. Township of E. Brunswick, 61 N.J. 560, 574-75, 296
A.2d 653, 660 (1972), followed in S.S. & 0. Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage
Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 385-86, 301 A.2d 738, 747 (1973). Cf. Metro Homes, Inc. v. City of
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If both a developer and his customers know that a charge is illegal, it
does not matter to them who is entitled to refunds. If developers are
entitled to refunds, they will ignore the illegal charges in setting their
prices; to the extent that homebuyers are entitled to refunds, they
will be willing to pay developers higher housing prices in the first
instance. The issue of entitlements to refunds is not a toss-up, however.
Administrative cost considerations indicate that developers can enforce
rights more cheaply in this instance. Entitling developers to refunds
will eliminate three deadweight losses that may result from the New
Jersey decisions: (1) the cost to developers, the better-informed of the
two parties, of educating homebuyers about their entitlements to re-
funds; (2) the higher costs homebuyers, compared to a single developer,
have in organizing to pursue their claims against the miscreant suburb;
and (3) the costs of litigation over refund shares that will arise between
homebuyers and developers when entitlements to refunds are not
certain.28 6
Measuring the damages resulting from excessive development charges
is unquestionably difficult-but hardly more so than in other familiar
forms of civil litigation. A court considering Tacky's claim for a refund
should not consider every scrap of evidence on Eden's past and pro-
spective policies for furnishing and financing parks. In most suburbs
the pattern will be so erratic and the record so incomplete that a court
can at best hope to dispense a rough justice. The recommended general
formula states that a refund should be awarded to the extent necessary
to equalize net benefits per dwelling unit over time. A specific unit's
net benefits are discounted to the date the unit was first completed
or the date the municipality first provided the service, whichever is
more recent. This assures that a landowner's refund never exceeds the
amount necessary to make a late-developing landowner as well off as
he would have been if the local government had always provided
equal current net benefits to dwelling units actually in existence. Sup-
pose that Tacky's subdivision would be slightly better served than usual
by municipal parks, and that about one-third of Eden's previous park
Warren, 19 Mich. App. 664, 666-67 n.3, 173 N.W.2d 230, 232 n.3 (1969) (indicating that
some Michigan builders, upon being refunded discriminatory sewcr-connection fees, had
settled with homebuyers who had sued for reimbursement).
286. A developer should, of course, be required to reimburse homebuyers if he con-
tracted to do so or if the consequence of the charge being illegal is that the homebuyers
will be validly subjected to previously unexpected assessments. Cf. Lloyd E. Clarke, Inc.
v. City of Bettendorf, 261 Iowa 1217, 158 N.W.2d 125 (1968) (court, though holding that
sewer-connection charges on developer violated statute, nevertheless recognizes that
municipality might thereafter levy special assessments against homebuyers for sewer
connections).
Vol. 86: 385, 1977
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis
acquisitions had been financed with benefits charges on landowners
who are now barred from seeking refunds by the statute of limitations.
A rough-and-ready remedy might then be the refund of Tacky's $200-
per-unit park fund contribution and, in addition, a damage award
equal to 50% of the value of the park site that Tacky had dedicated. "28 T
Tacky would then ultimately bear slightly above-average benefits
charges for parks, which would be approximately offset by its favorable
park benefits. More precise calculations would not be worth their ad-
ministrative costs.
If anything, courts should err on the high side when calculating
damages. Experience in Illinois and New Jersey indicates that suburbs
may not be dissuaded from imposing exactions of dubious legality28
if the only judicial sanction is a refund of the excess charged. Should
some developers not seek reimbursement-either out of ignorance or
fear that a reputation for litigiousness will hurt them in future deal-
ings with suburbs-an illegal fiscal policy may well be a profitable one
for a suburb. In flagrant cases punitive damages should thus be added
to the developer's award as a "kicker" to deter intentional suburban
misconduct.2 s
2. The Traditional Tests Criticized
The state courts at present differ in their handling of developer
challenges to benefits charges. There are three basic approaches. The
Illinois doctrine associated with Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Vil-
lage of Mount Prospect"-' 0 permits an exaction only if the "need" for
287. Tacky should receive interest on both awards.
288. On the Illinois experience, see Platt & Moloney-Merkle, supra note 34, at 715-28(Chicago suburbs have tried to circumvent Pioneer Trust by exacting open space at points
in deielopment process other than subdivision map approval). See also note 310 infra.
At least one local government in New Jersey blatantly disregarded judicial restrictions
on municipal exactions. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 167-69, 168 n.6, 336 A.2d 713, 721-22, 722 n.6, appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
289. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 65, at 1126 (since thief might not be
deterred if only forced to compensate victim, society imposes criminal penalties). Absent
statutory provisions to the contrary, most courts unfortunately decline to award punitive
damages against municipal corporations. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 903 (1951).
Quasi-criminal sanctions against individual municipal employees may provide the
necessary deterrence. In a recent case the builder of a Solana Beach, California, con-
domininm obtained an injunction against delaying tactics by San Diego County officials.
When a county building inspector subsequently tarried in his inspections, a superior
court judge fined him S1,000 for contempt. L.A. Times, July 17, 1974, § II, at 2, col. 7.
290. 22 II. 2d 375, 380-81, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961). Cases following Pioneer Trust
include State ex rel. Noland v, St. Louis County, 478 SAV.2d 363, 367 (Mo. 1972); and
McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 176-77, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374
(1971). The Pioneer Trust formula actually appeared first in Rosen v. Village of Downers
Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 453, 167 N.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1960) (Schaefer, J.).
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the facility being financed is "specifically and uniquely attributable"
to the subdivider's development. This is not a good test. First, the word
''uniquely" implies that Tacky's vulnerability to an exaction might
turn on the completely irrelevant issue of whether its subdivision alone
required a whole neighborhood park. The fact that a subdivision is
small and therefore merely contributes to the "need" for a facility
is not a sufficient justification for exempting the subdivision from
benefits charges; special assessments, for example, have often been em-
ployed in such situations. Second, and more fundamentally, the Pio-
neer Trust formula fails to focus the inquiry on the history of a mu-
nicipality's practices in both rendering and financing services-the two
decisive considerations for judging the fairness of benefits charges. If
the suburb of Eden has a policy of providing equal park services to
its resident households, Tacky's development would unquestionably
unleash a perceived "need" for parks. But the creation of "needs" is
only one act in the fiscal drama. If Eden has traditionally satisfied
park "needs" by spending general revenues, why should Tacky have
to pay specially to meet its own park needs when no other landowner
ever has? When applied, the Pioneer Trust doctrine usually prevents
suburbs from collecting cash contributions for city-wide programs; for
example, it would invalidate Eden's park charge of $200 per dwelling
unit. This result is usually a good one, but it is simply the fortuitous
byproduct of an inaccurate doctrine. In other critical situations Pio-
neer Trust provides no protection at all. For example, the doctrine
literally would authorize the exaction of fire engines, library books,
and teachers' salaries whenever a development is large enough to have
created the entire "need" for those expenditures.
The New Jersey Supreme Court is the leading proponent of the
second approach. That court allows a subdivider to "be compelled
only to bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to
the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the subdivision.' '12,
291. Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 350, 245 A.2d 336, 337
(1967) (per curiam), followed in, e.g., Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside, 55 N.J. 456,
465, 262 A.2d 857, 862 (1970); 181 Inc. v. Salem County Planning Bd., 133 N.J. Super.
350, 358, 336 A.2d 501, 505-06 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), aff'd in relevant part, 140 N.J.
Super. 247, 356 A.2d 34 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
The most recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision on the subject, Divan Builders,
Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975), apparently interpreted this approach
as always entitling a local government to require subdividers to pay the amount by
which the costs of an off-site improvement exceed the special benefits that the improle-
ment confers on them. This leads to the ironic result that the lower the special benefits
conferred on subdividers by a suburb's public works, the easier it is for the suburb to
shift the costs of those projects to subdividers. The Divan Builders opinion is utterly
confused; the New Jersey Supreme Court should disapprove it at the first opportunity.
For cases and statutes requiring a "reasonable" relationship between municipal charges
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This test properly excises the ill-advised "uniqueness" requirement of
Pioneer Trust but is otherwise just as blind to the critical relevance
of a municipality's historic fiscal policies. The fairness of making
Tacky pay for customary park services depends not just on Tacky's
"needs" or "benefits," but also on how Eden finances its other parks.
The New Jersey Supreme Court itself once recognized this in its su-
perb decision in West Park Avenue, Inc. v. Township of Ocean,202
which struck down a .$300-per-lot fee for school construction because
"there would be an imbalance if new construction alone were to bear
the capital cost of new schools while also being charged [through
property taxes] with the capital costs of schools serving other portions
of the school district. '2 3
The third judicial approach is deference to municipal decisions to
use benefits charges. This is the least defensible of the three because
it forsakes the judicial responsibilities to chip away at legislatively
sanctioned monopolies and to protect political outsiders from dis-
criminatory legislative policies. 294 Judicial deference to development
charges peaked in the mid-1960s with a pair of subdivision exaction
decisions in New York and Wisconsin.295 Local governments have lost
eight out of the twelve park exaction cases reported since 1966.29 6 The
best-known case, however-the California Supreme Court's unfortunate
Associated Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek297-was a
and landowner benefits (or needs), a standard similar to the rational nexus test, see,
e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949); Kessler v. Town of
Shelter Island Planning Bd., 40 App. Div. 2d 1005, 1006, 338 N.Y.S.2d 77$, 780 (1972);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65909 (West 1976); cf. ALI MODEL LAND DEV. CODr § 2-103(3) (Proposed
Official Draft 1975) (allowing exactions for specified improvements "of a quality and
quantity no more than reasonably necessary for the proposed development").
292. 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966).
293. Id. at 126-27, 224 A.2d at 3-4.
294. See pp. 473-75 supra.
295. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1966); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 NAV.2d 442 (1965),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
296. The eight losses are Home Builders Ass'n v. Riddel, 109 Ariz. 404, 510 P.2d 376
(1973) (construction tax designed to raise park revenues unconstitutional); Aunt Hack
Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (Super. Ct.
1967) (cash exactions for town park development unconstitutional); Admiral Dev. Corp.
v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1972) (exaction ordinance for park
development beyond charter and overbroad); Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood,
39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Cir. Ct. 1973) (fees violate equal protection clause and exceed city's
powers); Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971) ("public facilities
purchase fund" fees beyond statute); Kessler v. Town of Shelter Island Planning Bd., 40
App. Div. 2d 1005, 338 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1972) (specific exaction improper); East Neck
Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (specific
exaction confiscatory); and Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d
910 (1970) (exaction ordinance arbitrary on its face).
297. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), vacating 11 Cal. App. 3d
1129, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1970).
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municipal victory.2 8 That decision justified municipal collection of
cash development charges for parks in part on the "urgent needs' 200
for more parks to curb "the appallingly rapid disappearance of open
areas in and around our cities. '" 30 0 Even if there were factual support
for the court's perception of the value of more recreational areas,
which is far from certain,30 the merits of such a spending program
are irrelevant when the homebuilders' complaint goes to the issue
of how the parks are to be financed. One might as well let the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue argue in a narrow federal tax case that
the United States Treasury is short of money.
Despite its essentially deferential tone, even Walnut Creek implies
that a municipality may choose either to exact a park site or to collect
fees in lieu thereof, but not both.3 02 The lamentable outcome of the
case may be explained in part by the undistinguished performance
of the attorneys who represented the homebuilders. Rather than bring-
ing a test case for the refund of a charge paid by an individual de-
veloper, they asked instead for declaratory relief for homebuilders as
a class. That was a mistake. The fiscal equity accorded any particular
landowner depends on the historic treatment of his particular parcel.
These cases are therefore often poorly suited for class relief.3 02 In ad-
dition, the plaintiffs' attorneys neglected to introduce any evidence
on Walnut Creek's prior policies for furnishing and financing parks.
30 4
298. The other three victories are Norsco Enterprises v. City of Fremont, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 488, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976) (reducing but permitting-under Walnut Creek-
park fees exacted on conversion of apartment housc to condominiums); Krughoff v. City
of Naperville, 41 Ill. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976) (declaratory judgment sustaining
park exaction ordinance against statutory and constitutional challenges); and Collis v.
City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1976) (park exaction ordinance
constitutional on its face).
299. 4 Cal. 3d at 639, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
300. Id. at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
301. Nonuse of neighborhood parks (the type in controversy in Walnut Creek) is ap-
parently an increasingly frequent phenomenon. See S. GOLD, URBAN RECREATION PLANNING
101-03 (1973); Dunn, Book Review, 40 J. Ai. INST. PLANNERS 59 (1974).
A cost-benefit analysis of small parks in Los Angeles revealed an excess of costs over
benefits at reasonable discount rates. W. HiRscH, THE ECONOMICS OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 238-40 (1970).
The "need" for parks is usually measured by standards set by the National Recreation
and Park Association, an organization no less self-serving than any other professional
association. Its standards seem to be adjusted over time to stay ahead of prevailing
service levels; this helps local recreation officials in their budgetary battles. For biting
criticism of these official standards, see S. GOLD, supra at 143-81.
302. See 4 Cal. 3d at 640-41 n.6, 484 P.2d at 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640 n.6.
303. Other cases that homebuilders lost when their attorneys failed to introduce
evidence on the fairness of specific exactions include Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41
Ill. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976); and Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19
(Minn. Sup. Ct. 1976).
304. Walnut Creek was tried on a simple set of stipulated facts-essentially just the
texts of the ordinances that were being challenged. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669 (Ct. App. 1970).
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The park fees being contested would be fair if new Walnut Creek
subdivisions were to receive above-average park benefits or if the city
had previously relied principally on special assessmentsa °5 special park
districts, or subdivision exactions to raise revenues for park acquisi-
tions. Because the homebuilders did not introduce evidence to the
contrary, they failed to make out a prima facie case for relief.30
In sum, all three of the current judicial approaches are ill-suited for
unmasking fiscal inequities. Yet, as so often happens in the law, many
judges seem able to reach acceptable outcomes despite existing doc-
trine. Most courts are at least willing to prevent municipal discrimina-
tion among subdividers'307 and to bar the exemption of resident home-
owners from hook-up charges that developers have to pay. °s Given the
305. For cases upholding the special assessment of private land to finance park
acquisitions, see, e.g., Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U.S. 611 (1898); and Winnetka Park Dist.
v. Hopkins, 371 Iii. 46, 20 N.E.2d 58 (1939). Cf. State v. City of Topeka, 201 Kan. 729,
443 P.2d 240 (1968) (state lands subject to assessment for local park).
The city of Minneapolis is reported to use the technique frequently. Kitchen & Hendon,
Land Values Adjacent to an Urban Neighborhood Park, 43 LAND ECON. 357, 358 (1967).
Some California cities use special assessments (quite properly) when a neighborhood
receives unusually generous park benefits. See note 221 supra; San Diego Union, June 1,
1974, § B, at 1, col. 1 (one quarter of $5.44 million acquisition cost of 900-acre Tecolete
Can)on Park in San Diego to be financed with special assessments).
Income from special assessments for all purposes has declined from 6.7% of total
municipal revenue in 1930 to slightly o~er 1% today. See BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, CITY
GOVERNMStENT FINANCES IN 1970-71, at 5 (1972); 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOErrLE, supra note
195, at 413, 415 (excerpting from TAx FOUNDATION, INC., SPFCIAL AssEssMENTS AND SERVICE
CHARGES IN MUNICIIAxL FINANCE (1970)). This fall-off may be due in part to the increased
popularity of subdivision exactions, a form of municipal income the Census has not yet
attempted to tabulate.
306. Nevertheless, if the California Supreme Court had concluded that the merits of
the suit could be adjudicated in a class action, it might at least have remanded the case
to permit the gathering of additional evidence on Walnut Creek's practices in supplying
and financing parks. See Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E. Brunswick, 60 N.J.
115, 286 A.2d 498 (1972) (remanding for more evidence on township's financing of water
mains).
307. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Joliet, 108 111. App. 2d 230, 247 N.E.2d 47 (1969) (no
other subdividers had been required to install storm drain trunklines); Divan Builders,
Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975) (only two of many benefited land-
owners would be charged for drainage facility); MeKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26
Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971) (plaintiff had been required to dedicate land
for street widening and adjacent subdivider had not).
The most common form of discrimination appears to be charging big subdividers more
than small ones. See, e.g., CA. Gov'T CODE § 66475.1 (WVest Supp. 1976) (subdividers of at
least 200 parcels may be required to dedicate land for bicycle paths); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 4417(5) (1975) (authorizing school-site exactions only from subdivisions of more than
100 dwelling units). For a hostile judicial reaction to this pattern, see Johnson v. Reasor,
392 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1965) (utility connection fees imposed on subdividers but not on
individual lot owners held discriminatory). Cf. S.S. & 0. Corp. v. Township of Bernards
Sewerage Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973) (sewerage authority could not impose
higher connection charges on houses in developments than on other comparable dwellings).
308. See Beauty Built Constr. Corp. v. City of Warren, 375 Mich. 229, 134 N.W.2d
214 (1965) (this pattern of financing sewers denies equal protection); Strahan v. City of
Aurora, 38 Ohio Misc. 37, 311 N.E.2d 876 (C.P. Portage County 1973) (invalidating similar
scheme for water hook-ups).
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dearth of helpful academic commentary on these issues, 300 one must
be thankful that the judicial record is as good as it is.
3. Development Charges for Facilities Other than Parks
At first, American municipalities only sought to make developers
pay for streets and on-site utilities. Then came parks and schools. In
the last few years, charges for more exotic items like firehouses, police
cars, and cultural centers have begun to emerge.3 10 Developers should
generally have little trouble establishing a prima facie case against any
benefits charge that is aimed at funding a traditional service that the
municipality has historically financed with general revenues.
The exaction of school sites from developers, for example, usually
reduces their net benefits from schools to subpar levels. Special assess-
ments for school facilities are unknown in the United States3 11 (per-
haps because close proximity to a school actually lowers land values3 1 2).
Statutes expressly authorizing school-site exactions without compensa-
tion are only of recent vintage.3 13 Therefore developers who provide
school sites are paying benefits charges of a type that owners of existing
structures (and their predecessors) are unlikely to have paid. Despite
309. In their frequently cited article, Heyman and Gilhool argue that suburbs should
use "rational cost-accounting procedures" to allocate costs to developers. See Heyman &
Gilhool, supra note 34, at 1141-46. Their system of allowing benefits charges equal to
benefits conferred is similar to the New Jersey "rational nexus" test. See pp. 482-83
supra. Both tests are insensitive to how other landowners have been treated.
The redoubtable Michelman and Sandalow, however, have recognized that consistency
across landowners is the critical issue. See F. MscInirA, & T. SANDALOW, supra note 34,
at 536. Reps and Smith had the glimmer of a good idea when they suggested that exac-
tions should be permissible only for local improvements that could be financed with
special assessments. They focused, however, only on municipal power to use special
assessments, and not on actual financing practices. Reps & Smith, supra note 34, at 407-08.
310. In approving a dense PUD plan, one Illinois town exacted a five-acre school
site, S200 per dwelling unit for its cultural center and local hospital, a S20,000 lump sum
for its police and fire departments, installation of traffic signals on perimeter roads, and
commitments for the maintenance of the tract's interior streets and utility lines. Schaum-
burg, III. Ordinance No. 1030 (Nov. 27, 1973). These exactions may well have been valid
in this particular case because the town was apparently agreeing to allow subnormal
residential uses. See note 194 supra.
311. Two leading treatises on municipal law state that schools are not "local im-
provements" for which special assessments can be levied. E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 38.29, at 107 n.7 (3d ed. 1970); C. RHYNE, MUNICII'AL LAw § 29.3, at
718-19 (1957). Both cite two old cases as authority for this proposition: Vanoicr v. Davis,
27 Ga. 354 (1859); and Commissioners of Pub. Schools v. County Comm'rs, 20 Md. 449
(1864). Neither case in fact supports it.
312. See, e.g., Hendon, Property Values, Schools, and Park-School Combinations, 49
LAND Ecox. 216 (1973).
313. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4417(5) (1975) (only in subdivisions containing
over 100 dwelling units); cf. ALI MODEL LAND Dv'. CoDE § 2-103, note 3, at 46 (Proposed
Official Draft 1975) (§ 2-103 should be construed to authorize cash or in-kind exactions
"for public facilities such as schools, parks, and fire stations" that are reasonably allocable
to subdivider).
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their unfairness, school exactions are becoming increasingly popular.
Suburbs often condition PUD approvals on the dedication of school
sites. The Ramapo Plan awards valuable "development points" to land-
owners who donate these facilities.314 In California, where local gov-
ernments are required by statute to compensate subdividers for re-
serving school sites, 315 municipalities nevertheless openly sell waivers
to building moratoria in return for school contributions.3 1 The state
courts have usually seen fit to invalidate overt school-exaction pro-
grams, although frequently on statutory, not constitutional, grounds.317
The fairness of requiring landowners to provide rights-of-way and
improvements for streets usually turns on the width of the street.
Rights-of-way for local streets historically have been donated free by
developers; 318 the grading and paving costs of these streets have also
usually been covered through benefits financing-for example, special
assessments on abutters. 319 Where this has been the pattern, it is unfair
for a municipality not to exact improved local streets from subdi-
viders.320 Primary and secondary highways are another matter. Since
314. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
315. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66478 (West Supp. 1976); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55D-44 (West
Supp. 1976) (developer entitled to compensation for actual loss caused by temporary
reservation of land for public use).
316. See, e.g., Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (1974), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976) (San Jose initiative required land-
owner to promise to provide temporary school facilities to obtain rezoning); HousE &
HOtE, May 1972, at 34 (four homebuilders in San Diego agreed to pay school busing
costs and $750 per resident pupil for relief from building moratorium).
317. See, e.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957)
(school fees violated subdivision map act); Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township
of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966); ef. Op,. N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER 68-939 (1968)
(towns lack authority to exact school sites). But see Board of Educ. v. Surety Developers,
Inc., 63 I1. 2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975) (Pioneer Trust formula does not bar school
exaction in this instance); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137
N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (sustaining exaction of school fees
against landowner's statutory and constitutional challenges). See generally Feldman, The
Constitutionality of Subdivision Exactions for Educational Purposes, 76 DicK. L. REv. 651
(1972).
318. Cases upholding the exaction of interior local streets include MacLean v. Planning
Bd., 94 N.J. Super. 288, 228 A.2d 85 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); Noble v. Chairman of
Township Comm., 91 N.J. Super. 111, 219 A.2d 335 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966). But cf.
Battaglia v. Wayne Township Planning Bd., 98 N.J. Super. 194, 236 A.2d 608 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1967) (small interior street of no value to building permit applicant could not
be exacted).
319. Where exactions are not possible, Los Angeles uses special assessments to finance
both right-of-way acquisition and improvement costs of local streets. Los Angeles, Cal.,
City Council, Street Improvement Policies § IV (Council File No. 115,320) (undated) (on
file with Yale Law Journal).
320. Cf. Lipford v. Harris, 212 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1968) (challenge to public financing of
local streets). See also note 188 supra.
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landowners typically have not paid for them,3 2 1 a subdivider should
not be required to donate the right-of-way for a thoroughfare except
to the extent that his lands will be unusually well-served by the system
of primary and secondary highways. Until a decade ago, the reported
cases always sustained municipal exactions for major highways;3 22 since
then, the landowner has frequently prevailed -.3 2
Municipal financing of utility networks has been the single most
fertile ground for litigation. In most communities, abutting land-
owners have traditionally borne the costs of installing house connec-
tions and laterals for water and sewerage systems but not the costs of
more massive components like treatment plants and trunk lines.3",- 4 Al-
though Los Angeles long adhered to this basic financing pattern, it has
lately shifted onto new development the entire municipal share of the
capital costs of community-wide sanitary sewerage facilities.3 2 5 This is
prima facie inequitable because new neighborhoods will not receive
any special sewer benefits.32 ' The complexities of financing utility in-
frastructures seem to intimidate the courts; they generally have been
remiss in protecting owners of undeveloped land from discriminatory
water and sewer charges.3 27
321. For a thorough historical account of federal grants-in-aid for noninterstate high-
ways, see Schwartz, Urban Freeways and the Interstate System, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 406,
412-18 (1976).
322. See, e.g., Newton v. American Security Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941);
Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Krieger v. Planning Comm'n, 224
Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885 (1961); Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217
N.W. 58 (1928).
323. See, e.g., Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App.
2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967); Schwing v. City of Baton Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. App.
1971); State ex rel. Noland -. St. Louis County, 478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1972); Princeton
Research Lands, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 112 N.J. Super. 467, 271 A.2d 719 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1970); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370
(1971); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975); see also Broward
County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. App. 1975) (charge of 5200 per new
dwelling unit to finance city-wide road and bridge construction program exceeds city's
authority).
324. See generally R. TABORS, M. SHAPIRO & P. ROGEaS, LAND USE AND THE PIPE 89-96
(1976).
325. See pp. 465-66 & notes 231 & 232 supra. Los Angeles has also done this for parks.
See note 282 supra.
326. See pp. 466-67 supra.
327. Apparently discriminatory hook-up charges have often been upheld. See, e.g.,
Western Heights Land Corp. v. City of Fort Collins, 146 Colo. 464, 362 P.2d 155 (1961)
(fees would exceed construction costs); Hayes v. City of Albany, 7 Or. App. 277, 490 P.2d
1018 (1971) (upholding greater than tenfold increase in sewer-connection charges). But
see, e.g., Strahan v. City of Aurora, 35 Ohio Misc. 37, 311 N.E.2d 876 (C.P. Portage County
1973) (charge wotld exceed connection costs).
The courts also usually sustain newly adopted development charges imposed to fund
off-site impiovenients to utility systems. See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders .. City of
Livermore, 56 Cal. 2d 847, 366 P.2d 448, 17 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1961) (.5150 per unit for sanita-
tion fund); City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 312 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (total of $700 per unit for off-site water and sewer systems); R & C Robert-
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Municipal programs to place electric and telephone cables under-
ground raise especially complicated questions of fiscal equity. The
undergrounding process is expensive and perforce painfully slow. As
a result, some neighborhoods must inevitably be freed of unsightly
poles and wires before others are. Because benefits invariably are un-
evenly distributed, the horizontally fair way to finance underground-
ing programs is by means of benefits charges. Subdividers should thus
be compelled to bear undergrounding costs; 328 in established neighbor-
hoods, special assessments should be levied to recoup special benefits. 329
Suppose, however, that a suburb forces developers to pay for under-
grounding in new subdivisions, but dips into its general tax revenues
to finance the undertaking in established neighborhoods. 330 In that
case both subdividers and landowners in established neighborhoods
not soon scheduled for undergrounding would be receiving below-
average net benefits. To require a suburb to pay fully for under-
grounding costs in new developments, however, would give developers
a net fiscal advantage. A developer's remedy should therefore at most
be reimbursement of his undergrounding costs to the extent necessary
to provide him with average net undergrounding benefits.33 1
X. The Law of Development Restrictions: Quotas, Moratoria, and
the Regulation of Area, Bulk, and Use
When a court concludes that a development charge has been
illegally collected, the remedy is rather simple: a refund. But when a
son, Inc. v. Township of Avon, 28 Mich. App. 305, 184 NAV.2d 261 (1970) ($350-per-unit
capital charge). These charges are prima facie unfair in the typical case in which bene-
fits charges had not been used for this purpose before. They are especially unfair where
part of the revenue generated will be spent in existing neighborhoods.
As always, the New Jersey courts do not hesitate to correct fiscal inequities in this
context. See, e.g., Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286
A.2d 498 (1972) (water main finance).
328. Compulsory undergrounding in new developments has generally been upheld.
See, e.g., Sansoucy v. Planning Bd., 355 Mass. 647, 246 N.E.2d 811 (1969). The economic
rationale for the requirement is that outsiders and passers-by may suffer from the
ugliness of overhead wires, and thus that a developer's autonomous design decisions
might be suboptimal. For another approach to this problem, see Alternatives to Zoning,
supra note 73, at 776.
329. Undergrounding has been held to be a local improvement. See, e.g., Irish v. Hahn,
208 Cal. 339, 281 P. 385 (1929); Blaine v. Schmitkons, 107 Ohio App. 405, 159 N.E.2d 772
(1958); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1389 (1930).
330. Cf. Citizens for Underground Equality v. City of Seattle, 6 Wash. App. 338, 492
P.2d 1071 (1972) (undergrounding on arterial streets to be paid for out of general
revenue; undergrounding in residential neighborhoods to be financed by mixture of
general revenue and special assessments).
331. The amount of these average net benefits depends in part on whether land-
owners in established neighborhoods not soon slated for undergrounding are entitled to
any remedy. Because most of those landowners can no doubt vote in municipal elections,
that legal issue may be distinguishable from those addressed in this article.
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regulation is suspect, the remedial choices multiply. This Part describes
the disastrous judicial tradition of prescribing ambiguous and inap-
propriate remedies in zoning cases, articulates more fully the legal
approach recommended, and evaluates recent leading cases on growth
restrictions.
A. The Nectow Fallacy: A Critique of Zoning by Judicial Decree
The most pervasive judicial error in American land-development
law is the reluctance to grant the remedy of damages. The deeply
rooted misconception that the proper relief is usually the invalidation
of part or all of the offending ordinance may be called the "Nectow
fallacy" after Nectow v. City of Cambridge,33 2 a Supreme Court deci-
sion of a half-century ago. The facts were hardly memorable. A Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, zoning ordinance barred commercial and in-
dustrial uses on Mr. Nectow's property. He contended that this zoning
classification was improper and violated his federal constitutional
right to due process. The remedy he sought was a mandatory injunc-
tion entitling him to a building permit for a commercial or industrial
structure. The Supreme Court agreed with his arguments and declared
the ordinance unconstitutional. It did not, however, expressly address
the question whether Mr. Nectow was to be granted the entitlement
he sought (although that was certainly implicit in the Court's
opinion).33
As one of the few Supreme Court decisions on zoning, Nectow has
been an influential case. Its impact has been detrimental in three
respects. First, by grounding relief on the Federal Constitution, the
Supreme Court federalized an issue of landowner rights that it should
have left to state courts and state constitutionsY" Second, the case has
been construed to mean that a landowner's standard remedy against
overly restrictive zoning should be some form of injunctive relief and
not damages. Third, by failing to specify what type of injunctive
relief the landowner was to receive, Nectow reinforced the judicial
tendency toward sloppiness in the specification of remedies in zoning
cases.
Courts continue to write opinions that declare a challenged ordi-
nance to be void without going farther to delineate what rights land-
owners have as a result.3 3  An excellent illustration is Appeal of
332. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
333. The Nectow site was not actually used for industrial purposes until 1948. See 4
N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 83.10 (1975).
334. See pp. 470-73 supra.
335. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11,
283 A.2d 353 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1973),
490
Vol. 86: 385, 1977
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis
Girsh,330 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a zoning
ordinance invalid for failing to provide for multifamily structures.
The township subsequently placed several tracts other than the Girsh
property in an apartment district and claimed that it had complied
with the decision. The owners of the Girsh property challenged this
interpretation and after two years won a clarifying order from the
court directing the township to grant the permits the owners would
need to build apartments. In the meantime the township had begun
making arrangements to condemn the Girsh property for a public
park.337
A court that wishes to grant injunctive relief in a case like Nectow
can choose among four varieties of unambiguous decrees. First, it can
decide that because the ordinance is void, the landowner is entitled
to build any project that complies with the valid municipal controls
that remain (e.g., building codes). 338 This is rather Draconian. Why
should Cambridge's penalty for zoning too harshly be its complete
loss of zoning authority over Mr. Nectow's tract?3
30
A second judicial option is to invalidate the current restriction but
at the same time allow Cambridge to enact a new set of restrictions
applicable to the Nectow tract; if Mr. Nectow should then object to
the new controls, he could again seek judicial review. This relief,
however, is insufficient if the municipality refuses to accept the spirit
of the original judicial decision. If Cambridge continued to subject
Mr. Nectow to unduly stringent controls, albeit controls different from
those invalidated, he would eventually have to be given some form of
injunctive relief.3 40 Therefore, when judges permit a municipality to
replace an invalid ordinance, they usually set a deadline for that action
and either retain jurisdiction341 or advise the municipality that it must
permit certain uses.342
on remand, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 45
U.S.L.W. 2379 (N.J. Jan. 26, 1977); Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281
A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268
A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199
(1975).
336. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
337. See Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120
U. P.A. L. REv. 1029, 1080-82 (1972).
338. See ALI MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 9-113(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1975) (rule
or ordinance should be assumed not to include the invalid provision).
339. For similar sentiments, see, e.g., Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton
Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 378-79, 167 N.E.2d 406, 411 (1960).
340. See id., 167 N.E.2d at 411; Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 93 II. App. 2d 24, 235
N.E.2d 23 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969).
341. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon 1972); Petlin Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Dover, 64 N.J. 327, 316 A.2d 1 (1974) (setting 90-day deadline).
342. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975); City
of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975).
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Third, if Cambridge had denied Mr. Nectow's application for ap-
proval of a particular development project, a reviewing court might
simply order the city to grant the necessary permits for that specific
project.3 43 But why should a judge be restricted to a choice between
either validating Cambridge's distasteful regulations or clearing the
decks for the precise project that had happened to spark Mr. Nectow's
imagination?
The fourth form of injunctive relief plunges courts fully into the
land-use planning business; they themselves determine a set of controls
(uses, heights, setbacks, densities, parking) for the site in question. The
New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts, the national pacesetters in the
review of municipal zoning, are now doing just that.344 While one can
understand why they have been unenthusiastic about the other forms
of specific relief, one also doubts whether courts are the right institu-
tions to be poring over the details of site plans.
Under all four variations the Nectow fallacy eventually lures courts
into the morass of articulating specific development rights of land-
owners and mandating their protection. Injunctive relief is plagued
by two key shortcomings. First, prospective injunctions do not deter
municipal lawlessness because they fail to provide landowners with
any remedy for their past suffering. In the Nectow case, Cambridge
had the benefit of its illegal zoning restriction for the 4-1/2 years
between its enactment and the Supreme Court decision; it did not
have to compensate Mr. Nectow for any delay in his building activities.
If a landowner's remedy is prospective only, what will deter the city
of Cambridge from knowingly imposing illegal zoning restrictions
that will at least temporarily benefit political insiders? Would not the
343. See, e.g., Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 379,
167 N.E.2d 406, 411 (1960); Daraban v. Township of Redford, 383 Mich. 497, 176
N.W.2d 598 (1970); Superior Uptown, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 2d 36, 313
N.E.2d 820 (1974); cf. ALI MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 9-113(1) (Proposed Official Draft
1975) (court order itself should be treated as development permit).
Courts have been more willing to order permit approvals than to "rezone" the sub-
ject tract themselves; the latter step is usually regarded as an unwarranted assumption
of legislative functions. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1969);
Emjay Properties v. Town of Brookhaven, 42 App. Div. 2d 907, 347 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1973);
City of El Paso v. McArthur, 473 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). lut see, e.g., City of
Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973). See generally Krasnowiecki, supra
note 110, at 11-20.
344. See, e.g., Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor of Washington, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d
89 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (court adopts its consultant's recommendations on what
kinds of apartments the landowner should be permitted to build); Ellick v. Board of
Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975), followed in, e.g., Gorski v.
Township of Skippack, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 346, 339 A.2d 624 (1975) (court must in-
dependently approve specific controls for landowner's property). PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 53,
§ 11011(2), (3) (Purdon 1972) expressly authorizes this remedy.
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contents of the National Enquirer become more outrageous if the
exclusive remedy in libel cases were merely an injunction against
future excesses?
The second shortcoming of injunctive relief is that it overly cir-
cumscribes a municipality's future options. If Cambridge is entitled to
acquire Mr. Nectow's development rights through eminent domain, as
it certainly should be, a court should not issue a decree mandating the
city to issue a development permit. The correct prospective remedy is
to give the city its option of either repealing the overly intrusive
control or paying damages in order to keep it in force.
The appropriate remedy for Mr. Nectow would thus have consisted
of two components. 345 He should have been awarded his damages (if
any) arising from the past delays. And he should have had the benefit
of a decree ordering Cambridge to decide within a short time whether
it wanted to lift the excessive zoning restriction or retain it and pay the
future losses that Mr. Nectow would suffer. In short, the appropriate
landowner remedy in zoning cases is not injunctive relief, as the
Nectow tradition would have it, but rather an award of interim
damages for past delays plus the conditional award of permanent
damages.
B. A Complete Articulation of the Recommended Approach and
Its Application to a Typical Case of Exclusionary Zoning
The proposed doctrinal system for legal attacks on development
restrictions will now be illustrated in detail. 346 Suppose the zoning
scheme for the suburb of Eden, a municipality five square miles in
area, does not provide for the construction of new multifamily struc-
tures. Ten percent of Eden's households nevertheless live in apart-
ments tolerated as preexisting nonconforming uses; the other 90% live
in single-family residences on lots with a median area of a quarter-acre.
The Tacky Development Company owns a 20-acre tract of undeveloped
land in the heart of an Eden neighborhood that consists mostly of
single-family homes on half-acre lots. Tacky's tract, like all other un-
developed land in the suburb, is zoned for single-family residences on
at least half-acre lots.
345. Because Mr. Nectow wanted to build a commercial or industrial structure, either
of which would constitute a subnormal use, he should have been required to prove that
Cambridge's zoning for his tract was grossly inefficient in order to be entitled to
damages. See p. 419 supra.
346. The following hypothetical is loosely derived from Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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1. The Rights of Landowners
Tacky would like to build a modern, high-density garden apartment
project on its tract. When it applies for a rezoning to permit that use,
however, Eden officials deny the application.
a. The Landowner's Prima Facie Case
Eden's ordinances are not tainted by the sort of suspect classifica-
tions or motives that might justify an injunction against their en-
forcement. 3 7 Therefore Tacky's remedy, if it has one, should be
recovery of its damages resulting from Eden's violation of the taking
clause of the state constitution. 348
Because Eden residents would correctly perceive Tacky's apartment
project to be a below-normal land use, the suburb's ban on apartments
is an antinuisance measure. Therefore, to recover damages for that
restriction on use, Tacky would have to meet the requirements of the
more onerous of the two taking tests developed in Part IV. Namely,
Tacky would have to prove that banning multifamily uses on its tract
is a grossly inefficient policy.3 9 This would require evidence that the
costs of the no-apartment policy far exceed the benefits. Tacky would
have a strong case, for example, if the aggregate value of land350 in
the neighborhood 351 (including the value of Tacky's tract) would be
much higher if apartments were allowed on Tacky's site.3 .2 If Tacky's
land were buffered from surrounding houses by major highways or
commercial areas, and if its locational and topographic features made
the site much more attractive to apartment dwellers than to home-
owners, Tacky indeed might be able to prove that prohibiting apart-
ments was grossly inefficient. But the probability is small. It is more
likely that the welfare gains to Tacky and to housing consumers arising
from an apartment project on Tacky's site would not greatly exceed
the nuisance costs to the tract's neighbors. In many single-family-home
neighborhoods, prohibitions on apartments are a relatively efficient
347. See pp. 417-18 supra.
348. See pp. 469-73 supra.
349. See p. 419 supra.
350. If demand for apartments is perfectly elastic, the increase ill land prices should
indicate rather accurately the welfare gains from apartment construction. However, if
demand is not perfectly elastic, the focus on land values would fail to discern addi-
tional consumer surplus that might be generated by new apartments. See also Courant,
On the Effect of Fiscal Zoning on Land and Housing Values, 3 J. URB. EcoN. 88 (1976);
Olls, Weisberg & White, The Effect of Zoning on Land Value, I J. URa. EcON. 428 (1974).
351. This assumes that Tacky's apartments would not impose significant nuisance
costs or net congestion costs outside its neighborhood.
352. For discussion of the possibility that some of the increment in land value would
be attributable to monopoly prices for apartment sites, see note 360 infra.
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way (given current nuisance law3z3 ) to protect neighborhood character-
istics that cannot be protected by means of private agreements because
of high transactions costs.
Tacky has a better chance against Eden's requirement of half-acre
minimum lots. Because most Eden households live on lots smaller
than that, this lot-size requirement compels the conferral of benefits.
By demonstrating this fact, Tacky would become eligible to use Part
IV's less onerous test for a taking. Under that test, a landowner's prima
facie case is a showing that the contested restriction has substantially
reduced the market value of his land.354 Tacky's attorneys therefore
should call expert witnesses to testify that the half-acre minimum lot-
size requirement makes Tacky's particular tract substantially less
valuable than it would be if it could be developed at Eden's normal
residential density-quarter-acre lots.
b. The Municipality's Defenses
Were Tacky to prove that the apartment ban was grossly inefficient,
Eden would have no defense against liability for the resulting dam-
ages. 3 5 On the other hand, if Tacky could only make out the prima
facie case against the lot-size requirement, the suburb should be
entitled to invoke Michelman's fairness test as a defense in that in-
stance.3 "a To do so successfully, Eden would first have to prove that
half-acre lots would be more efficient in Tacky's neighborhood than
quarter-acre lots. That would depend on the site characteristics, on the
demand for the two types of housing, and on the effect of houses on
quarter-acre lots on the value of nearby houses on half-acre lots. Second,
Eden would also have to show that Tacky should be able to under-
stand why the denial of compensation in this case is in the long-term
self-interest of the owners of undeveloped land. To help make this
twin showing, Eden should argue that all landowners have an interest
in permitting municipal controls that promote efficient land use, and
that the only reason Tacky's tract would have a higher market value
if subdivided into quarter-acre lots is that Tacky's development would
be able to exploit the pleasant environment attributable to the larger
lots in the neighborhood. Eden should call expert witnesses to testify
353. Cf. Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 73, at 761-71 (suggesting appropriate
private nuisance remedies would be better than zoning for producing optimal patterns
of residential development).
354. See p. 419 supra.
355. If the control is grossly inefficient, Eden could not possibly make out the ef-
ficiency part of tle Michelman defense.
356. See p. 419 supra.
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that a landowner who owned all the land in the neighborhood and
who was not subject to the restriction at issue would find it most prof-
itable to subdivide Tacky's tract into at least half-acre lots. Observe
that the suburb's probability of prevailing on the Michelman defense
declines as the aggrieved developer's tract increases in size. Most of the
environmental consequences of the development of a large parcel do
not go beyond its boundaries. 337 Therefore, if Tacky wanted to carve
out quarter-acre lots in the heart of a 1000-acre tract, Eden would be
hard put to show that a half-acre minimum lot size requirement there
would be both efficient and fair. Because Tacky's site has only 20
acres, however, its subdivision into quarter-acre lots might indeed have
significant adverse spillover effects.
c. The Landowner's Remedy
Assume Tacky is adjudged to have failed in its attack on the apart-
ment prohibition but to have succeeded in its claim for compensation
for the half-acre lot requirement. The first step in measuring damages
is to calculate the diminution in the tract's market value that arises
from the excessive restriction. Suppose Tacky could show that its 20-
acre tract would have a market value of $500,000 if it could be
subdivided into quarter-acre lots3,s but has a value of only $300,000
when restricted to half-acre lots. (Both these valuations would auto-
matically reflect the influence of whatever development charges and
noncompensatory development restrictions Eden could validly im-
pose.aao) If housing prices in Eden have not been boosted by the output
restrictions imposed by the homeowner cartel,36 the diminution of
357. Nuisance costs are probably the principal environmental threat posed by new
development. These costs are obviously reduced the larger the development tract. Conges-
tion costs are more directly related to a development's total population than to its area;
but it is far from clear that suburban growth causes significant net congestion costs. See
p. 449 & notes 164 & 175 supra.
358. I assume that Eden's requirement of quarter-acre lots-for that suburb a sub-
normal use restriction-is not grossly inefficient for Tacky's tract and therefore that
Eden can apply it without risk of liability.
359. A landowner who is the victim of an excessive use restriction should not auto-
matically be entitled to recover the entire difference between the value of his property
in its "highest and best use" and its value subject to all existing suburban restrictions.
Such an entitlement would give a landowner compensation for the effects of all restric-
tions when in all probability only some of them are excessive when measured by the
taking doctrines proposed in Part IV. Cf. Costonis, supra note 168, at 1049-55 (arguing
that landowner is entitled to compensation only to extent denied reasonable beneficial
use); Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor
Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 816-23 (1976) (arguing that reasonable beneficial use
simply means adequate return on investment).
360. Measuring landowner damages is considerably more complicated when the market
value of land has been enhanced by suburban efforts to curtail housing supply. In such
situations landowners should be denied the right to recover for any lost opportunities
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$200,000 in the tract's value should be used to help compute both
Tacky's damages from delay and its conditional award of future
damages.
The calculation of damages caused by delay requires three determi-
nations: (1) the appropriate rate of interest; (2) the length of the
delay; and (3) the principal amount on which interest is to be awarded.
The court would use the rate of interest conventionally applied in
damage actions. The period of delay should commence, at the earliest,
on the date the landowner formally protested the restriction at issue
by seeking local governmental approval for a more intensive land use.
In our example this would be the day on which Tacky had applied
for rezoning to a multifamily classification. However, if the trier of
fact concluded that Tacky's land was not ripe for a quarter-acre lot sub-
division at that time, it should measure the delay period from the
date on which Tacky could have proceeded profitably with the
development of quarter-acre lots. (Because much suburban land is not
ready for profitable development, many landowners currently restricted
by large-lot requirements are in fact not suffering any delay damages.)
The date of judgment should terminate the delay period.
In calculating a landowner's delay damages, interest should be
awarded on the diminution in land value caused by the excessive re-
striction. In our example, this is $200,000, a smaller amount than the
full value of the asset if freed from the restriction ($500,000). A policy
of awarding interest on just the diminution in value encourages devel-
opers to mitigate damages-i.e., to comply with an excessive restriction
when that is more efficient than leaving the land undeveloped for the
period of litigation. 30' Suppose Tacky could prove that the develop-
to share in benefits flowing from the suburb's output restrictions. This rule not only
appeals to one's sense of distributive justice, but also forecloses the possibility that a
suburb would pay twice for a single injury. If consumers are entitled to recover all their
damages from higher housing prices, as will be suggested, see pp. 498-500 infra, a rule
requiring suburbs to compensate landowners for lost monopoly profits would make a
local government pay the actual costs of monopoly two times over. For example, in
Figure 3, supra p. 431, consumers priced out of the market by suburban policies that
raised housing prices to Pu should collect damages equal to the triangle GER. If land-
owners were entitled to compensation for the monopoly profits they would have obtained
by selling housing at P., landowners on the supply curve between K and E would collect
a trapezoid of compensation that would include GER. This double liability might deter
suburbs from enacting efficient antigrowth programs. A court should therefore instruct
expert witnesses to ignore the effects of government-induced shortages in their appraisals
of the value of the land with and without the contested restriction. In Figure 3, this would
mean that housing should be assumed to be selling for P,, not P,. If a tract is not
particularly suited for apartments, the entire increment in market value that would
result from its rezoning from single-family to multifamily use might well be entirely
attributable to prevailing restrictions on the supply of sites for apartments. This might,
for example, hae been true in Girsh. See also notes 138 & 170 supra.
361. To provide developers with adequate incentives for mitigation, courts must
entitle developers who have complied with an excessive restriction to receive compensa-
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ment of its tract into quarter-acre lots had been delayed one year. If
the applicable rate of interest were 10%, Tacky should be awarded
interim damages of 10% times S200,000, i.e., $20,000. If Tacky had
been delayed for five years it would recover the present value of an
annuity of $20,000 per year payable over the last five years.
In addition to any interim damage award, Tacky should receive a
conditional award of its permanent damages from the half-acre lot
requirement. The conditional award in this instance would be
$200,000-the diminution in value from *500,000 to $300,000 caused
by the excessive requirement. The trial court would order Eden of-
ficials to decide within a certain period (say, 60 days) whether to pay
that sum or to roll back the lot-area requirement to a quarter-acre. If
Eden chose the roll-back, Tacky could still collect its interim damages
(if any) for prior delay. If Eden chose to pay to keep the half-acre
requirement, the court should decree that Eden had acquired Tacky's
future rights to develop its land at a density greater than half-acre
lots. 302
2. The Rights of Housing Consumers
Eden's policy of limiting new housing to single-family residences on
large lots also might violate the rights of consumers. Their remedy
would also be damages.3 63
a. The Consumers' Prima Facie Case
If housing prices in Eden are at monopoly levels, the aggrieved con-
sumers would consist of (1) tenants who have been living in Eden, (2)
households that have moved to Eden since it began its exclusionary
policy, (3) households that have moved out or stayed away because of
the monopoly housing prices, and (4) households residing in nearby
suburbs that have felt the ripple effects of the price increase.3 4 The
tion nonetheless. In doctrinal terms, this means that developers who comply should not
necessarily be held to have waived their taking claims. For example, one of Tacky's op-
tions should be to subdivide its tract into half-acre lots and to sue Eden for whatever
damages it suffered because it was not permitted quarter-acre lots. However, to prevent
unnecessary litigation and to give suburban officials an opportunity to repeal contested
restrictions, no developer who complies should be entitled to damages unless he had
formally sought to have the zoning restriction changed before he complied with it.
362. Cf. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (because of drastic nature of city's
restrictions, city will be granted fee simple absolute and landowner will be compensated
accordingly). A suburb might be granted a third option: acquiring the landowner's
development rights for a limited period of time only.
363. See pp. 436-38, 444-47 supra.
364. See pp. 402-03 supra.
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claims of all these parties should be consolidated into a private class
action for damages30 -the usual format for private antitrust litiga-
tion.3 0 1 The consumers' complaint should invoke the taking clause of
the state constitution.0 7
To make out a prima facie case, attorneys for the consumer class
would have to introduce credible evidence that Eden's land-use policies
have increased housing prices in its area to the substantial injury of
the plaintiff class. 308 An econometrician would be the expert best-
equipped to detect prices influenced by monopolistic restrictions. He
is apt to fail in Eden's case. If several other suburbs that compete
closely with Eden are not pursuing exclusionary policies, it is highly
unlikely that a municipality as small as Eden could itself cartelize
housing supply. When a suburb has many close substitutes, the bur-
dens of its antigrowth policies generally fall on landowners, not con-
sumers.
3 9
b. The Municipality's Defenses
Even if the consumers' attorneys could prove that monopoly prices
were in effect, Eden might be able to show that its growth controls
met Michelman's fairness test.370 To do so, it would first have to prove
that its policies were efficient-as they might be if they prevented
serious net congestion costs.371 It would also have to demonstrate that
consumers should be able to recognize that not awarding damages is in
their long-term interest. This might be the case if the administrative
costs of computing an aggregate damage award were very high.
365. See generally Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1319
(1976). For a review of the more exotic forms of class litigation, see Dam, Class Actions:
Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 61-66
(1975).
The feasibility of class actions may be at least temporarily limited by onerous notice
requirements. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Home Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485, 488 (1974).
366. Some recent antitrust controversies in which the plaintiff class succeeded in
obtaining damages are City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); and
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
548 (1972). The potential complexities of this sort of litigation are demonstrated in
Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions, I Am. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 251 (1976). For a critical
appraisal, see Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of
Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976).
367. See pp. 470-73 supra.
368. If the actions of several suburbs have combined to produce monopoly prices, all
of them should be joined as defendants. See p. 438 supra.
369. See pp. 425-27 supra.
370. See pp. 446-47 supra.
371. See pp. 444-46 supra.
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c. The Consumers' Remedy
If Eden loses, a lump-sum damage award should be calculated for
the entire consumer class. The amount of this award must inevitably
be a gross approximation. Crude estimates of damages are hardly un-
precedented; courts handling antitrust damage actions have long held
that the impossibility of precisely measuring damages should not
shelter offenders from liabilityY72
Like individual landowners, consumers should be unconditionally
awarded their interim damages and conditionally awarded their
permanent damages.3 7 3 The former sum would be an estimate of the
amount necessary to compensate housing consumers for injuries arising
from the suburb's past restrictions on housing output."174 The munic-
ipality could avoid liability for permanent damages by repealing its
monopolistic policies prior to a deadline set by the trial court.
The administrative costs of calculating and distributing shares of
the aggregate damage award to individual housing consumers would
usually be unacceptably high. Most victims of Eden's monopoly hous-
ing prices should be able to perceive that their self-interest in ef-
ficiently deterring other suburbs from pursuing anticonsumer policies
makes it fair for them to be denied small individual recoveries. Any
aggregate award to consumers should thus first be used to defray at-
torneys fees and to compensate households that can prove substantial
injury; the balance should escheat to the state37
C. Applications to Other Current Problems
The courts that have recently adjudicated challenges to growth
controls have followed a quite different course.
1. Construction Quotas
In the celebrated case of Construction Industry Association v. City
of Petaluma,37 6 the federal district judge held that Petaluma's plan to
372. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-66 (1931). For a
review of methods for calculating and distributing damages in class actions, see Develop-
ments, supra note 365, at 1516-36.
373. See pp. 492-93 supra.
374. Suppose a suburb imposes elite design standards on new housing and the average
price of actual new housing units immediately doubles. The damages suffered by con-
sumers who pay the higher price are less than the price increase. They receie counter-
vailing benefits to the extent that they value dwellings that meet the elite standards more
than dwellings that do not. See also pp. 395-97 supra.
375. Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (proposal of "fluid
recovery" procedure).
376. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976); see note 6 supra.
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limit developers' building permits to 500 housing units per year
violated the excluded housing consumers' federal constitutional right
to freedom of travel. He decreed the quota program and its related
measures to be void.
This is a classic illustration of a court succumbing to the Nectow
fallacy that those aggrieved by land-use measures should be entitled
to some form of prospective injunctive relief.3 77 That remedy ignores
damages suffered in the past, a particularly serious shortcoming in a
case like Petaluma. Because Justice Douglas stayed the judgment of
the district court,3 78 the city reaped the full benefits of the quota
while the judgment underwent appellate review. In addition, prospec-
tive injunctions inevitably place excessive restrictions on a suburb's
future options. In Petaluma the district judge appointed a master to
oversee all future land-use policies of the city. This sort of interference
is procedurally expensive and substantively unsound. Certainly the
city of Petaluma should be permitted to limit its population growth
if it is willing to compensate the landowners and housing consumers
injured by that policy.
The district court decision in Petaluma was an instance of the wrong
court invoking the wrong doctrine to provide the wrong remedy. It is
highly improbable that the Petaluma Plan alone has any significant
impact on interstate migration. 379 The dispute therefore should have
been decided under the taking clause of the state constitution. Since
the plaintiff builders' association relied entirely on the Federal Con-
stitution, the Ninth Circuit was justified in reversing the district court
and denying all relief.380 In fact, under my view of the law in this
field, there was no substantial federal question, and the city should
have been entitled to have the matter dismissed by the district court
for want of jurisdiction. 381
The course of the Petaluma litigation would have been quite dif-
ferent under the recommended system. Because construction quotas
prohibit normal land uses, a landowner who sought damages in a state
court proceeding would only have to show that the program sub-
stantially diminished his land value. To recover damages for past
delays, he would have to prove that he actually would have built
earlier had there been no quota. A class action for compensation for
past consumer injuries would likely have succeeded; the Petaluma
377. See pp. 490-93 supra.
378. 522 F.2d at 902.
379. The district court found that interstate migration would be inhibited if quotas
began to proliferate among San Francisco suburbs. 375 F. Supp. at 580-81.
380. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
381. But see id. at 903.
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Plan appears to be a textbook example of a homeowner cartel aspiring
to monopolize housing supply in the face of nonelastic demand.382 The
city could avoid liability for prospective damages by repealing its
program. Indeed, it could retain the Plan without any liability at all
if it could prove that the quota system were efficient and also fair to
both consumers and landowners. Not much chance of that.
2. Development Moratoria
When a developer challenges a moratorium on building permits (or
on rezonings, subdivision map approvals, utility hook-ups, etc.), 383 most
courts succumb to the Nectow fallacy that the dispute must be
governed by a property rule. They choose between either mandating
that the developer be given the go-ahead he seeks or denying him
relief altogether.3 8 This approach creates the usual twin problems. If
a landowner's remedy against a moratorium is prospective only, the
municipality wins by force. Development is delayed without compensa-
tion for the period of litigation. On the other hand, compelling a
municipality to provide services to prospective developers is need-
lessly intrusive into its affairs. 3s5
Municipalities have defeated most of the reported landowner chal-
lenges to general development moratoria. They have won both when
their announced objective for the slowdown has been to provide a
breathing period to prepare master plans386 and when the rationale
has been the current overloading of public facilities. 3s 7 One recent
382. See pp. 432-33 supra.
383. For sources documenting the remarkable popularity of the moratorium device,
see note 5 supra.
384. For examples of cases granting mandatory relief, see notes 389 & 390 infra. For
those denying all relief, see notes 386 & 387 infra. Not all courts have succumbed to the
Nectow fallacy. See Charles v. Diamond, 47 App. Div. 2d 426, 366 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1975),
appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.2d 852, 345 N.E.2d 600, 382 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976) (ordering trial
on damage claim); Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 43 App. Div. 2d 727, 728, 350
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (1973), rev'd, 35 N.Y.2d 507, 323 N.E.2d 697, 364 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1974)
(dictum).
385. See p. 457 & notes 78 & 211.
386. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497
(1974); Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Ocean Township, 9 N.J. 64, 87 A.2d 9 (1952); Wal-
worth Co. v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257 (1965). But see, e.g., Board
of Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 453 (1975) (planning moratorium not
authorized by statute). See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1970).
387. The California courts have been particularly tolerant of this rationale. See, e.g.,
Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974),
appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976) (upholding moratorium on rezonings based oi
overcrowding in schools); Swahson v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d Adv. Sh.
512, 128 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1976) (upholding moratorium on water hook-ups attributed to
water shortage); Morshead v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., 45 Cal.
App. 3d 442, 119 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975) (upholding sewer-connection moratorium to
remain in effect until water-quality requirements are met). But cf. Associated Home-
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decision, Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com-
mission,388 denied a taking claim against a sewer hook-up moratorium
(designed to combat water pollution) that had been in effect for five
years.
A landowner has been most likely to prevail in cases in which a
municipality has made an ad hoc decision to withhold development
approval from him because of overloaded facilities. Most courts per-
ceive the potential arbitrariness of these unsystematic decisions and
are willing to mandate that an approval be given. 38 9 A few judges also
understandably have refused to permit a municipality to use the
municipality's past failures to anticipate demand for public facilities
as a justification for blanket denials of development permits. 300 But -
most courts seem to be unaware that temporary classrooms, portable
sewage treatment plants, 39 1 and other expedients can quickly over-
come alleged inadequacies of capital plant. 39 -
builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d Adv. Sh. 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1976) (trial court should sustain moratorium on building permits only if restriction is
reasonably related to regional welfare).
388. 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975).
389. See, e.g., Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954)
(town lacked authority to deny subdivision map approval because of impact on schools);
Baltimore Planning Comm'n v. Victor Dev. Co., 261 Md. 387, 275 A.2d 478 (1971)
(same holding); Daley Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd., 340 Mass. 149, 163 N.E.2d 27 (1959)
(water shortage did not justify ad hoc disapproval of subdivision map); cf. Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (unfounded
allegation of lack of adequate sewers does not justify refusal of building permits where
racial discrimination was actual motive). But see, e.g., Pearson Kent Corp. v. Bear, 28
N.Y.2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 218, 322 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1971) (sustaining ad hoc rejection of sub-
division map on ground subdivision would aggravate traffic problems).
Many moratoria nominally of general application are similarly arbitrary because they
are permeated with variances. For example, thousands of exceptions have been granted
to the sewer connection moratorium upheld in Smoke Rise. See Wash. Post, June 26,
1975, § D, at 1, col. 6. Cf. Campana v. Township of Clark, 82 N.J. Super. 392, 197 A.2d
711 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964) (upholding 31-month moratorium to develop new plan
despite several variances issued by township).
390. See Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 43 App. Div. 2d 727, 350 N.Y.S.2d 698
(1973), rev'd, 35 N.Y.2d 507, 323 N.E.2d 697, 364 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1974) (landowner should
not suffer from city's failure to provide sewers); cf. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n v. Rosenberg, 269 Md. 520, 307 A.2d 704 (1973) (denial of subdivision
approval under general plan to present overcrowding of schools was arbitrary on facts of
case); Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of S. Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d
700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969) (prohibition on new apartments to prevent overloading of
sewage treatment plant held invalid; dictum hints short moratorium might be approved).
The shortages in facilities that plague a municipality are sometimes the responsibility
of school or sanitary districts or other independent units of government. In these cases a
municipality that purchases a moratorium might have an action for partial indemnifica-
tion against any district that negligently allowed the shortage to develop.
391. See House & Hoxir, June 1973, at 102.
392. If voters have defeated bond issues, a local government often can evade ref-
erendum requirements by arranging for lease financing of capital improvements. See,
e.g., Dean v. Ktichel, 35 Cal. 2d 444, 218 P.2d 521 (1950); City of La Habra v. Pellerin,
216 Cal. App. 2d 99, 30 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1963).
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In general, the courts have been much too tolerant of moratorium
measures. Because moratoria usually prevent landowners from pursu-
ing normal land-use activities, they are always suspect from the stand-
point of horizontal equity. In addition, many moratoria appear to be
inefficient. If the costs of a slowdown were shifted by the courts from
landowners and housing consumers with little political power to a
suburb's taxpayers generally, probably few suburban officials would
choose, for example, to buy time to prepare master plans.30 3 If suburbs
can delay growth without liability, they may use devices like the
Ramapo staged-growth program to help boost housing values to mo-
nopoly levels.39 4 A moratorium lasting but a few months and aimed at
dealing with a true emergency might be defensible under the Michel-
man fairness test; an 18-year delay (the maximum possible under the
Ramapo Plan) clearly is not.3 93 The recommended legal approach
would entitle a town like Ramapo to determine its rate of growth but
also would sensitize it to the full social costs of its policies.390
3. Use Restrictions and Design Requirements
The lion's share of litigation over suburban growth controls has
been directed at municipal ordinances that prohibit the construction
of mobile homes, apartments, or modest subdivisions. 3 7 In this soil
the Nectow fallacy has long been in full flower. For example, when a
393. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is authorized to award federal
grants to defray two-thirds of the cost of state and local attempts at comprehensive
planning. 40 U.S.C. § 461(a), (e) (Supp. V 1975). One wonders how much municipal
master planning would go on in the absence of this support.
394. See pp. 433-34 supra; Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
395. Consider someone who is entitled to a perpetual annuity consisting of equal
yearly payments. If the first annuity payment is pushed back from one year in the
future to 18 years in the future, the present value of the annuity is diminished by 61%
at a 6% discount rate and by 83% at a 10% discount rate. This is no temporary in-
convenience. Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals expressly rejected a landowner
challenge to the Ramapo ordinance based on the taking clause of the state constitution.
30 N.Y.2d at 380-83, 285 N.E.2d at 303-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154-56.
396. The Ramapo Plan appears principally designed to induce developers to dedicate
parks, school sites, firehouses, and similar facilities that most suburbs finance with
general revenues. These exaction policies are probably illegal under the equal-net-benefits
test. See pp. 459-65, 477-89 supra. To calculate the damage a landowner suffered from
the Ramapo Plan, one should thus ignore any influence these illegal policies have had
on land values in his neighborhood.
397. These restrictions may arise not only from zoning provisions, but also from other
municipal codes. For example, there is considerable evidence that many municipal
design requirements for buildings and subdivisions are not cost-justified. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMs, BUILDING TnE AMERICAN CITY 257-63 (1969);
J. NEWVILLE, NEW ENGINEERING CONCEI-IS IN COMMUNITY DEVELOIPMENT (Urban Land Inst.
Tech. Bull. No. 59, 1976); L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, supra note 38, at 38-40; Yearwood,
Accepted Controls of Land Subdivision, 45 J. URB. L. 217, 246-50 (1967).
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landowner challenges a suburb's insistence on large lot sizes, most
courts refuse to grant damages and either validate the requirement3 98
or render some form of prospective mandatory relief. Most judicial
decrees in favor of the landowner hold that the municipal ordinance
is "void" 399 (whatever that means), approve the development plans
proposed by the landowner, 40 0 or impose judge-made restrictions on
the use of the site.40 1
The courts in several states in which exclusionary zoning has been
particularly widespread have further aggravated the remedial con-
fusion by decreeing that municipalities must provide (unspecified)
locations for a certain variety of land uses. The leading case is Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.402 There
398. For relatively recent cases sustaining minimum lot-size requirements, see, e.g.,
Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976) (one-acre minimum); Steel Hill
Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) (principally three-acre and
six-acre minimums); Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919
(1974) (18-acre requirement); Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217,
504 P.2d 344 (1972) (21h acres in village center); Barnard v. Zoning Bd., 313 A.2d 741 (Me.
1974) (30,000 sq. ft.); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254
Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969) (two acres); Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 326 N.E.2d 922
(Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (two acres); Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275
N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971) (60,000 sq. ft.). Most of these decisions explicitly
rejected taking claims asserted by the landowner.
399. See, e.g., Bismark v. Incorporated Village of Bayville, 49 Misc. 2d 604, 267 N.Y.S.2d
1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (40,000 sq. ft. minimum invalid); Board of County Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (two-acre minimum invalid).
400. See, e.g., Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567
(1971) (zoning ordinance requires town to grant permits for lots smaller than two acres);
Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975)
(landowner must be permitted to build apartments he had planned for single-family zone).
401. See, e.g., AMG Assocs. v. Township of Springfield, 65 N.J. 101, 319 A.2d 705
(1974); Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor of Washington, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1974); cf., e.g., Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975)
(courts should review developers' proposed plans and specifications element by element).
402. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
See generally Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zon-
ing Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1. Mount Laurel is criticized in Payne, Delegation Doctrine
in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGmES
L. REV. 803, 804-19 (1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court elaborated on Mount Laurel
in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 45 U.S.L.W. 2379 (N.J. Jan. 26,
1977).
The courts of New York and Pennsylvania also require a suburb's land-use policies,
taken as a whole, to meet certain general standards. See Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110-11, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681-82 (1975) (con-
stitutionality depends, inter alia, on whether consideration is given to regional needs and
requirements); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 529-33, 215 A.2d 597, 611-13 (1965) (township cannot stand in way of natural
population growth); cf. Associated Homebuilders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d Adv.
Sh. 582, 557 P.2d 473, 497, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 65 (1976) (Mosk, J., dissenting: growing
suburb must absorb "reasonable share of region's population pressure"). For another
critique of these judicial strictures on general municipal growth policies, see Note, The
Inadequacy of Judicial Responses in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REV. 760
(1976).
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the Supreme Court of New Jersey created a presumption that a local
government must make realistically possible the construction of hous-
ing for all elements in its regional population. One can find much to
admire in the Mount Laurel decision. The court properly perceived
that state judiciaries must play a role in curbing local parochialism
and had the wisdom to rest its decision on the right document-the
state constitution. But it clearly bungled the remedy. A suburb should
not be prohibited from imposing elite standards for housing construc-
tion if it is willing to compensate those injured by the standards.
There is little to recommend policies designed to ensure that each
neighborhood has a mixture of all housing types (and hence all income
groups).40 3 The famous Tiebout Hypothesis404 suggests that differen-
tiation among suburbs enhances consumer satisfaction by making
available a wider variety of packages of public goods. The Mount
Laurel decision needlessly reduces the richness of residential choices
available to New Jersey households.
Nor can one be sure that landowners and housing consumers actually
won much in Mount Laurel. First, because the court did not create
sanctions against suburbs that have committed sins in the past, New
Jersey municipalities can be expected to invoke every procedural trick
to delay enforcement of the decision. Second, and more important,
Mount Laurel requires only that a municipality's overall package of
zoning practices comply with the court's standards. Legal requirements
of this sort are inherently ill-suited for enforcement by private civil
litigation. A suburb burdened by such a requirement is not compelled
to satisfy the grievance of any particular landowner or consumer; it
merely must satisfy some landowners and some consumers. As the
aftermath of the Girsh case illustrates, 0 any suburb that loses a legal
attack on the overall contours of its land-use policies will certainly not
reward the winning landowner or consumer with smooth sailing for
the project in which he happens to be interested. Because the suburb
can accommodate regional population pressures by relaxing controls on
other sites, it will do just that to deter other troublemakers from
initiating litigation. Once the "public interest" groups have won their
symbolic victories and have retired from the scene, what payoffs will
there be to induce private civil suits?
Experience indicates that this problem will lure the courts ever
403. But see, e.g., A. DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS 1-102 (1973) (arguing desirability
of mix of households of different income levels).
404. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL EcoN. 416, 418
(1956).
405. See pp. 490-91 supra.
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deeper into the mire of injunctive remedies. In order to reward vic-
torious landowners, judges in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania are
now framing packages of prospective regulations for specific sites.40 6
One fears that the New Jersey courts may soon be hiring planning
consultants to draft entirely new zoning ordinances for suburbs that
refuse to comply with Mount Laurel and appointing masters to over-
see their implementation. 407
D. The Precedents for Awarding Damages
The courts need not enter this swamp. The recommended remedy
of damages would not only cause fewer allocative disruptions, but
might even be cheaper to administer. The township of Mount Laurel
would not necessarily be liable to a host of plaintiffs. It is not at all
clear that Mount Laurel (or even Mount Laurel and its neighboring
suburbs) has injured housing consumers in southern New Jersey.408
In addition, no landowner in Mount Laurel should recover his
damages for delays unless he can prove that his development activity
was actually hampered.40 9
There are no judicial precedents for allowing consumers to recover
damages from suburbs that have monopolized housing supply. But
using the taking clause or some other state constitutional provision as
the basis for such a remedy should not be beyond the capacity of a
body as inventive as the Supreme Court of New Jersey.410
Drafting an opinion to justify a landowner recovery would be some-
what easier.41 1 Several courts have recently pierced through the Nectow
406. See notes 344 & 401 supra.
407. One lower court in New Jersey has already ordered 11 municipalities to permit
construction of their regional share of low-income and moderate-income housing. Urban
League v. Mayor of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. I1, 359 A.2d 526 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
If their compliance is grudging, a yet more drastic remedy will be necessary.
Mount Laurel requires a reviewing court to give a suburb in breach of its regional
obligations a chance to correct its policies. If the suburb does not, the opinion implies
that additional (but unspecified) sanctions are appropriate. See 67 N.J. at 191-92, 336
A.2d at 734. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, should be given credit for reject-
ing the even more intrusive remedy ordered by the trial judge in Mount Laurel. He had
ordered the township to adopt an affirmative plan to provide for low-income and mod-
erate-income housing. See 119 N.J. Super. at 178-80, 290 A.2d at 473-74.
408. As it happens, the Philadelphia area is noted for relatively low housing prices.
409. Most of the undeveloped land in the township had been zoned either for in-
dustrial use or for lots with a minimum of 20,000 square feet. Because landowners in
both types of zones were denied the right to build residential buildings of a quality
normal for Mount Laurel, they would have the benefit of the less onerous prima facie
case for a taking.
410. See generally pp. 470-71 supra.
411. Several other commentators have argued for the more frequent use of damages as
the landowner's remedy against improper land use restrictions. See Badler, Municipal
Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URB. LAw. 25 (1973); Berger, A
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 385, 1977
fallacy to recognize that the issue of whether a suburb can control its
growth is distinct from the issue of whether it should have to pay to
do so. In Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto,4 12 a land-
owner prevented from developing by a variety of municipal measures
was held to be entitled to recover damages for a taking of property."13
Arastra announced that the landowner's remedy should be permanent
damages, unconditionally awarded. This was an error. The court in-
stead should have granted Palo Alto the option of dropping its efforts
to compel above-normal residential uses and should have explicitly
stated that the landowner was to be compensated for his past delays.
There is at least scattered precedent for these more accurate remedies.
Several decisions have expressly entitled landowners to proceed with
claims to recover for illegal delays in municipal development ap-
provals, 41" and another has recognized that the correct prospective
Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165, 210-11 (1974); Note,
Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in Property Value as Compensible
Damage, 28 STAN. L. REv. 779 (1976). For a vehement expression to the contrary, see Note,
Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordi-
nance, supra note 252.
412. 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The
Arastra decision was vacated pursuant to stipulation. The decision vacated had held that
the plaintiff landowner should prevail on its taking claim, but the parties settled prior
to trial of the damages phase of the case. Palo Alto agreed to take title to the land in
fee simple absolute and the landowner agreed to receipt of a large sum in cash. Because
several other suits brought by similarly aggrieved landowners were pending against Palo
Alto, city officials were concerned that Arastra might determine the liability issue in
those other cases by collateral estoppel. As part of the settlement, the city therefore
insisted upon and obtained the landowner's agreement to ask the district court to vacate
its prior decision. Telephone Interview with John Petrasich, attorney for Arastra Limited
Partnership (Mar. 3, 1977).
413. See also Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(denying motion to dismiss landowner's taking claim against ordinance that requires 100
acres per dwelling unit); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1976) (landowners' taking claims against ordinance placing their land in open-
space category state cause of action).
The doctrinal confusion has been so complete that several of the most eminent state
court judges have sustained landowners' taking claims in zoning cases and then, as a
remedy, granted prospective invalidation of the ordinance rather than damages. See, e.g.,
AMG Assocs. v. Township of Springfield, 65 N.J. 101, 319 A.2d 705 (1974) (court finds
zoning provision constitutes taking and then itself tailors less onerous use restriction for
property in question) (Hall, J.); Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack,
23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969) (taking claim one of several
grounds relied on to invalidate prohibition on construction of apartments) (Breitel, J.).
This mistake is hardly novel. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
(defendant need not comply with regulation that would constitute taking of his property)
(Holmes, J.).
414. See Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir.), rev'd en bane, 527 F.2d 736
(2d Cir. 1975); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J.
1976); Town of Exeter v. Britton, 115 N.H. 209, 337 A.2d 356 (1975); Lomarch Corp. v.
Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 113, 237 A.2d 881, 884 (1968) (statute tying up land for
one year should be construed as requiring compensation because legislature knew that
failure to compensate would be unconstitutional); Charles v. Diamond, 47 App. Div. 2d
426, 366 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1975), motion for leave to appeal granted, 38 N.Y.2d 852, 345
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remedy is to let the suburb choose between paying damages and re-
pealing the excessive restriction. 415
Only one judicial opinion has acknowledged that the proper re-
medial combination is interim damages for past delays plus a condi-
tional award of permanent damages. That was Justice Clark's dissent
in the recent case of HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court.41 6 The Supreme
Court of California unfortunately used that same case to perpetuate
the Nectow fallacy. Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, argued
that a landowner's basic remedy against excessive zoning restrictions
should be some form of injunctive relief. He characterized an 81%
decline in land value as a "mere reduction" 41 7 and implied that the
only hard question would arise "in the event a zoning regulation
forbade substantially all use of the land in question." 418 HFH was a
landowner challenge to a prohibition on commercial uses, and its
holding should be limited to those facts.419 Otherwise the broad
language of the opinion will be a springboard to both monopoly hous-
ing prices and serious inequities among landowners in California. The
New Jersey Supreme Court's flawed performance in Mount Laurel
was sparkling by comparison.
XI. Summary
This article has developed a comprehensive set of constitutional
doctrines for resolving civil actions against suburbs that restrict the
amount and composition of new housing development. Economic
theory indicates that the burdens of suburban antigrowth programs
usually fall primarily on landowners, not housing consumers. When
N.E.2d 600, 382 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976) (sewer moratorium); Belie Harbor Realty Corp. v.
Kerr, 43 App. Div. 2d 727, 728, 350 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (1973), rev'd, 35 N.Y.2d 507, 323
N.E.2d 697, 364 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976) (dictum).
Most courts, however, have declined to compensate landowners even for delays arising
from admittedly invalid zoning provisions. See, e.g., Kramer v. City of Jefferson, 124
S.W.2d 525 (Mo. App. 1939) (error was "governmental act"); Veling v. Borough of
Ramsey, 94 N.J. Super. 459, 228 A.2d 873 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (must avoid "op-
pressive financial burdens" on municipalities); Superior Uptown, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
39 Ohio St. 2d 36, 313 N.E.2d 820 (1974) (municipal tort immunity invoked); see also
HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 518-20, 542 P.2d 237, 244-45, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365, 372-73 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
415. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436, 444, (Ct. App. 1974), vacated,
15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
416. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 523, 542 P.2d 237, 248, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 378 (1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 904 (1976).
417. Id. at 513, 542 P.2d at 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
418. Id. at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244 n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16 (emphasis in
original).
419. Because the landowner's grievance in HFH was against an antinuisance measure,
he should have prevailed only upon proof that the city's prohibition of commercial uses
on his tract was grossly inefficient. See p. 419 supra.
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consumers are injured, those worst affected (in dollar terms) are not
the households that have been excluded (as has usually been thought)
but those that actually buy housing at prices inflated by the anti-
growth measures. The chief beneficiaries of a suburb's development
charges and development restrictions are the individuals who own its
existing houses and apartments.
Homeowners can be expected to dominate the politics of small
suburbs. Their most profitable strategy is to capture the producers'
surplus of owners of vacant land by means of subdivision exactions and
other development charges and, when there are no close substitutes
for the suburb, to gain monopoly profits by limiting the output of
new housing. Homeowner cartelization programs create inequities
among landowners and consumers and lead to the usual efficiency
losses that arise from monopoly. Homeowner cartels are apt to cause
less allocative mischief in metropolitan areas where zoning authority
is highly Balkanized than in areas-like Washington, D.C.-where
these cartels occasionally can dominate most of the few governments
that have land-planning authority. State-wide land-use programs, if
captured by exclusionary forces, could create fearsome inefficiencies in
real estate markets.
Judicial intervention is justified to prevent municipal antigrowth
measures from creating serious inequities and misallocations of re-
sources. It is especially appropriate in the usual situation in which the
state legislature has not specifically authorized municipalities to pursue
parochial policies. Policing municipal abuses is generally the exclusive
task of state courts employing state constitutional doctrine. When local
or state antigrowth programs create significant interstate spillovers,
however, federal constitutional constraints should be applied.
Land-development law has long been plagued by the Nectow fallacy
that the appropriate remedy against overly restrictive zoning is prospec-
tive invalidation of the ordinance. That approach does not adequately
remedy past municipal abuses and may prevent suburbs from carry-
ing out efficient antigrowth programs. The superior judicial approach
is to grant a suburban government discretion to enact almost any
measure but to restrain its enthusiasm by the threat of potential
liability for damages. State courts therefore should use the taking
clauses in their state constitutions to entitle landowners and housing
consumers who meet specified requirements to recover for damages
suffered from antigrowth programs. The specific rules proposed in this
article are tailored to minimize the administrative costs of the damages
remedy. To give two examples: (1) consumer awards should usually
be made only to class representatives and not be actually distributed
510
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to individuals; (2) a suburb should always be relieved of liability if it
can meet the burden of proving that its policies are efficient and fair.
The amount of damages to be awarded a landowner on account of
an antigrowth restriction is partly a function of the legal rules that
limit development charges. To ensure equality of treatment among
landowners and households and to prevent revenue measures from
being used to cartelize housing supply, suburbs should not be per-
mitted to focus taxes on housing construction either to control con-
gestion or to raise general revenue. Development charges should be
tolerated, indeed encouraged, however, to the extent necessary to
prevent developers from obtaining above-average net benefits from
municipal programs. The recommended doctrines for identifying
fiscal inequities among landowners would be superior to the disparate
approaches the courts have adopted in cases like Pioneer Trust and
Walnut Creek.
The few judicial opinions worthy of unreserved praise are those-
like the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.420 and that of the Ninth
Circuit in the Petaluma case-in which federal courts have declined
to federalize essentially intrastate controversies. In general, the state
courts have succumbed to the Nectow fallacy that the exclusive remedy
in growth-control controversies must be injunctive relief. Having
made that mistake, they are left with two undesirable alternatives.
The Supreme Court of California, for example, gerferally has de-
ferred to municipal development controls, apparently in the Polly-
annaish view that giving suburbs a free hand at planning will lead to a
better urban future. The analysis here suggests that it leads instead to
housing monopolies and inequities among landowners and con-
sumers.4 21 Activist courts like the Supreme Court of New Jersey at
least have recognized these dangers. But they have responded with
remedies that will immerse judges in complicated attempts to reshape
municipal planning restrictions. One hopes that both camps will soon
realize that the damages remedy is the fairest, the most accurate, and,
after the smoke clears, the simplest.
420. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
421. Local governments in California have begun to exploit the permissive attitude
of their state supreme court. Santa Cruz County has decided to permit no more than
one dwelling unit per 100 acres-perhaps a record-breaking density limitation. See San-
filippo v. County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1976). One recent
decision of the California Supreme Court hints that its members may be about to shed
the cloak of complete passivity. Associated Homebuilders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d Adv. Sh. 582, 557 P.2d 473, 487-90, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 55-58 (1976) (local growth con-
trols must bear reasonable relationship to regional welfare).
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Confidentiality of Pretrial Services Information
under the Speedy Trial Act*
In 1974 Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act to "assist in reducing
crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by
strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial."'
Title 112 of the Act establishes experimental pretrial services agencies
(PSAs) in 10 federal districts. Five of these agencies are governed by
the Division of Probation of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, and five are controlled by boards of trustees.3 The
purpose of Title II is to test whether PSAs can reduce pretrial deten-
* Much of the information in this Note is the product of personal interviews. Special
thanks are given to Judd Kutcher, Elsie Reid, and Guy Willetts of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts; Dan Ryan, Chief Pretrial Services Officer in the
Eastern District of New York; and Bruce Beaudin, Director of the District of Columbia
Bail Agency.
1. Pun. L. No. 93-619, preamble, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974). Congress believed that speedy
trials would reduce crime primarily by shortening the period during which defendants
released pretrial could commit crimes. Lengthy pretrial delays also result in loss of
evidence and disappearance of witnesses, forcing the Government to abandon otherwise
valid prosecutions. S. REP. No. 93-1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156 (Supp. V 1975).
3. Id. § 3153(a), (b). See H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1974), re-
printed in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 7420-21. The Division of Probation
operates PSAs in the Central District of California, the Northern District of Georgia, the
Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of New York, and the Northern
District of Texas. The remaining PSAs are administered by boards of trustees composed
of the chief judge of the federal district court, the United States attorney, the public
defender, a member of the local defense bar, the chief probation officer, and representa-
tives of community organizations appointed by the chief judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3153(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1975). Boards of trustees operate PSAs in the District of Maryland, the Eastern
District of Michigan, the Western District of Missouri, the Eastern District of New
York, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania [hereinafter referred to as trustee dis-
tricts]. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF TITLE I AND TITLE II OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at 26 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT]. The statute requires the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts to report to Congress, comparing the
accomplishments of those districts governed by the Division of Probation with those
governed by boards of trustees. 18 U.S.C. § 3155(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Technical assistance is provided to all 10 districts by the Pretrial Services Branch
of the Division of Probation of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra at 28.
